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Introduction: reasonable tolerance
Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione
Theory and practice are often at odds. Yet there is something particularly
strange in the way in which the received theory and the presumed practice
of toleration in contemporary societies seem to go their separate ways. 
Theoretical statements on toleration posit at the same time its necessity in
democratic societies, and its impossibility as a coherent ideal.1 In her intro-
duction to a comprehensive collection on tolerance and intolerance in
modern life, Susan Mendus aptly makes the point that the commitment 
that liberal societies have to toleration ‘may be more difficult and yet more
urgent than is usually recognised’.2 In contrast with the urgency insisted on
by the theory, the practice can appear complacent: liberal democratic soci-
eties seem to have accepted the need for the recognition and accommoda-
tion of difference without registering its depth. So much so that ‘practical’
people often just dismiss such toleration as an excess of permissiveness. 
The success of ‘zero tolerance’ as a slogan for a less forgiving society bears
witness to the diffusion of such a mood in public opinion.
This divergence between theory and practice is, however, more produc-
tive than it may at first appear. Arguably, much of the current literature on
tolerance as an interpersonal attitude, and on toleration as a set of institu-
tional arrangements for peaceful coexistence,3 has fully internalised it.
Indeed, the present state of the theoretical debate reflects the attempt to
come to terms with the transformations that the ideal, the virtue, and, to a
certain extent, the institutions of toleration have undergone, as we increas-
ingly operate in a multicultural environment. The present collection is part
of such an ongoing conversation, by which we try to make the theory of
toleration more relevant to its practice, and strive to inform the practice
with some of the principles and ideas of the theory.
In this introduction, we will briefly characterise the current debate, sketch
both its main lines of development and some of its unresolved questions, and
suggest, finally, how the chapters of this volume contribute to this debate.
As has already been mentioned, the renewed interest in issues of tolera-
tion come from the attempt to adapt its vocabulary to the challenges posed
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by the way in which ‘difference’ has become both more diffuse and more
pervasive in our daily lives, through processes of individualisation, multi-
culturalism, globalisation, and the multiplication of ‘immigrant societies’.4
As a rough and ready distinction, we suggest that, historically, the tolera-
tion debate has entered its third phase. It first originated as a reasoned
answer to the social and political conflicts that divided European societies
along religious lines. Although the ascendancy of arguments for religious
tolerance can be traced to considerations of prudence and political realism,5
from a more principled perspective, toleration was supported along two
main lines of reasoning. One was overtly sceptical and secularist, under-
mining the truth-content of religious beliefs and their relevance for 
social and political coexistence; the other was more subtly latitudinarian,
questioning the control that we have on our own beliefs, and the self-
defeating nature of imposing outward conformity on intractable inner
convictions.
The second phase of the toleration debate continued the process of
making religious beliefs, and religion at large, a private rather than a public
matter, by more firmly establishing the state as the neutral arbiter over its
citizens’ different ideas of the good life. The debate over liberal neutrality
(a debate with the opponents of liberalism, but also within liberalism itself)
superseded that about freedom of religion – of both worship and con-
science. The relationships between the individual and the state, or the 
individual and public opinion, became central to the new conception of
toleration, which rested on two important principles of what has been
referred to as the ‘modernist project’: the assimilation of the individual in
the democratic society, and the strict separation of public and private, with
all forms of secondary associations placed firmly within the latter domain.6
In spite of the many spirited defences of either liberal neutrality, or individ-
ual autonomy, or the crucial distinction between self- and other-regarding
actions, at the bottom of modern toleration seems to lie the prudential
maxim of indifference to others: ‘live and let live’; or perhaps the more
guarded version: ‘good fences make good neighbours’.
Slowly, but decidedly, the assimilationist drive that characterised the for-
mation of nation-states across the modern world has been reversed because
of pressures from both within and without. For better or for worse, the
barriers of the private sphere have been weakened, if not entirely disman-
tled, which opens up the operations of personal and private life to the
uncomfortable scrutiny of the public eye, and subjects them to the criteria
of justice. Moreover, pluralism has become, as Rawls claims, a ‘fact’ that
moral and political philosophy cannot bypass when thinking about the
terms of fair co-operation in society. These are the main features that char-
acterise the third phase of discussions on toleration.
Within this new social and philosophical context, tolerance is still widely
perceived, by philosophers as well as practically minded people, as a kind
of response to difference that we cannot do without. The Final Report of
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the Advisory Group on Citizenship established by the British Government
(the ‘Crick Report’), for instance, places a heavy emphasis on tolerance 
in its learning outcomes (which schools have a statutory responsibility to
deliver). The Report states that children ought to be disposed to the ‘prac-
tice of toleration’, and have the ‘ability to tolerate other view points’.7 But
even in the absence of policy-based requirements that toleration be culti-
vated in citizens, it is reasonable to expect that political philosophers should
reach some form of substantive agreement with respect to the nature, limits,
and correct forms of expression of a concept as fundamental and impor-
tant as toleration. Notwithstanding close scrutiny and the efforts of theo-
rists on this front, agreement has proved impossible to achieve. If anything,
toleration seems to have become a more contested ideal and a more elusive
virtue, while its very formulation as a concept remains paradoxical: how
can a person have reason to tolerate ideas, behaviour, and practices that,
by definition, she has reason to believe to be wrong?
Although these aspects of the current debate on toleration are not entirely
new, there is a feeling that, as a concept, toleration may have, so to speak,
outreached its usefulness and may need radical re-thinking. We have raised
this question in another context,8 where we have argued that some of the
more stringent analyses of toleration as a philosophical concept have some-
what distanced it from common usage, and have made the virtue of toler-
ance more demanding, while at the same time still questioning its internal
coherence. However, there, as here, we wish to suggest that in spite of these
difficulties, the recent debate has not been in vain. Indeed, it is our convic-
tion that there may be something to be gained by re-thinking the concept
of toleration in the light of ideas such as reasonableness and recognition
which, although distinct, both point to a more positive and appreciative
way of looking at others’ experience and perspective. In the same way,
democratic citizenship has been recast in a pluralist and inclusive form, with
more attention being paid to valuing difference over assimilation, which
keeps democratic citizenship open in principle to the aspirations and sensi-
bilities of minorities and particular groups. However, we are not proposing
an idyllic picture of the state of the debate. Both the difficulties and the
urgency of the task of re-thinking toleration are all too evident, particularly
after the disturbing events and the repercussions of the 11th of September.
This volume contributes to the task by offering, in the first part, a number
of sober reflections on how we may reformulate the idea of toleration in
the light of the demands both of reason and of the recognition that others
seek from us. The second, and perhaps more cautiously upbeat, part of the
volume investigates the contexts within which our ideals and practices of
toleration are continuously tested and transformed.
From a substantive point of view, one of the themes that runs through
many of the chapters is the way in which reasonableness may be opera-
tionalised so to make the idea of toleration more internally coherent, while
grounding tolerance as a principled practice. As we have already mentioned,
Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione 3
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in the past popular justifications of toleration relying on either some form
of scepticism or prudential reasoning seemed sufficient to guarantee peace-
ful coexistence within the boundaries established by a combination of the
international system, the nation state, and democratic politics. The problem
with the merely prudential form of justification seems to be one of stabil-
ity: on this view, toleration can be, at most, a modus vivendi. If the distri-
bution of power changes such that peace could be maintained by one group
forcibly imposing its views on the others, then what need have we for tol-
erance any more? If the most that can be said for tolerance is that, when
power is roughly equal, it is the rational choice of those who would
otherwise violently conflict, then arguments for tolerance look impotent in
any context (of which our world is an example) in which power is not dis-
tributed roughly equally.
With respect to sceptical defences of toleration, the issue is more complex.
Moral scepticism seems, on the one hand, incapable of establishing the
limits of tolerance, thus allowing for a radical form of relativism regarding
the actions that we are prepared to tolerate. But on the other hand, it cannot
coherently sustain toleration itself, for the recommendation that one must
be tolerant must itself be read as a relativistic statement, for consistency’s
sake. Epistemological scepticism, particularly of a moderate kind – viz., that
there are truths, but that we are severely limited in our capacity to know
them – appears more promising. However, it is subject to two combined
objections. First, that as a philosophical doctrine it may be too controver-
sial to be accepted widely, and second, that it may carry too little con-
viction to motivate in real life, for it appears to entail a counterintuitive
conception of people’s commitment to their own beliefs and values, sug-
gesting that they hold their beliefs, and commit to their values, in a provi-
sional way.
As a move away from merely prudential or deeply sceptical justifications
of toleration, contemporary philosophers subscribing to some form of polit-
ical liberalism have argued that the justification of political principles must
proceed according to the ideal of public reason.9 Broadly stated, this ideal
is that any person who offers other people reasons for accepting or reject-
ing political proposals must take it that these reasons could be reasons for
others. If the differences constitutive of pluralism cannot be expected to 
disappear even in ideal conditions, wherein each person exercises her reason
correctly, then public reasons cannot simply map on to any one particular
set of beliefs or values. If political justification in conditions of pluralism
must conform to public reason, then each person must at least defend prin-
ciples of toleration at the political level (and perhaps also cultivate toler-
ance as a personal virtue): anything less than toleration could be rejected
by others in conditions of reasonable pluralism. In other words, on this
story, people who reject toleration are unreasonable: they fail to propose
political principles which, given the permanence of pluralism supported by
the exercise of reason, all other people could accept.
4 Introduction: reasonable tolerance
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Prima facie, the advantages of this approach to toleration over one jus-
tified by either a narrow modus vivendi or some form of preliminary scep-
ticism are as follows.10 If toleration is a requirement of reasonableness –
and part of what it is to be reasonable is to accept that the free use of reason
makes pluralism permanent – then, the forcible imposition of one particu-
lar set of beliefs or values cannot be justified by claiming that those who
are coerced would come to accept these beliefs and values in ideal condi-
tions, were they to exercise their reason correctly. A defence of toleration
as a demand of reasonableness makes it impossible to justify intolerance in
the name of the reason of those who are not tolerated; it makes crusades
and inquisitions unjustifiable as obstetric exercises encouraging the proper
use of reason on the part of those oppressed. The reasonableness-defence
of toleration makes it a requirement of justice whatever the balance of
power between those who share political problems. This defence also has
advantages over some form of ‘preliminary’ scepticism. The thesis that 
pluralism is consistent with the proper exercise of reason by each person
may seem, or so it is claimed, a less controversial philosophical doctrine
than either moral or epistemological scepticism; for the requirement that,
when offering justifications of political principles, each person accepts the
‘burdens of reason’ thesis, is less demanding than the adherence to either
of the forms of scepticism outlined above.
There are, however, several possible objections to, and ways of develop-
ing the ideal of, reasonable tolerance as advocated by Rawls and by some
other supporters of political liberalism. The contributions to the first part
of the volume explore some of them. Jeremy Waldron, for instance, takes
a less sanguine position on the way in which the application of the prin-
ciple of reasonableness may solve real-life conflicts. By exploring the way
in which the rules of social order and coexistence work in a liberal society,
so as to guarantee that there are no direct conflicts between people pursu-
ing different life styles (compossibility principle), and so that those very
same rules do not prevent the pursuit of a life style with a reasonable degree
of success (adequacy principle), Waldron concludes that in some real-life
conflicts, it is unclear on whom the burden of reasonableness may fall. His
is a kind of a-posteriori scepticism, which recognises that the principle of
reasonableness may simply lead us to an impasse, whenever accommoda-
tion between different views and conceptions of the good is deeply prob-
lematic. The ‘liberal algebra’ of compossibility between liberties and their
adequate protection (and/or promotion) is one that has no solution; but,
Waldron sombrely adds, this is the case for any other kind of ‘algebra’ in
conditions of pluralism, where people with different conceptions of the
good come into social contact with each other and are, to a degree, sensi-
tive to each other’s pursuits.
A second kind of objection to the Rawlsian argument is that advanced
by Matt Matravers and Sue Mendus, who regard Rawls’s argument from
the ‘burdens of judgement’ and Brian Barry’s justification of impartiality by
Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione 5
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reference to a moderate epistemological scepticism as two ways of making
toleration a requirement of reason that is limited in the sphere of practical
political justification.11 They argue that Barry’s conception of reason
imposes unacceptable existential costs on agents, and that Rawls’s concep-
tion makes toleration a requirement of a modus vivendi only. Although less
directly critical of the Rawlsian position, the other essays in the first part
of this volume pursue the discussion of toleration and recognition along 
the more positive line suggested by Matravers and Mendus, by linking them
more directly to a particular conception of justice. Rainer Forst identifies 
a ‘respect’ conception of toleration that, he argues, is required of those
engaged in practical political justification and that addresses the paradoxes
besetting the concept of toleration itself. This conception asks us to make
it a requirement of justice – sustained by the criteria of reciprocity and gen-
erality, but also by a personal perception of the finitude of reason – that
social and political arrangements should be such that the ethical identity 
of persons, as citizens, is the object of equal respect. Whether this takes us
beyond the impasse outlined by Waldron, in which there is a direct conflict
between ethical identities, is an interesting question. Nancy Fraser’s own
view of recognition, and of the dialectic between recognition and distribu-
tion in modern societies, offers a more pragmatic solution to the impasse,
suggesting that respect of others is essential, but that this should be a con-
sequence of the moral recognition of the ‘parity of participation’ to which
everyone is entitled both as a member of society, and as a member of the
particular group to which each person belongs. In her view, we should be
more circumspect in dealing with the ethical dimension of identity politics,
where pluralist solutions are not always available.
From within liberal theory, there is, however, another way of posing the
question of toleration. As Catriona McKinnon suggests, the incommen-
surability of different ethical views is only part of the story of why the
permanent fact of pluralism makes toleration a permanent requirement.
Different conceptions of toleration can be justified with different accounts
of the character of pluralism as opposed to its nature: questions about the
character of pluralism are questions about the attitudes people can reason-
ably be expected to cultivate with respect to those who differ from them.
As a mark of the changes in the ideal and practices of toleration that have
gradually taken place in contemporary societies, both McKinnon and Forst,
for example, note that there is a continuum of attitudes that are often
referred to as ‘tolerant’, a theme that is also explored in other essays of this
collection (notably in Wolff and Heyd; but also more indirectly in Waldron
and Fraser). Such a continuum can be differently described, but it is well
captured by Michael Walzer’s distinction between five different attitudes 
to difference, all resulting in some form of acceptance: resignation, indif-
ference, stoic endurance, openness, and full endorsement.12 Resignation 
and indifference, though still very much used in common parlance, are 
often ruled out on philosophical grounds, for they lack the necessary moral
6 Introduction: reasonable tolerance
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tension that seems to be required by the idea of tolerance. Stoical resigna-
tion is perhaps the one that best captures the philosophical, and philo-
sophically paradoxical, idea of toleration as accepting differences to which
we deeply object. Openness and endorsement are also problematic for the
same reason mentioned for resignation and indifference, but in reverse, in
that the attitudes to difference they involve are not hostile. The important
point within the present debate on toleration is that the demands of rea-
sonableness, recognition, and democratic citizenship seem to require a move
from a kind of stoic tolerance to a deeper engagement with difference cap-
tured by ideas of respect and sensitivity to others’ identity and self-chosen
aims and life styles.
The more open-minded attitude towards difference, which is a requisite
of social coexistence in multicultural democratic societies, where no one has
a privileged position from which to dispense toleration,13 is the kind of atti-
tude that ordinary language tends nowadays to identify with tolerance –
what, in a non-technical sense, could be called a ‘reasonable’ response to
difference. The second part of this volume is an attempt to explore the inter-
nal coherence of such a transformation when applied to different contexts.
James Bohman, for instance, argues that openness to others in discourse,
and their treatment as free and equal, is part of a kind of reflexive tolera-
tion that pertains to public communication in the deliberative context. In
such a context, individuals recognise each other as part of the same demo-
cratic community, and they do so both by taking each other’s reasons seri-
ously, but also, and even more crucially, by taking each other’s perspectives
fully on board. From a different perspective, Andrew Mason’s discussion
of ‘cities’ and ‘communities’ develops a parallel argument on the impor-
tance of coming into contact with others. His focus is on the different
images, and the related values and attitudes, engendered respectively by 
cosmopolitan city life and narrow communitarian engagements. In fact, his
view is that this opposition is usually overdrawn. He claims that the ideas
of city and community can be made to work in complementary ways in an
account of reasonable tolerance.
A similar tension between the virtues of sameness and difference is
explored in Jonathan Wolff’s contribution. Here, toleration is seen in rela-
tion to the ethos of a society, a group, or an organisation, and is treated as
a dynamic process. In this sense, tolerance is part of the process through
which a certain state of affairs and ethos are changed or adapted. Tolera-
tion involves overcoming certain fixed ideas or rigidities by accepting the
innovative value that difference may bring at different levels of values, prin-
ciples or practices. The same dynamic element is central to Cécile Laborde’s
conceptual and historical analysis of the way in which the practice and 
principles of toleration have operated in the complex political debate that,
in France, developed around the notorious affair of the headscarves. Her
analysis emphasises the important ideological role that the idea of laïcité
played in that discussion, unveiling the complex cluster of meanings and
Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione 7
MCKIN  1/10/2003  10:15 AM  Page 7
values that this is intended to mobilise, but also the transformative role that
such discussions have on the definition of our very ideals and concepts. So,
in practical situations, appeals to toleration may only acquire a meaning
when this is placed in a more complex discursive and institutional context.
The importance of considering toleration within a context in which a 
plurality of values may operate, so that the exercise of tolerance may come
into external conflict with the application of other principles – something
that is separate from its ‘internal’ paradoxes – is brought to the fore by
both Stuart White’s and David Heyd’s contributions. In the separate con-
texts of work and education with which they deal, equality of opportunity
and moral instruction, respectively, seem to come into conflict with the
second-order virtue of tolerance, since this, even when does not require
from us things objectionable in themselves, undermines the operations of
the other principles. Nevertheless, both White and Heyd stress that toler-
ance remains an important element within our universe of values, and that
in such cases its proper application may have to follow certain background
rules, which reflects the different interests and aims that the different prin-
ciples are meant to either protect or promote.
In conclusion, most of the contributors to this volume would seem to
agree that, though perhaps imperfect and ‘transitory’ in character, or even
as second-best options, both the virtue of tolerance and the institutions of
toleration remain necessary ingredients for democratic societies to be able
to accommodate reasonable difference reasonably.
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4 Michael Walzer talks of ‘immigrant societies’ as a regime of toleration reflect-
ing the way in which the population constituting those countries belong to 
separate cultural and ethnic groups, which may have settled at different times
in the history of that particular land: On Toleration, pp. 30–5.
5 Cf. C. Hill, ‘Toleration in seventeenth-century England: Theory and practice’,
in Mendus, The Politics of Toleration, pp. 27–44.
6 Part of this story is told by Cécile Laborde’s contribution to this volume, though
she mainly addresses the French debate. Michael Walzer refers to democratic
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assimilation as one of the aspects of the ‘modernist project’, while he points to
group self-determination within the international context as the other aspect.
Both are pointers to the importance of the nation-state as the central element
of the modernist project: On Toleration, pp. 83–7.
7 ‘Citizenship for 16–19 year olds in education and training’, Report of the 
Advisory Group to the Secretary of State for Education and Employment
(Further Education Funding Council Publications, 1998), Appendix A.
8 Cf. D. Castiglione and C. McKinnon, ‘Introduction: Beyond toleration?’, in
idem. (eds), Toleration: Moral and Political, Special Issue of Res Publica. A
Journal of Legal and Social Philosophy, 7:3 (2001) 223–30.
9 Cf. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia, NY: Columbia University Press,
1993), Lecture 2, §§1–2, pp. 48–58.
10 We say preliminary, to distinguish these two kinds of sceptical approaches (moral
and epistemological) from those that come to a sceptical conclusion not on the
basis of an analysis of the grounds for toleration, but after having examined the
reasons for toleration in their substantive operation. This distinction will become
clear below, in discussing Waldron’s position. The distinction between
‘antecedent’ and ‘consequent’ scepticism is not new: David Hume suggests it in
An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. T. L. Beauchamp (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), Section 12, Part I, §§ 3 and 5, pp. 199–200,
although his use is different, and differently motivated, from the one here
suggested.
11 B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.
168–73.
12 Walzer, On Toleration, pp. 10–12.
13 Glen Newey, ‘Is democratic toleration a rubber duck?’, in Castiglione and 
McKinnon (eds), Toleration: Moral and Political, 315–36, at pp. 324–30.
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Part I
Re-thinking toleration
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In the streets of a large city, people drive their cars for different reasons and
to different destinations. Because the roads are crowded and because these
different journeys cut across each other, with people going different ways
through various intersections, there is a potential problem. If two vehicles
pass through the same intersection at the same time, there may be a colli-
sion, and if there is, one or both of the drivers may fail to reach their des-
tinations. (Indeed, one or both of them may be hurt, maimed or killed and
their vehicles damaged, perhaps beyond repair.)
The point of traffic rules is, first and foremost, to prevent such collisions,
and ensure that the roads are safe for drivers and their vehicles. But that is
not their only point. If the whole point were ‘safety-first’, it could be accom-
modated by requiring all drivers to proceed at 5mph and to stop and get
out at each intersection in order to ascertain that it is safe to proceed. But
then, few people would get to the destinations they want to reach at any-
thing like the time they want to reach them. Fortunately, the aim of a good
set of traffic rules is also to ensure that everyone can proceed to their des-
tinations as expeditiously as possible, under the condition that proceeding
to these destinations must not make it impossible for others to proceed
expeditiously to theirs. In other words, the streets and the rules governing
their use attempt to accommodate everyone’s purpose in using them. The
rules say: ‘No matter where you want to go or why, we will allow you to
proceed to your destination. Each of you just has to accept the few restric-
tions that are necessary to extend this right to each and every other driver.’
So we impose a speed limit, and we ask people to obey stop lights. We
have rules about the right of way at uncontrolled intersections. We enforce
following distances and overtaking restrictions. Probably nobody gets to
her destination as quickly as she would if she had the streets to herself.
Probably no one has exactly the sort of trip he would prefer. But the restric-
tions we think are reasonable. There is no one for whom they destroy the
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point of driving. The rules simply modify the way each person pursues her
purposes on the streets so as to make her use of them compatible with their
use by everyone else.
Liberal algebra
It is not my aim in this chapter to talk about traffic laws. But I believe they
provide a useful analogy for thinking about a difficulty – which, I fear, is
an irresolvable one – facing modern liberal theories of toleration.
Liberals envisage a whole society, not just a network of streets, in which
aims of all sorts can be pursued. As they negotiate their way through life,
people aim at different values and pursue different goods. These pursuits
pose a problem of social order, which consists in the possibility (likelihood,
inevitability) that the activities inspired by various people’s aims will come
into conflict with one another. Conflicts arise, as they did in the traffic
analogy, when the activity of one agent cuts across or collides with the activ-
ity of another, in such a way that the actions in question cannot both take
place. The legal rules of a liberal order may be viewed, like traffic rules, as
a way of dealing with that possibility of conflict. For example, it is the job
of property law to address the possibility of conflict between different
persons’ attempts to make use of the same material resources. They do this,
crudely, by indicating for every resource who is allowed to make which use
of that resource and when. But it is not just property: there are rules gov-
erning the time and manner in which parades and demonstrations can be
mounted; and there are restrictions on the exercise of political liberty
designed to preclude the possibility of collision between one person’s angrily
brandished fist and another’s arrogantly positioned nose. All these arrange-
ments are supposed to be governed by the liberal ideal of securing order in
a way that is fair to the aims and activities of all.
This aspiration of modern liberalism is Kantian in inspiration: Act exter-
nally in such a way that the free use of your will is compatible with the
freedom of everyone according to a universal law.1 The idea is that although
different people have very different conceptions of value and happiness, a
set of constraints can be formulated that, if accepted, would allow each
person’s pursuit of his own ends to coexist – without conflict – with the
pursuit of ends by each and all of the others. Although, in order to avoid
conflict, each person has to accept some restrictions, the idea is that no one
will be required to labour under such extensive or burdensome restrictions
as to make the pursuit of his chosen ends impossible.
Formally speaking, the liberal claim may be described as the task of 
specifying a set of constraints on conduct (call it set C), satisfying two con-
ditions: (1) no two actions permitted by C conflict with one another; and
(2) for each individual who is subject to C, the range of actions permitted
by C is adequate for the pursuit of his ends. I shall call these the require-
ments of compossibility2 and adequacy. Together they amount to something
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like algebraic specifications for the formal structure of a liberal society.
Although there is no guarantee that the simultaneous equations of this
liberal algebra admit of a solution, liberals remain optimistic. Their 
optimism is not in a utopian spirit, but in the belief that a practicable set
of constraints can be formulated and realised under the familiar circum-
stances of modernity, taking people as they are, and laws – in only a mildly
reformist spirit – as they might be.
Compossibility and adequacy together
To say that two actions conflict, for the purposes of the compossibility
requirement, is to say that the performance of one of them interferes with
the performance of the other (and perhaps vice versa). Direct physical
incompatibility – like two people struggling to use the same tool at the same
time – is the clearest type of conflict.
Conflict is not the same as opposition (or disapproval). It means more
than that two actions are inspired by rival ideals, or that the agents are
opposed, each to the other’s action, or that one of them wishes the conduct
of the other would not occur. I may oppose or disapprove of someone’s
conduct without my disapproval (or my own contrary pursuits) conflicting
with or impacting adversely upon them. This familiar distinction is of
course crucial to our understanding of liberal toleration: as a liberal, I 
tolerate something even though I disapprove of it; that is, I subscribe to a
social structure that makes room even for activities to which I am utterly
opposed.
There are, however, intriguing cases in between, one of which I want to
put on the table at this stage. Think back to the framework of my traffic
analogy. My friends and I are holding a funeral procession for some dear
departed colleague. But the procession is continually broken up by bikers
weaving noisily in and out of the cortège, to the extent that it seems to us
that our procession has been ruined. How should we analyse this case?
Perhaps an argument could be made that the actions (by us) required 
for the successful pursuit of our funereal end actually conflict with the
actions of the bikers. On this analysis, a set of constraints, C, that permit-
ted both the bikers’ actions and the mourners’ actions would fail the test
of compossibility. But that argument may not work: there may not literally
be any physical incompatibility – for it may be part of the bikers’ aim to
weave skilfully in and out of the procession in a way that does not cause
any of the funeral vehicles to slow down or any of the mourners to break
step.
Even so, there does seems to be a deeper incompatibility. If C permits
bikers or skateboarders to behave in a way that ruins the procession, then
maybe we have to say that C fails the test of adequacy. For although it may
be true that all the actions or behaviours that the mourners actually need
to perform are permitted by C, still acceptance of and submission to C
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means that the mourners’ ends are bound to be frustrated by actions of the
bikers also permitted by C.
By itself, compossibility is a relation between actions, not directly a rela-
tion between ends. Ends come into the picture when we consider adequacy:
or rather, the relation between ends – the idea of a Kantian ‘kingdom of
ends’3 – comes from the combination of compossibility and adequacy, not
from compossibility alone. To focus on adequacy as well as compossibility
is to indicate our desire for a liberal, not just a Hobbesian, peace. Whether
the liberal order respects and makes room for each of us is not just a matter
of whether it protects us from collisions. It is a matter of how much room
is left for our freedom. And that in turn is not just a question of how many
actions are permitted to each of us (whether that rises above a certain
minimum or whatever). It is a question of how the permitted minimum
stands in relation to the ends we take it upon ourselves to pursue.
Now consider again our example of the bikers and the mourners. The
complaint of the mourners is not a complaint that actions they want or
need to perform are prohibited. Their complaint is that their actions are
frustrated by permissions granted to others. This indicates two possible
ways of formulating the condition of adequacy. We may formulate it as:
2a For each individual P who is subject to C, the range of actions permit-
ted to (be performed by) P by C is adequate for the pursuit of P’s ends,
or as:
2b For each individual P who is subject to C, the range of actions permit-
ted to anyone by C is such that action within C is adequate for the
pursuit of P’s ends.
According to (2b), the permissibility of the bikers’ actions under C would
mean that C fails the test of adequacy so far as the mourners’ ends are 
concerned. But this result would not follow under (2a).
Which of the two should we adopt? I think we have no choice but 
to adopt the second version, (2b). The importance of complementing 
compossibility with adequacy is that a liberal theory ought to be concerned
about whether each individual has enough freedom for him to flourish as
a person with ends of his own to pursue. We are not just interested in reduc-
ing conflict; we are trying to reconcile something that is important and ade-
quate in each person’s case with something that is important and adequate
in the case of each of the others. If we were to reject (2b), and plump for
(2a) only, our concern for adequacy would be in danger of appearing
implausibly one-dimensional. Although pretending to be concerned with
whether a person has room to pursue his own ends, our concern would run
out once we were assured that certain actions – in the sense of bodily move-
ments – were available to him. But the pursuit of one’s ends is a more com-
plicated matter than that. It depends not just on action – in the sense of
bodily movement – in the abstract, but on action under a description, and
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the description may well involve a reference to circumstances that include
the actions of others.4
Maximisation and equality
Apart from the issue between (2a) and (2b), how strong is this requirement
of adequacy? The proposition that C must be adequate for the pursuit of
P’s ends does not entail that P is assured of success in pursuing whatever
aims she has set herself. That is her responsibility, or it may be a matter of
good or bad fortune, or it may be a matter of competition with others; but
at any rate, success is not what the liberal order purports to offer individ-
uals. Adequacy has to do with the efforts one might undertake in pursuit
of one’s ends: the idea is that a set of constraints fails the test of adequacy
if it denies her what one might call a fair shot at pursuing her ends. In many
situations, what counts as a fair shot cannot be defined except by reference
to the overall structure, and that introduces a potential for circularity, which
is reasonably well understood.5 But, in other cases we understand the 
contrast between pursuit and success reasonably well. A set of constraints
is not reasonable if it prevents me from ever demonstrating my political
convictions in public; but it is not unreasonable simply by virtue of failing
to guarantee that I win over any adherents. A set of constraints is not rea-
sonable if it prevents me from doing anything that my religion prescribes
in the way of worship; by the same token, it is not made reasonable by the
mere fact that my religion itself makes provision for its own attenuated
practice under conditions of oppression and persecution. That provision is
to be understood as a response by religion to something that the liberal
ideal forbids, not as a relaxation of the demands that the accommodation
of this religion imposes.
However we define it, the constraint of adequacy is weaker than two
other constraints with which might have defined the liberal ideal. One is
maximisation (in the case of each individual). Kant, for example, talks
about a constitution allowing ‘the greatest possible human freedom accord-
ing to laws, by which the liberty of every individual can co-exist with the
liberty of every other.’6 Some of John Rawls’s early formulations indicated
something similar: individuals are to have a right ‘to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.’7 The idea of 
maximisation is easy enough to apply in cases where simple Pareto-
improvements of liberty are possible: where at least one person’s liberty can
be enhanced without diminishing that of anyone else. But it is a much more
difficult conception to apply when we face trade-offs and the interpersonal
comparisons that they involve.
The other somewhat stronger constraint would be a constraint, not just
of adequacy but of equality. The Rawlsian formulation just quoted referred
not only to compossibility and maximisation but also to the idea of ‘a
similar liberty for others’.8 In Political Liberalism, the equality constraint
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is more prominent: ‘Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate
scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with
the same scheme for all.’9
Equality here may be understood in two ways. It might mean that the
liberties must be the same for everyone: if P has a right to do X, then every-
one in the society must have a right to do X. Alternatively, it might mean
that, even if the liberties are different, their net effect must be such as to
enable the persons who enjoy them to advance their respective aims to an
equal extent.
The second interpretation takes us back to – and perhaps compounds the
problem about – the relation between adequacy and success. Now we have
to calculate the relation between ends and activities, not just in terms of
adequate pursuit, but in terms of constraints on conduct that secure for
each agent the same degree of success in pursuit of his end as is secured for
others in pursuit of theirs. We sometimes pretend that we can do these 
calculations. We ask whether some sect or activity is having to bear an
unfair proportion of the restraint required on all sides for an orderly social
life, although I am not sure whether we can figure all that out. At any rate,
adequacy by itself is sufficient to pose the difficulty that I want to address,
so – in the present context – there is no need to consider any idea of equal-
ity that goes beyond that.
What about the first interpretation of equality? Does a liberal order
assume that the set of liberties made available to one person for the pursuit
of his conception of the good will be the same as the set of liberties made
available to each other person? The assumption that they will be the same
is appealing, for it coincides with slogans about ‘the rule of law’ and ‘equal
rights’.
But I think there are good reasons to question it. In the real world, we
have to come to terms with the fact that people pursue not only different
aims, but aims with different and disparate shapes. Consider the variety of
religious conceptions. Some people will belong to small, intensely sectarian
groups; some will belong to Churches that are organised on a cosmopoli-
tan scale (such as Islam or Roman Catholicism). For some the essence of
religious practice may be community action; for others it may be a clois-
tered monastic ideal. Some may belong to Churches (like Episcopalianism)
that retain some of the official character they had before they were dis-
established; some may practice cults like spiritualism that are frowned on
in official circles. Some people will be tormented by religious doubt; others
will live contented lives of secular atheism; still others will be crusading
atheists. Since people’s aims are so utterly disparate in their character and
content, it is likely that the activities that count as the pursuit of those aims
will be different also, and if so, it is likely that the liberties and protections
that the parties need or require will differ accordingly.
For example, someone who belongs to an organised Church may think
it important to have a right to freedom of worship, whereas a contented
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secular atheist may say that he has no use for such a right. By this I mean
that if the atheist is asked whether freedom of worship is an important
liberty for every person, he may quite reasonably answer ‘No’. No doubt,
we could abstract from the term ‘worship’ and find some very vague
description (freedom of conscience, perhaps, conjoined with freedom of
assembly) that he would recognise as a right that everyone needed. But I
think such abstraction would very quickly end up with our saying simply
that everyone had a right to pursue his own aims, and that is not being
denied. What is in question is whether that universal right entails equal or
uniform rights at a more concrete level.10
A difficult case
Let me now develop an example that, I think, poses a fearful difficulty 
for this sort of Kantian algebraic liberalism that I have been trying to
characterise.
In the modern world, most societies for which liberal arrangements are
thought to be practicable contain many persons who satisfy each of the 
following descriptions. P is an entrepreneurial pornographer: he enjoys
pornography, he enjoys catering to others’ tastes for pornography, and he
rather relishes the shock that his pornographic wares occasion in unwilling
passers-by. Q is a devout Muslim: he abhors pornography, but is constantly
distracted by P’s display of it. Q’s concern about pornography is not just a
concern for himself – he also despairs of being able to bring up his children
as pious Muslims in a social environment polluted by P. P, on the other
hand, is fond of saying to his own children things like ‘It’s a lurid and excit-
ing world out there, my boys. Enjoy!’ R is a secular humanist, who has no
children and no interest in anyone else’s children. He manages to pursue
his own aims and hobbies in a way that is impervious to public displays of
pornography. He is not one of P’s customers, but he is not particularly dis-
tracted by P’s behaviour; nor for that matter is there any incompatibility
between his conduct and ideals and those of Q.
Arguably, it is not possible to find a set of constraints satisfying
conditions (1) and (2), above, that can accommodate the ends of P and Q
and R. P and R could certainly live together. And Q and R could live
together, provided R didn’t try to enter Q’s mosque in a state of undress,
etc. But P and Q cannot live together in a liberal arrangement (with or
without R). P’s pursuit of his way of life makes Q’s way of life impossible;
and the conditions for Q’s pursuit of his way of life make P’s way of life
impossible.
The example is schematic but by no means unrealistic. Something like
this happens in multicultural settings all the time. Readers will have no dif-
ficulty in recognising this as the crux of the difficulty in the Salman Rushdie
affair. With slight alterations, we can equate P with Rushdie, and Q with
those hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of Muslims, in Britain who
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were deeply offended by the publication of Rushdie’s book, The Satanic
Verses. So this is the sort of difficult case I want to talk about.
The peremptory response
How difficult is this case? It is often said that this is to be expected, since
the liberal principle of toleration was never supposed to be a principle of
unrestricted range. Look at Locke on atheism, or even, in his early work,
on Roman Catholicism.11 No one can tolerate everything. Some things are
necessarily excluded from the scope of toleration. If someone loves murder,
or torture, a liberal society cannot guarantee him a niche that is adequate
for his purposes. Suppose I get my kicks from enslaving other people: I am
an Aristotelian slave-hunter; I go out looking for what I regard as ‘natural
slaves’ to capture, as other people hunt deer or wild boar. Patently this con-
ception of the good cannot be accommodated within the liberal scheme I
have outlined. Room cannot be made for me to pursue this end except at
the expense of completely frustrating some other people’s pursuit of their
ends (viz., those who might fall victim to my slave-hunting).
Because cases like these are extreme and distasteful, it is tempting to
present the dismissal of the aims of sadists, torturers, slave-hunters, rapists,
murderers etc., from the realm of ends to which the liberal claim is said 
to apply, as obvious and more or less peremptory. But such a response is
unsatisfactory.
It is unsatisfactory, first, because it doesn’t help us with more problem-
atic cases – cases like the one I have developed. In the example of the
pornographer and the Muslim, we concluded that P and Q cannot live
together in a liberal arrangement any more than our imagined slave-hunter
and his victims could live together. But, even if the incompatibility between
P and Q is like the incompatibility between the slave-hunter and his victim,
it is not clear who, in the case of P and Q, is like the slave-hunter and who
is like the victim. Is P like the slave-hunter because he insists on flaunting
his pornographic wares in a way that makes Muslim life impossible for Q?
Or is P like the victim because his exhibitionism is crowded out by Q’s
imperious insistence on a certain sort of pious environment? If a liberal
society cannot accommodate P and Q together, then which of them should
it throw out? P or Q or both? And what is the principle on which that is
to be decided?
Second, the strategy of peremptorily excluding certain ends as unreason-
able or clearly unacceptable, etc. from the ambit of toleration underesti-
mates the ambition associated with the liberal model itself. Liberalism
makes a very strong claim: namely, that it is the liberal algebra itself that
provides the reasons for excluding these ends. The point of liberal algebra
is to explain the wrongness (and hence the legitimate excludability) of things
like murder, rape, assault, fraud, and non-consensual sadism. The prohibi-
tion of such actions is supposed to be explained and justified in virtue of
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their being comprised in any set of constraints C that satisfies adequacy and
compossibility. That explanatory point is simply defeated if it turns out that
the success of the liberal claim relies on our presupposing that of course
such ends and actions can be excluded.
Rawlsian ‘reasonableness’
Modern liberals in the Kantian and Rawlsian tradition wildly overestimate
their ability to think through these cases. They are led to do so by their
possession of technical jargon, philosophical terminology that they use to
characterise – but cannot use to justify – the idea of an unacceptable action,
or an aim that may legitimately be excluded from the Kantian kingdom of
ends.12
Consider the terminology of reasonableness – the contrast between the
reasonable and the rational – put about by John Rawls and his followers.
Persons are reasonable, says Rawls, when the conceptions of the good for
which they demand accommodation are adopted and put forward in a way
that is sensitive to the need for a fair scheme of cooperation. The liberal
commitment to allowing individuals to pursue their aims is complemented
by an insistence that individuals be reasonable in choosing what aims to
pursue. Each person must take into account that he lives in a society with
others, each of whom in turn has a life to lead by his own lights. Each must
take account of this situation in conceiving his ethical and religious aims
and obligations. Though individuals view themselves as ‘self-originating
sources of claims’ in the sense that the pursuit of the good as they conceive
it carries weight in its own right without being derived from any antecedent
social conception, still they must not think of themselves as ‘tied to the
pursuit of the particular final ends they have at any given time, but rather
as capable of revising and changing these ends on reasonable . . . grounds.’13
People must be prepared to tailor and discipline their conceptions of the
good so they fit together into a just and practicable social structure. As
Rawls puts it:
The principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on what satisfactions have
value; they impose restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions of one’s
good. In drawing up plans and in deciding on aspirations men are to take these
constraints into account. We can express this by saying that in justice as fair-
ness the concept of the right is prior to that of the good.14
In the present context, the concept of the right is the concept of a 
regime regulated by compossibility and adequacy. Individuals are entitled
to choose only those ends that they have reason to believe may be accom-
modated within a regime governed by these constraints. They may not
simply cling to their given religious or ethical convictions without regard
to their implications for the compossible practice of other people’s aims and
pursuits.
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Fair enough. But how does it cut in our difficult case? Given that P and
Q cannot together satisfy the constraints that interest us, which of them is
to be regarded as unreasonable? Is it P or Q who has chosen a conception
of the good that is incompatible with liberal assumptions?
The difficulty becomes even more acute if we imagine that P was once a
fanatical pornographer to the point of rampant exhibitionism and
voyeurism, in a way that used to offend people like R, but that he under-
went expensive therapy and re-education so that his residual pornographic
ideals could fit reasonably into a liberal society. Unfortunately, he had not
counted on having to accommodate himself to Q’s sensitivities as well as
R’s, and he is inclined to draw the line at this point, insisting that he has
already given up as much as he can reasonably be expected to give up. And
something similar may be true of Q. Perhaps he used to believe that he
could not pursue the pious life of Islam and bring up his children as good
Muslims in a society desecrated by the mere presence of unbelievers like R.
But he painfully changed his outlook, so that he could live at peace in
England with neighbours like R. But now the problem of P has come up.
Is it reasonable to expect Q to accommodate himself further to this sort of
blasphemous presence? (More reasonable, I mean, than to expect P to pull
in his horns to accommodate the sensitivities of Q?)
Perhaps we can appeal to some other aspect of Rawlsian reasonableness
to help us here. For it is well-known that ‘unreasonable’ has two meanings
in Rawls’s later work. On the one hand, as we have just seen, it refers to a
person’s acceptance of the subjection of the good to the right: his willing-
ness to tailor his ends so that they can be practised on fair terms with the
practice of the ends of others, similarly disciplined. On the other hand,
‘unreasonable’ is used by Rawls to refer to a conception of the good whose
divergence from other conceptions is not intelligible in light of what he calls
‘the burdens of judgment’. This is a quasi-epistemic conception, compris-
ing the various hazards, vicissitudes and perspectives involved in the 
conscientious exercise of people’s powers of reason and judgement in the
circumstances of modern human life.15 I don’t want to go into this in any
detail – it is quite familiar to Rawls aficionados, and quite important. What
I want to stress is that although Rawls casts the net of this quasi-epistemic
sense of the reasonable quite wide – leaving open the possibility that rea-
sonable people will come up with quite different conceptions of the good,16
and stressing that ‘many of our most important judgments are made under
conditions where it is not to be expected that conscientious persons with
full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will arrive at the same con-
clusion’17 – although he concedes all that, Rawls does think that a society
will be justified in controlling and excluding aims that are unreasonable in
this epistemic sense, ‘so that they do not undermine the unity and justice
of the society’.18
It is not hard to see why he would want to do this. But it is hard to see
why he would want to say it. For a view may be mad but harmless, or a
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whole society may comprise stupid but perfectly compossible beliefs. The
real danger for Rawlsian theory is the converse: views that are reasonable
in the sense of not crazy, but whose reasonableness is problematic in the
sense of their orientation to compossibility with others. I have argued 
elsewhere that these definitions of ‘unreasonable’ can come apart.19 Militant
Islam provides an example of a comprehensive conception whose claims are
not at all unreasonable in the quasi-epistemic sense, but may seem never-
theless unreasonable in the sense of openness to accommodation with other
conceptions.
At any rate, I do not think unreasonableness in the epistemic sense – in
the burdens of judgement sense – provides any basis for distinguishing
between the conceptions of P and Q. An alternative strategy, within the
fabric of late Rawlsianism, may be to ask whether Q’s – the Muslim’s –
sensitivities can be stated in publicly accessible terms? If they cannot, then
maybe they have no claim to be respected in a liberal society, for Q 
cannot state his complaint against P, and against the system that permits 
P, in publicly accessible terms.20 On this approach, the trouble with Q’s
insistence on a certain sort of moral environment, free from pornography
and blasphemy, is that it depends on premises that are internal to his 
religious faith, and that might seem perhaps arbitrary from an external
point of view.
This does show, I think, some of the difficulties involved in defining ade-
quacy. If our constraint were success as opposed to adequacy, presumably
the success criterion would have to be understood on the terms posed by
each conception of the good. It is of no use to say that one’s pursuit of one’s
own aims is successful, if it does not seem successful by one’s own lights.
And the same must surely apply to adequacy – even accepting a distinction
between adequacy and any guarantee of success. I don’t think there is any
way of saying that a set of permissions is adequate for the practice of a reli-
gion except by paying attention to how that set of restrictions seems from
the internal point of view of the religion. To abandon any interest in that
would be, in effect, to abandon any real concern for adequacy. An exter-
nally stated adequacy condition – which was quite at odds with internal
conceptions – would be arbitrary and unmotivated. So there is a delicate
line to walk here. We want reasons affecting the constraint set to be stated
publicly. But by subjecting the constraint set to a criterion of adequacy, we
accept that it is important to comprehend how it seems from the point of
view of each of the conceptions that it purports to accommodate. So I think
we have to say something like this. Even if this particular aspect of Q’s faith
cannot itself be comprehended publicly – and often it can – still, we can
publicly comprehend Q’s good-faith insistence that not being allowed to
practise it undermines his conception of the good. (By analogy, one does
not need to grasp the mysteries of transubstantiation in order to understand
the difficulties that any general prohibition on the consumption of wine
would pose for the Catholic practice of the Mass.)
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The original position
A similar result may be reached by considering the thought-experiment that
dominated Rawls’s earlier work. Consider the predicament of someone in
the original position who thinks it possible he turn out to be a person like
Q. Of course, people in the original position do not know which aims they
will want to pursue. No one thinks of himself as a Muslim, say, while he
is in this choice situation. But the parties have general knowledge, and they
know that aims of this sort are commonly pursued. Each must therefore
take into account the possibility that he will end up holding an aim of this
sort. With this possibility in mind, how should he bargain or deliberate?
Now Rawls’s argument for religious liberty goes as follows:
[I]t seems evident that the parties must choose principles that secure the
integrity of their religious and moral freedom. They do not know, of course,
what their religious or moral convictions are, or what is the particular content
of their moral or religious obligations as they interpret them. . . . Now it seems
that equal liberty of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the
original position can acknowledge. They cannot take chances with their liberty
by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine to persecute or sup-
press others if it wishes. Even granting (what may be questioned) that it is
more probable than not that one will turn out to belong to the majority (if a
majority exists), to gamble in this way would be to show that one did not take
one’s religious or moral convictions seriously, or highly value the liberty to
examine one’s beliefs.21
However, if one thinks it possible that one will turn out to be Q, then
one might think it possible that an acknowledgment of equal religious
liberty for certain others – say a cult of pornographic Satanism by P – will
be inimical to the practice of one’s faith. On the other hand, each person
in the original position will also think it possible that he adheres to the
outlook of P or to some similar conception that sits ill with the sensitivi-
ties of a person like Q. Contemplating this possibility, the guy in the 
original position will be reluctant to sign up for any principle of sensitivity
that limits his freedom in this regard.
So the person in the original position is in a bind. He wants to leave room
for the possibility that he may hold sensitive religious convictions, and he
wants to leave room for the possibility that he may hold a conception whose
practice sits ill with those sensitivities. What is he to do? He cannot gamble
with his ability to discharge whatever religious obligations he turns out to
hold, by plumping either for a principle that favours a given sensitive aim
or for a principle that favours pornographic aims. He faces a dilemma. The
actual incompossibility of aims of these various types is represented in the
intractability of this decision problem for each person behind the Rawlsian
veil of ignorance.
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The generalisation
Here is a general formulation of the difficulty. We take a set of individual
ends {e1, e2, . . . en} for which no set of constraints can be designed that sat-
isfies the requirements of adequacy and compossibility, and we consider that
the exclusion of just one particular end – say, en – would remove the diffi-
culty, leaving us with a set of ends – {e1, e2, . . . em} – that can be ordered
by liberal principles. This, then, is seen as a fact about en which warrants
its exclusion not on any intrinsic or qualitative ground (its wickedness or
offensiveness as an end), but simply on the ground of its formal incompat-
ibility with other ends in the set, in relation to the systemic requirements
of a liberal order. On this basis, we say that activities in pursuit of en may
legitimately be prohibited in a liberal society, and that en itself may be pro-
scribed as an end, in the sense that people must recognise a responsibility
to come up with something other than en as their account of what makes
their respective individual lives worth living.
The difficulty is fairly obvious. If the problematic set of ends we began
with suffers from incompossibility, this is presumably on account of some
conflict between activities in pursuit of en and activities in pursuit of some
other end – say, em. It is not the intrinsic quality of en that warrants its exclu-
sion but only its affront to compossibility. So why is that not a ground for
excluding em rather than en from the set of acceptable ends? Why should
the blasphemer’s ends be excluded rather than the particularly sensitive aims
of the pious? After all, there is a sense in which each places burdens on the
other. Or why should restrictions be placed on the person whose way of
life requires an environment free of pornography rather than on the person
whose life style involves the flaunting of pornographic images? The purely
formalistic liberal strategy seems incapable of answering these questions.
Types of aim
Perhaps we can distinguish among types of end, and rule certain types out
because of their inherent incompatibility with liberalism.
There are some aims that people pursue that are simply aims for them-
selves, aims whose successful pursuit by them does not require the involve-
ment or participation of anyone else. Without prejudice to the content of
these purposes, I shall call them protestant aims. The spirit of a protestant
aim is captured in John Locke’s characterisations of religious practice:
seeing that one man does not violate the right of another by his erroneous
opinions and undue manner of worship, nor is his perdition any prejudice to
another man’s affairs, therefore, the care of each man’s salvation belongs only
to himself. [. . .] Every man in that has the supreme and absolute authority of
judging for himself. And the reason is because nobody else is concerned in it,
nor can receive any prejudice from his conduct therein.22
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Protestant aims may be contrasted with communal aims. It is the mark
of a communal aim that it cannot be successfully pursued by anyone unless
all or most of the members of a specified community are also involved in
its pursuit. An example is the aspiration to work and worship in the life of
an established Church, such as the Church of England (if not in its 
present form, then in at least some of its earlier manifestations). A person
with this aim may enjoy the mingling of ecclesiastical and local politics in
the life of the parish; he may revel in the fact that his bishop is also a leg-
islator in the House of Lords; he may welcome the use of state funds for
church buildings; and he may take pride in the special role his Church plays
in the official ceremonial life of the nation. None of these attitudes can be
sustained unless all other British subjects play a part in the activities of his
Church, whether they like it or not: they must be affected by parish gov-
ernment, bound by a legislature that includes bishops in the second
chamber, required to pay taxes for the support of the Church and to endure
the Anglican liturgies in ceremonies of coronation, the opening of 
Parliament, etc. Methodists, Roman Catholics and atheists in the popula-
tion might welcome the disestablishment of the Church of England and the
separation of Church and State. But for many Anglican parishioners, that
will undermine much of what they cherish in their faith. An independent
Episcopalian Church, of the kind found in the United States, faithful to
Anglican liturgies but purged of its official status, may not answer to their
aspirations at all. Other examples of communal aims along these lines,
include forms of religious establishment like the institution of Sharia
(Islamic law) in a Muslim society.
Now, perhaps we can insist that liberalism need not tolerate or accom-
modate communal aims, inasmuch as such aims are directly in conflict with
liberalism’s own aspiration to set out the structure of a free society. Such
an approach would focus on the difference between conceptions of the good
life that are adopted and followed purely as individual aims, and concep-
tions of the good that purport to govern a whole society. Suppose for a
moment that we are dealing with a conflict in society between a particular
protestant aim, Y, and a full-blown communal aim, Z. Suppose too, that Z
is a communal aim that claims the whole population of the society, includ-
ing the adherents of Y, as the relevant community to which it is to be
applied. Then one reason for objecting to Z – one reason for singling out
Z as the aim to be excluded for the sake of compossibility – is that Z is in
effect a competitor to the liberal ideal of compossibility itself. Z is a com-
peting principle of social organisation. If this is so, then obviously adher-
ents of liberal compossibility must reject Z, since they are not in a position
to tolerate competition at this level.23
The trouble with this line of argument is that it works only for the clear-
est cases of aims that purport to compete with compossibility. Standing
between protestant and communal aims are aims that I shall describe as
‘sensitive’. Our earlier case of the funeral procession, at the beginning of
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the chapter, provides a good example. If the mourners require everyone 
to participate in the procession, their aim is a communal one. Usually,
however, they require only some forbearance or mark of respect: their com-
plaint against the bikers is not that the bikers are failing to join the pro-
cession. Their complaint is that the bikers are failing to modify their pursuit
of their own (perhaps perfectly legitimate) aims, in a way that would be
sensitive to the conduct of the funeral.
A very well-known example of such demand for sensitivity is that of mil-
lions of Muslims in the West, responding to the publication of Salman
Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses. Many who condemned the book
emphasised that while they do not require others to become Muslims or
abide by Sharia, there are limits on their own ability to practise their faith
under conditions of insult and blasphemy.24 The followers of Islam take
their faith to be sensitive to the behaviour of others in society, inasmuch as
its proper practice requires them to exact a certain respect on the part of
others or at least the avoidance of offensive displays of disrespect.
It is, of course, not only Islam that is sensitive in this way. There are
similar Christian concerns about blasphemy. Launching a private prosecu-
tion of Gay News for blasphemous libel in 1977, Mary Whitehouse
explained, ‘I simply had to protect Our Lord.’25 Some Muslims feel that
Christian denominations have lost their substance, because they have ceased
to be so sensitive:
Many writers often condescendingly imply that Muslims should become as tol-
erant as modern Christians. After all, the Christian faith has not been under-
mined. But the truth is, of course, too obviously the other way. The continual
blasphemies against the Christian faith have totally undermined it. Any faith
which compromises its internal temper of militant wrath is destined for the
dustbin of history, for it can no longer preserve its faithful heritage in the face
of corrosive influences. The fact that post-Enlightenment Christians tolerate
blasphemy is a matter for shame, not for pride.26
Some have even argued that all religious convictions should be understood
to be sensitive in this way, so that a claim can be made on behalf of any
believer to the forbearance of others so far as his own faith is concerned.27
The point I want to make is that the solution we considered a moment
ago – the solution that purports to rule out any aim (such as an illiberal
communal aim) that directly competes with liberalism – will not work for
merely sensitive conceptions of the good such as modern Islam. The Islamic
faith held by Q in our example is not a competitor with liberalism. On the
contrary, as I said before, we can imagine that Q has modified his faith pre-
cisely so that it can fit into certain forms of liberal society.
Someone may reply that perhaps the sensitivity of Islam is the shadow
cast by its historic pretensions to compete with the liberal vision. Those
pretensions are concealed at the moment, but it is no secret that many
Muslims do aspire to the realisation of illiberal systems of Islamic law.
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However, there is no guarantee that this is true of every sensitive concep-
tion, no guarantee that it is true of sensitivity in general.
In any case, we are simply not in a position to say that the only aims
entitled to respect in a liberal order are those that have no connection,
logical or genealogical, with full-blown views about the good society.
Thoughtful people do not form their conceptions of the good life in isola-
tion from any thought of what a good society would be. For most people,
views about the consideration and assistance they owe to others form an
important part of their personal ethic, and it would be utterly artificial to
suppose that those views were in turn unrelated to wider ideas about what
we might owe each other in society. It might be tidier, from the liberal point
of view, if people’s conceptions of the good life were defined strictly as indi-
vidual aims, rather than as fragments of theories about how best to organ-
ise a human society. It might be tidier if individual aims were unrelated to
any thinking about the problems and possibilities posed by large numbers
of humans living together. But it is utterly unrealistic. Such a requirement
would exclude not only all communal aims, and most sensitive aims, but
most protestant aims as well.
Who is causing the problem?
We are not even entitled to say that sensitive aims are the cause of incom-
possibility. A set of aims that includes some that are sensitive is not neces-
sarily incompossible. A sensitive aim may coexist with a number of others,
provided that their practice does not encroach on the sensitivities specified.
For example, the following set of religious aims:
S: {Islam, pious Christianity privately practised, pious Judaism privately
practised}
seems a perfectly compossible set. It is true that the inclusion of a sensitive
aim, X, in any set of other aims does indicate a potential for incompossi-
bility. For one of the other aims may involve practices that offend the
sensitivities of the proponents of X. For an aim to be sensitive is for its
proponents to be concerned as part of the pursuit of their own aim about
the aims that others pursue and the activities that others perform. So there
is always a danger that X will sit ill with some other aim in a given set. It
is not necessary for incompossibility that there be protestant aims in the
set. A given sensitive aim may be incompatible with other sensitive aims if
the practices of the latter do not accord with the sensibilities of those who
practise the former. The sensitive forms of Islamic faith that I have men-
tioned may sit well with certain protestant forms of Christian piety, but sit
ill with the militant proselytising of an evangelical Christian faith.
I should emphasise finally that, although the presence of a sensitive (or
a communal or a competitive) aim seems necessary for intrinsic incompos-
sibility, we should not say that such aims are the cause of incompossibility.
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The cause of incompossibility, where it occurs, is the combination of X with
some other aim that sits ill with it. The presence of both is necessary; taking
either one away would resolve the incompossibility.
In a situation of incompossibility, each party to the conflict can insist that
she is choosing her convictions from a set of compossible aims. Consider
again the conflict between Salman Rushdie and the followers of Islam.
Rushdie will say that he is choosing his aim (the freewheeling secular 
exploration of a cosmopolitan inheritance) from a set that includes a
number of aims that others pursue in modern society. He will say that he
is perfectly willing to live and let live, so far as those other aims are con-
cerned. He may, for example, oppose the shallow values of Hollywood, but
he does not propose to ban or picket any films. He may oppose traditional
Christian values as well, but he is perfectly prepared to live in peace with
their proponents, adjusting the pursuit of his own ideals accordingly. True,
the set from which he chooses does not include all possible aims. Most
prominently, it does not include the sensitive aims of Islam (which The
Satanic Verses offended). But the Rawlsian formula recognises this: some
aims must be excluded in the name of reasonableness if compossibility is
to be secured.
The trouble is: his Islamic opponents can make exactly the same sort of
claim. They too have chosen their (sensitive) aim from a compossible set
(like S, mentioned earlier), a set that includes many of the other aims
pursued in modern society. They do not agree, for example, with Christians
about the nature of Jesus, or with the Jews about the extent and scope of
God’s revelation, but they have shown themselves willing to live in peace
and mutual toleration with a number of Christian and Jewish denomina-
tions. As much as the set from which Rushdie chooses his aims, theirs is
not all-inclusive. Specifically, it excludes aims that involve as part of their
pursuit a willingness to blaspheme the name of the founder of their reli-
gion. They exclude that in the name of reasonableness: they cannot see 
why Rushdie and others should regard themselves as entitled to pursue 
such an aim, given that there are two million Muslims living with them in
Britain.
So there is an impasse. Rushdie is being reasonable and he is choosing
from a compossible set – one, however, that excludes the sensitive aims of
modern Islam. The followers of Islam are being reasonable and choosing
from a compossible set – but one that excludes what they regard as blas-
phemy. In each case, the feature of the excluded aim that leads to its exclu-
sion is precisely a feature that is central to the practices of the proponent
of that aim. Rushdie cannot live the life he wants to lead unless he can treat
his religious heritage as playfully as he did in The Satanic Verses. His oppo-
nents cannot live the life they want to lead unless they can vindicate the
name of the Prophet. Who is to give way? Neither the idea of compossi-
bility, nor the Rawlsian idea of reasonableness or the constraints of right,
indicates an answer.
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To put it another way, several Kantian kingdoms of ends are imaginable.
In one, people like Salman Rushdie write their novels as they please, and
others practise their religions as they please, but the domain of religion is
restricted to those that do not translate mere offence into pressure for a
legal requirement that others refrain from blasphemy. In another kingdom
of ends, a sensitive religion like Islam is practised and other individual ends
(including alternative religious faiths) are tolerated, but Rushdie-style blas-
phemy is excluded by a broad framework of respect for Islamic faith and
perhaps for any other faith that demands it. From the point of view of com-
possibility, there is nothing to choose between these worlds. People like
Rushdie are going to feel intolerably constrained in the second kingdom of
ends; but then those who burned his book in Bradford evidently felt intol-
erably constrained in the first place.
Asymmetry?
The hunch that there must be a solution to this problem rests, I think, on
the view that there is an asymmetry to conflicts such as the one we have
been discussing. Someone may say, ‘The Islamic militants are trying to kill
Rushdie whereas he is not trying to kill them.’ But leave aside the particu-
lar issue of the fatwa, which is, in a sense, a response to the conflict rather
than the basis of it. Consider the view of those more moderate Muslims
who are not trying to assassinate anyone but who still think that in a just
society the publication of books like The Satanic Verses would not be
allowed.28 Then the alleged asymmetry presumably goes like this: ‘All
Rushdie is doing is offending their sensitivities, whereas they are proposing
to limit his liberty.’ Is this difference, between what they propose to do to
him (restrict publication) and what he proposes to do to them (insult their
faith), sufficient to determine the issue in favour of one party or the other?
Again, the answer is ‘No’. Recall the earlier discussion of equality and
difference, and our rejection of any simple notion of equality as a constraint
on our algebra. I suggested there that if people’s aims and activities are quite
different in their character and content, then it is likely that the liberties
and protections that they respectively require in order to pursue their aims
will differ accordingly. What Rushdie needs, for example, is freedom of
speech, freedom to publish (and be damned?), and protection from the
wrath of those he expects to offend. What his Islamic opponents need is
something different: protection from blasphemous insult. But though the
needs are different, they are on a par so far as the theory of compossibil-
ity is concerned. For, in abstract terms, each requirement is what is neces-
sary for the pursuit of the aim in question. From this abstract point of view,
there is no asymmetry. What Rushdie demands encroaches on the pursuit
of Islamic aims, and what the Muslims demand encroaches on the pursuit
of Rushdie’s aims. Each is demanding something that would make life intol-
erable for the other. Thus, nothing is gained in the argument by pointing
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out that the rights the Muslims demand are rights that Rushdie, for
example, would be happy to repudiate. They may claim the right to be pro-
tected from blasphemy or from demonstrations of disrespect for their cher-
ished beliefs. If the line of argument I am exploring here is correct, it is no
reply to this claim that secular atheists are willing to disown any such pro-
tection. For example, the fact that Salman Rushdie does not need to be pro-
tected from ridicule in order to be able to pursue his own good does 
not show that others do not need such protection in order to be able to
pursue theirs. Different aims may require different liberties and different
protection.
Can we say perhaps that his demand (for freedom) is not intentionally
or intrinsically opposed to the pursuit of their aim, while their demand (for
protection from such blasphemy) is intrinsically and intentionally opposed
to the pursuit of his aim? After all, there is nothing intrinsically anti-Islam
in a demand for freedom of speech, whereas there is something intrinsically
anti-infidel in a demand for respect for the Prophet. This will not do either.
Both positions can be described abstractly without reference to the other:
his is a demand for freedom, theirs is a demand for respect. On the other
hand, even the abstract specification in each case makes reference to the
idea of an other: respect is always accorded by someone, freedom is always
freedom from someone’s constraint. Anyway, under certain descriptions,
Rushdie’s claim is inherently inimical to theirs, for what he claims is exactly
the right to make fun of a heritage that is theirs as well as his. On their
account (which we must take seriously) it is part and parcel of Islam ‘to
vindicate the reputation of God and his spokesman against the militant
calumnies of evil’;29 freedom to blaspheme is freedom to assault Islam. In
any case, it is not at all clear why the intentionality of the conflict should
make a difference. Extrinsic conflict (such as conflict arising out of scarcity)
is as much a source of incompossibility as intrinsic, and we should still have
to deal with that impasse even if a given demand on scarce resources made
no reference at all to any other demand.
Aggressive liberalism
Perhaps in the end what liberals have to do is simply to bite the bullet and
insist – in an explicitly partisan way – that the only aims whose inclusion
can be countenanced in a compossible order are aims that are positively
imbued with the idea of such an order. Compossibility, they might insist, is
not only a liberal idea, but an idea for liberals, that is, an idea for those
who have formed their life plan in the specifically protestant spirit charac-
teristic of modern individualism. I have my doubts about this aggressive
liberalism, though I have advocated it elsewhere (as a solution to certain
difficulties afflicting liberal neutrality) in the following terms:
It is true that the liberal has a decidedly individualistic account of what con-
stitutes a conception of the good life. . . . But so what? The liberal has not arbi-
Jeremy Waldron 31
MCK1  1/10/2003  10:17 AM  Page 31
trarily plucked her account of what it is to have a conception of the good life
out of the air. She has settled on that view . . . because of the fundamental prin-
ciples and values that underlie her position. She thinks that the shaping of indi-
vidual lives by the individuals who are living them is a good thing; and she
fears for the results if that process is distorted or usurped by externally applied
coercion, even the coercion of Gemeinschaft. On the basis of these concerns
and these fears, she identifies moral views of this individualistic sort as those
between which legislative neutrality is required.30
After all, the very idea of compossibility emerged in modern (Kantian)
thought around a specific conception of individualistic autonomy and ful-
filment, and aggressive liberals may want to insist that the solicitude of 
compossibility be confined to individual lives that are governed by that con-
ception. Underlying the commitment to compossibility, it is this conception
of the self that is cherished. Apart from that conception, the Kantian
kingdom of ends, or the formal idea of compossibility, is not worth pursu-
ing as an ideal.
But I now think this aggressive liberalism is unsatisfactory as a solution
to the problem we are addressing. The main difficulty is that by restricting
the field of aims among which compossibility is sought, this approach arti-
ficially restricts the range of real problems to which compossibility can
provide the basis for a solution. Compossibility turns out to be a recipe not
for live-and-let-live in the real world, but for mutual admiration among
liberal individualists in an artificial world, exclusively populated by them
and their imitators. Opponents of liberalism would be entitled to say that
if the rules of the game have changed in that way, then they should be able
to make idealistic assumptions as well, and assume whatever is necessary
to present communitarian conceptions in a rosy light.
It has always been one of the advantages of the liberal approach to politi-
cal theory that it prides itself on dealing with the real world of men and
women as they actually are.31 Its claims about pluralism and the need for
toleration have been based on the actual dissent about value that can be
expected to emerge when men and women engage in thought about their
lives and their relations with others under less than perfect conditions. What
Rawls has called in his recent writings ‘the burdens of reason’ are impor-
tant here. They are the real-life circumstances that make it more or less
inevitable that, with the best will in the world, people will come up with dif-
ferent religious, philosophical and moral convictions.32 But exactly this
realism precludes any aggressive assumption that we are addressing a society
in which only protestant aims need to be considered or taken seriously.
The aggressive liberal might protest – and this is the last response I will
consider – that at least some communal or sensitive conceptions may be
accommodated in the order he envisages, provided they are represented in
a suitably individualistic form. The aggressive liberal might, for example,
treat each communitarian as though his vision of society were a private
hobby-horse, and each militant follower of Islam as though his aspiration
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to Sharia were just another innocuous protestant sect. But he would with-
hold support and respect for those visions to the extent that their propo-
nents went beyond these individualist ‘caricatures’.
Again, in the end that is a travesty of a solution. If the Rushdie affair has
taught us anything, it has shown that people will not put up with having
their ideas ‘respected’ in this truncated sense. Such an approach, tidying up
recalcitrant conceptions so that they fit neatly into the Kantian kingdom of
ends, may satisfy a theorist’s urge for order, but will do nothing to address
the real problem of social order that, as we saw at the beginning, evoked
the idea of compossibility in the first place. It seems more honest to admit
defeat in the long search for a solution to the algebra of compossibility,
than to adopt the artificial expedient of treating the proponents of com-
munal or militantly sensitive religions as though they were liberals.
Impasse
I have argued myself to a standstill on this. I have no rabbit to pull out of
the hat. It seems to me that, in a world where many people’s ethics and reli-
gions are sensitive to the activities and attitudes of others, there is no deter-
minate solution to the problem of compossibility.
This conclusion is bleak and uncomfortable. It means that we can no
longer confront issues like the case of Salman Rushdie with the conviction
that there is a perfectly good solution of live-and-let-live, if only people
would restrain themselves sufficiently to adopt it. There is no such accom-
modating solution. It means that we can no longer organize liberal aspira-
tions around the formula of the kingdom of ends. The algebra intimated in
Rawls’s principle of an adequate liberty for each, compatible with a similar
liberty for all, is insoluble. Other conceptions, other formulations for lib-
eralism must be found.
It is worth noting, finally, that although the difficulty is primarily one for
liberal political philosophy, there is precious little comfort for the oppo-
nents of liberalism in the conclusions we have reached. For when they are
finished saying ‘I told you so’, they too must confront a world in which
there is no solution like ‘live-and-let-live’, no principles for accommodat-
ing the reality of the adherents of different kinds of values living side-by-
side. That reality is likely to be troubling even to those who advocate the
social institution of some particular conception of the good (on either com-
munitarian or perfectionist grounds).
For perfectionists and communitarians, as much as their liberal oppo-
nents, must be prepared to engage with the real world. They must engage
with a world in which, as a matter of fact, a number of rival conceptions
of the good and the pious are at war with one another. They may lament
the ethical and religious pluralism of modern society, and urge the merits
of their own favoured conception, but anyone can do that. Rawls is right:
for the foreseeable future, this is the world we must live with. In other
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words, the problem of incompossibility between conceptions of the good is
at least a practical problem for everyone in modern society, not just for lib-
erals or for those who celebrate pluralism. The opponents of liberalism 
– the perfectionists or the communitarians – may offer the institutionalisa-
tion of a single conception of the good as their first-best solution’s to the
dilemmas of modern society. But since there is no chance whatsoever of that
solution’s being adopted, they must tell us something about their second-
best. At that level, seeking the compossibility of such conceptions as there
happen to be in society seems to be the counsel not just of liberal political
philosophy, but of ordinary common sense. To the extent that this is so, the
conclusions of the argument I have expounded in this chapter should be
taken as a disturbing and discomforting challenge to us all, not just as a
way of embarrassing liberalism.
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The reasonableness of pluralism
Matt Matravers and Susan Mendus
Introduction
In ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’, John Rawls remarks that the
aims of political philosophy depend upon the society it addresses, and that
modern, democratic societies are characterised by ‘the fact of pluralism’:
they are societies in which different people have different and conflicting
comprehensive conceptions of the good, different and conflicting beliefs
about the right way to live morally speaking.1 Moreover, and troublingly,
these differences are not explicable simply by reference to stupidity, in-
attention or faulty reasoning.2 On the contrary, in many cases they are the
predictable outcome of the operation of reason, which, Rawls claims, stands
under ‘burdens’. These burdens render pluralism reasonable, unavoidable
and not in any way regrettable. Rawls specifies the burdens of judgement
as follows:
a. The evidence – empirical and scientific – bearing on the case is conflicting
and complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate.
b. Even when we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that are 
relevant, we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different
judgements.
c. To some extent all our concepts, not only moral and political concepts, are
vague and subject to hard cases; and this indeterminacy means that we must
rely on judgement and interpretation [. . .] within some range [. . .] where
reasonable persons may differ.
d. To some extent [. . .] the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and par-
ticular values is shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life up
to now; and our total experiences must always differ.
e. Often there are different kinds of normative considerations of different force
on both sides of an issue and it is difficult to make an overall assessment.
f. Any system of social institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that
some selection must be made from the full range of moral and political
values that might be realized [. . .] Many [of these] hard decisions may seem
to have no clear answer.3
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Rawls goes on to claim that the fact that reason stands under these
burdens both tells us why pluralism is to be expected and explains why it
is not lamentable. He writes: ‘to think of the fact of pluralism as a disas-
ter is like thinking of the outcome of the operation of reason under condi-
tions of freedom as a disaster’.4
So if the aim of political philosophy depends on the society it addresses,
the aim of political philosophy in modern democratic societies, charac-
terised by the fact of reasonable pluralism, will be to find ways in which
people might live together harmoniously despite the persistence of reason-
able disagreement about the highest good or the best way to lead one’s life.
One such way, endorsed by Rawls and those ‘liberal impartialists’ who have
followed him, is to hold that since pluralism about conceptions of the good
is reasonable, it is unjust or illegitimate for one group of people to insist
on the superiority of their conception of the good and to use that as a reason
either to impose their conception of the good on another group of people,
or to repress any conflicting conception of the good. This might be called
the ‘injustice of imposition’.
The injustice of imposition is often held to follow from the reasonable-
ness of pluralism; but the conclusion that it is unjust, or illegitimate, to
impose a conception of the good on those who do not hold it (or, alterna-
tively, that it is unjust to repress a conception of the good simply because
one does not share it) cannot be drawn simply from the reasonableness of
pluralism itself. That judgement operates under burdens, and that reason
is indeterminate in matters of the good, does not tell us what we ought, or
ought not, to do. What is needed is some further claim, such as a commit-
ment to equal respect. So the argument is something like the following:
people are owed equal respect, and that fact, when taken together with the
fact that reason is indeterminate, delivers the conclusion that we ought not
to impose a conception of the good on those who do not hold it (and, of
course, are not unreasonable in refusing to hold it). It may be that, espe-
cially in Rawls’s recent work, this moral component is to be understood as
built into the idea of ‘reasonableness’ in reasonable pluralism, in which case
the argument will not need to proceed in two distinct steps. Nevertheless,
even on this interpretation it is possible to discern two aspects of reason-
ableness, one epistemological, the other moral.
Our aim in this chapter is to examine two arguments that purport to
underpin the move from the reasonableness of pluralism to the injustice of
imposition. On the one hand, there are those (including, for the most part,
Rawls) who hold that, since pluralism about conceptions of the good is rea-
sonable, we must not, in attempting to settle questions of justice, invoke the
truth of any conception of the good. This is the method of avoidance (or of
epistemological restraint). On the other hand, there are those (including
Brian Barry) who endorse the conclusion that what follows from the rea-
sonableness of pluralism is the injustice of imposition, but argue that this
must be underpinned not by the method of avoidance, but by scepticism.
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We begin with Barry’s sceptical argument (in the next two sections). In
the first of them we argue that in presenting the case for scepticism and
against epistemological restraint, Barry misrepresents epistemological
restraint. Moreover, we claim that underpinning the injustice of imposition
with scepticism exacts substantial existential costs given the connections
that there are between conceptions of human flourishing and views on the
status of conceptions of human flourishing. In the following section we
argue that scepticism cannot, in any case, deliver an unequivocal ground-
ing for the injustice of imposition unless a clear distinction can be drawn
between types of beliefs. Such a distinction is, we claim, implausible. We
then return to the method of avoidance and ask whether it can legitimise
the move from pluralism to the injustice of imposition. Our conclusion is
that it cannot: where arguments from scepticism succeed only by under-
mining the permanence of pluralism, arguments from avoidance succeed
only by undermining the priority of justice. Both scepticism and avoidance
are epistemological arguments, and the move from the reasonableness of
pluralism to the injustice of imposition requires a moral, not an epistemo-
logical, foundation.
Scepticism and the reasonableness of pluralism
What follows from the fact of pluralism at the epistemological level? Brian
Barry claims that what follows is scepticism, understood as doubt rather
than denial.5 Since we cannot persuade others of the truth of our own con-
ception of the good, we must hold that conception with some doubt, and
doubt is all that is necessary in order to generate (moderate) scepticism.
Rawls, however, resists this conclusion because he believes that political
liberalism ought, so far as possible, to stand back from questions of the
highest good and from metaphysical and philosophical questions generally.
In a society characterised by reasonable pluralism, there will not only be
conflicting conceptions of the highest good, or the right way to lead one’s
life, there will also be conflicting metaphysical and epistemological views
underpinning those different conceptions. Therefore, in arriving at princi-
ples of justice, no conception of the good should be advanced as true, nor
should any metaphysical or epistemological claim be assumed. For Rawls,
then, political liberalism is severely political. It is not simply political as dis-
tinct from moral; it is also political as distinct from metaphysical, episte-
mological, or more generally philosophical. On his account it is not simply
the case that people have conflicting conceptions of the good. It is also the
case that they have conflicting views about the status of those conceptions
of the good, and therefore a truly ‘impartialist liberalism’ must remain
agnostic both about comprehensive conceptions and about the metaphysi-
cal or epistemological underpinnings of those conceptions. Barry dissents.
He draws a distinction between what is comprehensive and what is con-
troversial, and argues that while ‘impartialist liberalism’ both can and must
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distance itself from a commitment to any comprehensive conception of the
good, it is futile for it to attempt to distance itself from saying anything
controversial. ‘Scepticism’, Barry writes,
is not a view of human flourishing. It is an epistemological doctrine about the
status of conceptions of what constitutes human flourishing. Scepticism is, of
course, a controversial view and some people would deny it. But there is no
way of avoiding the affirmation of a position that is not universally accepted
if one is to get anywhere at all. My claim is that the case for scepticism cannot
reasonably be rejected.6
As was noted above, Barry’s argument is that scepticism cannot reason-
ably be rejected precisely because of reasonable pluralism. Modern demo-
cratic societies are ones in which reasonable people fail to persuade each
other about which conception of the good is the correct one, and this failure
is sufficient to generate moderate scepticism even in the most intransigent
case, the case of personal religious revelation:
Suppose that God were (as it seemed to me) to grant me a vision in which
certain truths were revealed. A partisan of epistemological restraint would
suggest that I might be absolutely convinced of the veridical nature of this rev-
elation while nevertheless admitting that others could reasonably reject my evi-
dence. But is this really plausible? If I concede that I have no way of convincing
others, should that not also lead to a dent in my own certainty?7
For Barry, then, everything hinges on the extent to which the agent’s inner
convictions can legitimately withstand his or her failure to persuade others.
His claim is that the method of epistemological restraint is one that sup-
poses that people might legitimately continue to hold their beliefs with cer-
tainty even though they are unable to persuade others of the truth of those
beliefs. And this, Barry claims, is an implausible supposition. Even in the
strongest case, my inability to persuade others should dent my own cer-
tainty, and that dent is sufficient to force a move from avoidance to scep-
ticism. However, that move is not a disaster, since scepticism is not itself a
view of human flourishing but only an epistemological claim about the
status of conceptions of human flourishing.
Two points merit consideration here: the first is that Barry’s argument
misrepresents the aim of the method of avoidance, which is precisely to
detach questions of inner conviction from the success or failure of persua-
sive strategies. Barry supposes that we cannot justify imposing on others
because, and only because, we cannot be certain ourselves. But the method
of avoidance aims to render questions of certainty irrelevant to the legiti-
mation of political power. Thus, Rawls need not maintain that it is legiti-
mate to carry on believing with conviction even when we cannot persuade
others. He need only insist that, even if we do retain conviction, that does
not in itself legitimise imposition.
The second, and connected, point is that the argument from scepticism,
as advanced by Barry, rests crucially upon the appropriate existential con-
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dition of the agent in the modern world. According to Barry, it is because
we are not entitled to certainty in the face of our inability to persuade others
that we must move to moderate scepticism as the foundation of liberal neu-
trality. However, this claim undermines Barry’s own distinction between
views of human flourishing and epistemological doctrines about the status
of views of human flourishing. To see this, consider the following passage
from Charles Taylor’s ‘Sources of the self’. Taylor claims that in the modern
world we are in:
a fundamentally different existential predicament from that which dominated
most previous cultures and still defines the lives of other people today. That
alternative predicament is one in which an unchallengeable framework makes
imperious demands which we fear being unable to meet. We face the prospect
of irretrievable condemnation or exile, or of being marked down in obloquy
forever, of being sent to damnation irrevocably [. . .] the form of danger here
is utterly different from that which threatens the modern seeker, which is some-
thing close to the opposite: the world loses altogether its spiritual contour,
nothing is worth doing, the fear is of a terrifying emptiness, a kind of vertigo,
or even a fracturing of our world and body space.8
On Taylor’s account, one very important factor contributing to what he
calls our different ‘existential predicament’ is that we can no longer hold
our own beliefs unquestioningly: the plurality of different conceptions of
the good (in Taylor’s terms, different ‘frameworks’) has a tendency to leave
us in a state of doubt even about our most deeply held religious and moral
convictions, for we are constantly made aware of the fact that our frame-
work is but one among many others.
However, and as is clear from Taylor’s remarks, it is this condition of
doubt or uncertainty which is itself our problem. In modern societies, char-
acterised by the fact of pluralism, the manner in which we can properly
hold our beliefs has been seriously undermined by comparison with a world
in which they functioned as unquestionable frameworks. And our different
existential predicament is, for him, largely a consequence of the different
epistemological status of our conceptions of the good. It is the very fact
that we can no longer hold our views unquestioningly that itself contributes
in large part to the sense of vertigo that Taylor describes.
To put the point more generally, Taylor’s analysis suggests that the 
plurality of competing conceptions of the good generates uncertainty, and
that a conception of the good that is held with a degree of uncertainty is, in
important respects, a different conception of the good from one that is held
with assurance. It is not merely what we believe that contributes to and
constitutes our ability to flourish; it is also the way in which we are entitled
to believe it. If this is right, then while scepticism might not be a ‘view of
human flourishing’, it is nevertheless something that may contribute to or
detract from our ability to flourish. The religious believer who can hold a
belief in God unquestioningly is in a significantly different condition from
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the religious believer who can hold that belief only provisionally: the 
declaration ‘I know that my Redeemer liveth!’ has a different status from
the declaration ‘I believe that my Redeemer liveth, but since I am unable to
persuade others I must entertain doubt.’ Thus, Barry’s distinction between
conceptions of the good and views about the epistemological status of 
conceptions of the good is unstable and, in consequence, so is the distinc-
tion between what is comprehensive and what is controversial. Scepticism
is not itself a comprehensive conception of the good; but it is a view that
has consequences for comprehensive conceptions of the good.
Barry’s appeal to a form of scepticism that is grounded in the degree of
certainty that the agent is entitled to feel about his or her beliefs is there-
fore one that yokes together the ‘existential’ condition of the agent and the
justification of liberal impartiality. His argument for scepticism depends
upon the claim that if the agent cannot persuade others of his views, then
he must hold them only provisionally, and it is the inappropriateness of
continuing to hold one’s beliefs with certainty despite one’s inability to per-
suade others that motivates Barry’s appeal to scepticism and that in turn
underpins the move from the reasonableness of pluralism to the injustice
of imposition. It is, however, precisely the importance of separating exis-
tential condition from justification that motivates Rawls’s project. Pace
Barry, Rawls’s reluctance to ground political liberalism in moderate scepti-
cism is not simply a forlorn hope that he can avoid saying anything con-
troversial. It is also a desire to justify political arrangements without
undermining any comprehensive beliefs and, as Taylor’s analysis indicates,
the argument from moderate scepticism cannot perform this trick because
it depends crucially on the claim that if I cannot persuade others of the
truth of my comprehensive belief, I must hold that belief only provision-
ally. To accept this is to accept that the justificatory project of scepticism
has extensive existential costs. It protects the injustice of imposition only
by sacrificing the commitment to the reasonableness of pluralism.
Scepticism and the injustice of imposition
Our concern in this chapter is with the transition from the reasonableness
of pluralism to the injustice of imposition. In the last section, we suggested
that it would be unwise for the ‘impartialist’ to underpin this move with a
commitment to scepticism, and that the reason it would be unwise is
because scepticism as an epistemological doctrine is not easily separable
from comprehensive conceptions of the good or conceptions of human
flourishing. The desire of the ‘impartialist’ to stand back from comprehen-
sive doctrines will be undermined by the endorsement of scepticism. In this
section we question whether scepticism is capable of delivering the injus-
tice of imposition.
One case that seems to support the argument is that in which orthodox
Catholics wish to organise society around their religious beliefs. The objec-
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tion to such a proposal is that their desire is a desire to impose a concep-
tion of the good on others who do not share it. Since reason is indetermi-
nate in these cases (pluralism is reasonable) and since, moreover, people are
owed equal respect, it would be unjust to allow the orthodox Catholics to
have their wish. Here, then, is a case in which the reasonableness of plu-
ralism, when combined with a commitment to equality of respect, delivers
the injustice of imposition.
Two considerations are pertinent here: first, and as we have seen already,
the reasonableness of pluralism is held, by Barry at least, to follow from
the fact that we lack certainty vis-à-vis our conceptions of the good. And
we lack certainty (or should lack certainty) simply because we often lack
the resources to persuade others of what we believe. So the reasonableness
of pluralism is vindicated by lack of certainty. The second consideration
concerns the scope of the indeterminacy of reason. Is this a doctrine that
holds quite generally, or is it to be confined to conceptions of the good?
Take the first point first: the reasonableness of pluralism is supported by
the fact that we cannot always persuade others of our beliefs, and the claim
is that, since we cannot persuade others, we must lack certainty ourselves.
However, this argument has its limitations. Very many questions concern-
ing the use of public power can only be resolved with recourse to empiri-
cal claims about the world, and in many cases we will be uncertain about
these claims. Consider the case of the sustainable use of resources. Any pro-
posal for the use of political power to restrict current consumption in order
to provide a just distribution of the Earth’s resources over generations must
confront the problem that we lack certainty about the consequences of
current levels of consumption. We cannot know with certainty what the
consequences of continuing to consume at current rates will be, and yet we
do not deem that lack of certainty to be disabling in arriving at decisions
about public policy. In brief, then, the indeterminacy of reason is differently
understood in the different cases. Where conceptions of the good are
involved, the claim is that any uncertainty, however small, is sufficient to
legitimise the injustice of imposition; but where factual or scientific matters
are concerned, the case appears to be different, and the standard of reason
invoked is simply that one be ‘certain enough’ or that one follow, in Barry’s
phrase, ‘the consensus of the scientific community’.9
One obvious response here is to note that liberal impartiality is meant to
apply only to the procedures (often, constitutional procedures) by which
public policy is decided. It is not necessarily meant to apply to the policies
themselves. Thus, as long as the procedures by which environmental poli-
cies are arrived at can be justified without reference to a privileged con-
ception of the good, the absence of certainty over the consequences of
current consumption need not stymie policy making. This is the move made
by Barry, who glosses the procedural requirements of neutrality as follows:
‘decisions should be open to public debate, capable of being defended by
rational arguments, and so on’.10
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In citing ‘rational arguments’ and ‘the consensus of the scientific com-
munity’, Barry appears to be relying on a common-sense claim that the in-
determinacy of reason (the reasonableness of pluralism) is confined to
conceptions of the good, and this brings us on to the second question raised
above: what is the scope of the doctrine of the indeterminacy of reason? If
it is to be scepticism that grounds the injustice of imposition in cases of
conceptions of the good, but that allows public policy to proceed where
there is doubt about the facts of the matter, then it must be held that the
indeterminacy of reason reigns over conceptions of the good, but does not
apply to those beliefs about the world (and to rational argument in rela-
tion to that world) that are needed for decisions to be arrived at in areas
such as intergenerational justice. However, in order to defend that con-
tention, we need to be able to make a clear distinction between conceptions
of the good on the one hand, and beliefs about the way the world is (sci-
entific or factual beliefs) on the other.
The idea that there is such a distinction is flatly denied by some for whom
science is on a par with ethics and aesthetics. ‘Pragmatism’, Richard Rorty
writes,
does not erect Science as an idol to fill the place once held by God. It views
science as one genre of literature – or, put the other way around, literature and
the arts as inquiries on the same footing as scientific enquiries [. . .] Physics is
a way of trying to cope with various bits of the universe; ethics is a matter of
trying to cope with other bits.11
So, for Rorty and those like him, the idea that science or rules of rational
enquiry can be neutral is a mistake. There is no distinction between con-
ceptions of the good and beliefs about the way the world is.
Rorty’s stance is controversial, and it is open to the ‘liberal impartialist’
to disassociate herself from it. However, what might be taken to be the
opposing view of the nature and status of science is no more supportive of
the distinction that is needed to sustain the sceptical grounding of the injus-
tice of imposition. Consider the argument that science is different; that it
provides us with testable predictions (and unless it does so, it is not science);
that (in relevant circumstances) we have reason to act in accordance with
those beliefs that have withstood testing and the threat of being falsified.
Such a view may be able to differentiate between conceptions of the good
and ‘scientific’ beliefs. After all, the idea is to distinguish between the fal-
sifiable predictions of science and other propositions (and, in so doing, to
draw attention to closed systems). However, this view does not distinguish
between these different kinds of claims in a way that allows the ‘liberal
impartialist’ to call upon science as neutral.
The difficulty is that in adopting what we might call a ‘positivist’ con-
ception of science, and in using the consensus of the scientific community
as a touchstone for scientific results, the ‘impartialist’ threatens to under-
mine many conceptions of the good that include, or are underpinned by,
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different beliefs about the way the world is and about how we come to
know how it is. The positivist conception of science will provide clear guid-
ance on what is to count as ‘evidence’, as ‘rational enquiry’, and so on –
guidance about which we cannot be certain, but the status of which can,
on the positivist model, be distinguished from non-science, or pseudo-
science. However, the declarations of this science may be challenged by, for
example, Christian fundamentalists who regard the Bible stories of Noah’s
ark and of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah as providing evidence
relevant to current decisions and the claims of future generations. In short,
the positivist model provides the distinction between beliefs about the good
and beliefs about the world, and it provides us with confidence in some
beliefs of the latter kind; but it does so at a cost to impartiality.
The root of the problem lies with the interdependence of conceptions of
the good and conceptions of how the world is. As Hilary Putnam notes in
his discussion of Bernard Williams’s views of truth in science and in ethics:
Consider, for example, the question as to whether we can condemn the Aztec
way of life, or, more specifically, the human sacrifice that the Aztecs engaged
in. On Williams’ view, the Aztec belief that there were supernatural beings who
would be angry with the Aztecs if they did not perform the sacrifices was, as
a matter of scientific fact, wrong. This belief we can evaluate. It is simply false.
. . . But we cannot say that the Aztec way of life was wrong. Yet the feature
of the Aztecs’ way of life that troubles us (the human sacrifice) and their belief
about the world that conflicts with science were interdependent. If we can say
that the Aztec belief about the Gods was false, why can we not say that the
practice to which it led was wrong?12
The issue, as is highlighted by this quotation, is that a Rortyan concep-
tion of science will not distinguish the status of ‘scientific’ and ‘ethical’
claims; but then it will also not provide the ‘impartialist’ with enough mate-
rial to construct the decision procedures necessary for making public policy
in contested areas. The positivist conception, by contrast, does distinguish
between the two types of claims, but it delivers too much. It delivers the
materials, but only by denying that they are contested.
Taken together, these arguments suggest that the indeterminacy of reason
understood as delivering moderate scepticism plays different roles in dif-
ferent contexts. Specifically, lack of certainty is deemed sufficient to deliver
the injustice of imposition in cases that concern conceptions of the good,
but not in cases that concern facts about the way the world is. This is the
force of the sustainability case. However, it is not clear that beliefs about
the way the world is can be so sharply differentiated from beliefs about the
good. This is the force of the examples of the fundamentalist Christian and
the Aztec, and of the discussion of conceptions of science. The idea that
there is impartial space in deliberating over procedures for a conception of
‘rational argument’ or for considering facts about the world is implausible.
Any such space will be as infected with controversy and uncertainty as are
disputes about the nature of the good.
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Our concern is with the transition from the reasonableness of pluralism
to the injustice of imposition. We have argued that the attempt to under-
pin this transition, and to justify the injustice of imposition, with mod-
erate scepticism faces three obstacles. First, there is an interconnection
between conceptions of the good and the epistemological status of concep-
tions of the good. This interconnection destabilises the distinction between
the controversial and the comprehensive. The controversial claim of mod-
erate scepticism undermines some conceptions of the good. Second, the pro-
ponents of scepticism must attribute very different standards of certainty in
respect of beliefs about conceptions of the good and beliefs about the way
the world is, yet the justification of there being such different standards is
moot. Third, people’s views about the way the world is will characteristi-
cally be influenced by their conceptions of the good. There is a two-way
relationship between beliefs about the way the world is and conceptions of
the good. In falling back on a particular picture of how the world is, the
‘impartialist’ must accept either that this is to fall back on just one view
amongst many, or insist that it is the best view (of those currently avail-
able). In both cases the price paid for acquiring the injustice of imposition
(if it can be acquired at all) is borne by the respect for pluralism.
Epistemology and the reasonableness of pluralism
We began by noting, with Rawls, that the aims of political philosophy
depend upon the society it addresses, and that, in modern societies charac-
terised by reasonable pluralism, one very important aim of political phi-
losophy is to show how people may live together in conditions of justice
and stability while subscribing to different, and conflicting, comprehensive
conceptions of the good. We have further argued that, if scepticism deliv-
ers the injustice of imposition, it does so only by sacrificing respect for the
significance and permanence of pluralism. In this section our question is,
‘Can the method of avoidance fare any better?’ Our argument is that it
cannot because the conception of belief that it deploys, and that it needs in
order to respect the significance and permanence of reasonable pluralism,
is one that cannot, at the same time, show the injustice of imposition.
As we have seen, Rawls believes that pluralism is permanent because it
is the outcome of the operation of reason under conditions of freedom.
Additionally, he believes that pluralism is significant because, in the modern
world, ‘belief matters’. He writes:
When moral philosophy began, say with Socrates, ancient religion was a civic
religion of public social practice, of civic festivals and public celebrations.
Moreover, this civic religious culture was not based on a sacred work like the
Bible, or the Koran, or the Vedas of Hinduism. The Greeks celebrated Homer
and the Homeric poems were a basic part of their education, but the Iliad and
the Odyssey were never sacred texts. As long as one participated in the
expected way and recognized the proprieties, the details of what one believed
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were not of great importance. It was a matter of doing the done thing and
being a trustworthy member of society, always ready to carry out one’s civic
duties as a good citizen – to serve on juries or to row in the fleet in war – when
called upon to do so. It was not a religion of salvation in the Christian sense
and there was no class of priests who dispensed the necessary means of grace;
indeed the ideas of immortality and eternal salvation did not have a central
place in classical culture.13
However, he goes on to argue that this early understanding has changed
in two highly significant ways: first, the medieval period saw the rise of ‘sal-
vationist’ conceptions of religion; second, the Reformation period witnessed
the fragmentation of religion into distinct sects, each of which had its 
own view of the route to salvation. What we find, therefore, in the post-
Reformation period is a dramatically altered conception of the significance
of religious belief, which comes to be, no longer a matter of indifference,
but a matter of supreme importance on which depends one’s prospects of
attaining life everlasting. Moreover, Rawls argues that the significance
accorded to belief in this period has survived into the modern age and has
become a central feature of modernity. So, if the aims of political philoso-
phy depend on the society it addresses, then modern political philosophy is
faced with the task of demonstrating the injustice of imposition in a world
in which (reasonable) pluralism is permanent and in which belief matters.
It is against this background that Rawls now advocates the method of
avoidance (epistemological restraint). It is because pluralism is permanent
and because belief matters that a truly ‘impartialist liberalism’ must remain
agnostic both about comprehensive conceptions and about their epistemo-
logical or metaphysical underpinnings. But if belief matters, in what sense
exactly does it matter, and what kind of defence of ‘impartialist liberalism’
can be generated from the contention that belief matters?
One way of answering this question may be found by turning to the phi-
losophy of John Locke. In Political Liberalism, Rawls refers approvingly to
Locke’s defence of toleration, and it is not difficult to see the parallels
between that defence and Rawls’s own endorsement of epistemological
restraint: both writers eschew a defence of toleration grounded in scepti-
cism; both insist on the significance of individual belief; both insist that the
state must remain agnostic about questions of truth and falsity. Crucially,
for our purposes, however, Locke’s defence of toleration contains within it
an argument for the significance of belief. It gives us a sense in which ‘belief
matters’. Locke writes: ‘No man can, if he would, conform his faith to the
dictates of another. All the life and power of true religion consists in the
inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without believ-
ing.’14 So, in the religious context, belief matters because the faith that is
required for salvation is a faith that depends crucially upon the individual’s
recognising and acknowledging something for himself.
Moreover, the importance of believing for oneself (of the ‘inward and full
persuasion of the mind’) is not restricted to the religious context, but is a
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specific case of Locke’s more general epistemology as given in the Essay on
Human Understanding, where he writes:
For I think we may as rationally hope to see with other Men’s Eyes, as to 
know by other Mens Understandings. So much we ourselves consider and
comprehend of Truth and Reason, so much we possess of Real and True
Knowledge. The floating of other Mens Opinions in our brains makes us not
a jot more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was Science,
in us is but Opiniatrety, whilst we give up our assent to reverend Names and
do not, as they did, employ our own Reason to understand those Truths, which
gave them reputation . . . In the Sciences, everyone has so much, as he really
knows and comprehends: what he believes only and takes upon trust, are but
shreads . . . Such borrowed Wealth, like Fairy-Money, though it were Gold in
the hand from which he received it, will be but Leaves and Dust when it comes
to use.15
So, our question is ‘Why does belief matter?’ and Locke’s answer is that,
in the religious context, it matters because it is only sincere and inner belief
that is pleasing to God, and the state lacks the means to coerce such belief.
Hence the futility of persecution designed to save the soul of the heretic.
However, and for Locke, the religious case is not unique, for in all other
contexts, too, it is important that we come to see things for ourselves and
not rely on the opinion of others, or take things on trust.
As a piece of epistemology, Locke’s story is highly implausible, for it is
surely the case that, especially in science, we do take things on trust, and
indeed we often (perhaps usually) have no choice but to do so. Beliefs about
the way the world works, its construction and composition, rest on complex
scientific considerations, and in the modern world there can be few, if any,
who are in a position to ‘find out for themselves’ before taking penicillin
for example, or sending the car to the garage. These are areas where we
cannot sensibly expect to be able to do anything other than take things on
trust. Additionally, it might be thought that, even in the area of the moral,
we sometimes both can and should take things on trust. Annette Baier’s
recent work in moral philosophy mounts a very powerful case for the indis-
pensability of trust in moral contexts,16 and, as we have seen, Hilary Putnam
has gone yet further, urging that the very distinction between what we
accept as scientific fact and what we believe to be morally right is less clear
than is often supposed. So, as an epistemological claim, Locke’s theory is
suspect in three distinct ways: it is not a theory that can plausibly be
defended in the area of science; it is contentious even in the area of the
moral; and in any case the moral and the scientific are intertwined.
However, we will not dwell on these objections, important though they
are, for our main aim is not to cast doubt on Locke’s claim that belief
matters, but rather to establish whether there is an interpretation of it that
shows how the reasonableness of pluralism can lead to the injustice of impo-
sition. It is, after all, in this context that Rawls insists that the modern world
is one in which ‘belief matters’, and what we therefore need is not a set of
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objections to that claim but, if possible, a plausible interpretation of it. 
To this end, we will examine the defence of toleration that follows from
Locke’s concept of belief. Famously, Locke claims that coercion works by
operating on a person’s will. That is to say, in coercing someone we attempt
to influence their decision-making via threats or inducements. However, he
goes on to insist that belief is not subject to the will. That is to say, I cannot
alter my beliefs simply by deciding to change them, or willing that they
change. It then follows that all attempts to coerce religious conformity are
strictly irrational, since they involve deploying means utterly inappropriate
for the desired end. They are an attempt to change belief by changing 
the will; but belief is not subject to the will. Waldron puts the matter this
way:
Laws, Locke says, are of no force without penalties and the whole point of
penalties is to bring pressure to bear on people’s decision-making by altering
the pay-offs for various courses of action so that willing one particular course
of action (the act required or prohibited by law) becomes more or less attrac-
tive to the agent than it would otherwise be. But this sort of pressurizing is
crazy in cases of action which men are incapable of performing no matter how
attractive the pay-off or unattractive the consequences. Sincerely believing a
proposition that one takes to be false is an action in this category . . . the impo-
sition of belief, then, by civil law has been shown to be an absurdity.17
Again, we are not here concerned with whether or not Locke’s position
is a plausible one. There are certainly reasons for doubting that it is, and
some of those reasons are given by Waldron in the article quoted from
above. What does concern us, rather, is the kind of defence of toleration
that Locke’s theory, if true, would support. And here there are reasons for
thinking that it cannot deliver a principled defence, but only, and at most,
a modus vivendi.
This general point is noted by a number of commentators, but comes in
different guises. Thus, Waldron notes that, by insisting on the irrationality
of persecution, Locke ignores entirely the question of whether and why per-
secution is morally wrong. He writes: ‘what one misses above all in Locke’s
argument is a sense that there is anything morally wrong with intolerance,
or a sense of any deep concern for the victims of persecution or the moral
insult that is involved in the attempt to manipulate their faith’.18 Similarly,
Paul Kelly concludes his discussion of Locke with the reflection that: ‘In the
“Two Tracts” Locke suggested that toleration would invite anarchy and
disorder, in the “Essay” and “Letter” he argued that toleration of practices
consistent with civil order was most likely to contribute to peace and sta-
bility. In each case what differs is the perception of the threat posed to the
social order, and the policy most likely to remedy it. There is no attempt
to advance a principled argument for toleration as a necessary component
of the good society.’19 And again, Russell Hardin claims that ‘Locke did not
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assert fairness as a prior or trumping principle against any particular reli-
gious value. Rather, he argued for accommodation as a practical antecedent
to achieving any religious value. It is the practical consideration of oppos-
ing forces that makes agreement to less than one’s full theory of the good
reasonable.’20
What all this suggests is that Locke’s defence of toleration, based as it is
in an epistemological premise, cannot deliver a moral conclusion. At best,
it will explain why persecution may be irrational, ineffective, or a waste of
time; but it will be impotent to explain its moral wrongness or injustice.
The injunction to refrain from persecution, not because it is wrong, but
because it is irrational, looks very much like a modus vivendi account, and
the more so if we concede to Waldron the further claim that, even if coer-
cion cannot operate directly on belief, it can easily operate on the epistemic
apparatus surrounding belief:
suppose the religious authorities know that there are certain books that would
be sufficient, if read, to shake the faith of an otherwise orthodox population.
Then, although again people’s beliefs cannot be controlled directly by coercive
means, those who wield political power can put it to work indirectly to rein-
force belief by banning everyone on pain of death from reading or obtaining
copies of these heretical tomes. Such means may well be efficacious, even
though they are intolerant and oppressive, and Locke, who is concerned only
with the rationality of persecution, provides no argument against them.21
Recall that the motivation for this discussion of Locke is to try to find
an interpretation of the claim that ‘belief matters’ that will sustain the fact
of pluralism while simultaneously showing the injustice of imposition. And
the charge that successive commentators level against Locke is that his
account is impotent to do the latter. As an account of why belief matters it
is suspect; but even if its understanding of belief were correct, it still would
not deliver the right kind of defence of toleration, because it cannot show
why imposing one’s views on those who do not concur with them is morally
objectionable. It can only, and at most, show why such imposition is inef-
fective, imprudent, or irrational.
If correct, then this conclusion has important implications for the general
(Rawlsian) project of attempting to defend impartial theories of justice via
epistemological abstinence, for what is suggested here is that to the extent
that epistemological abstinence is indeed an epistemological position, it
cannot sustain a defence of toleration as a requirement of justice. This is
the burden of all the comments referred to above. Epistemology shows us
only, and at most, why a particular policy of persecution might be ineffec-
tive or irrational; it cannot show us why it might be morally wrong. So, in
the modern context, if we interpret the claim that ‘belief matters’ as a
Lockean claim about the epistemic conditions of belief, then we have no
more than a modus vivendi defence of toleration.
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Conclusion
Our aim in this chapter has been to ask how the injustice of imposition
might follow from the reasonableness of pluralism, and we have considered
several epistemological arguments designed to effect the transition. The
argument from scepticism has been rejected both because it exacts heavy
existential costs and because it requires belief to play different roles in dif-
ferent contexts – something that it cannot do given the difficulty inherent
in distinguishing between facts on the one hand, and conceptions of the
good on the other. Epistemological restraint is also problematic because it
rests upon a conception of belief, and an understanding of how belief
matters, that can deliver only a modus vivendi defence of toleration. The
argument from epistemological restraint cannot tell us why imposition is
unjust as distinct from imprudent. If these arguments are persuasive, then
they suggest that the move from the permanence of pluralism to the injus-
tice of imposition is one that requires, not an epistemological, but a moral
foundation. To say this is, of course, to say nothing about the nature of
that moral argument; it is only to suggest that, without some moral argu-
ment or other, ‘impartialist liberalism’ cannot adequately address the
problem of modernity, which is to show that, in a world characterised by
pluralism, imposition is not merely inefficacious, but unjust.22
Notes
This chapter originated in conversations at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
where we gave separate papers to a seminar on religious toleration. We are grate-
ful to Stephen Darwall and Edwin Curley for the invitation to that seminar. Earlier
versions of our joint efforts resulted in a paper at the University of Hull and the
University of Southampton. Our thanks to the participants on those occasions, and
to Catriona McKinnon for very helpful written comments.
1 J. Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. S. Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1999), pp. 421–48.
2 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993),
pp. 55–8.
3 Ibid., pp. 56–7.
4 Ibid., p. xxiv.
5 B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
6 Ibid., p. 174.
7 Ibid., p. 179.
8 C. Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 18.
9 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 161n.
10 Ibid., p. 161.
11 R. Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), 
p. xliii.
12 H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1992), p. 106.
52 The reasonableness of pluralism
MCK2  1/10/2003  10:19 AM  Page 52
13 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xxi.
14 J. Horton and S. Mendus (eds), John Locke: A Letter Concerning Toleration in
Focus (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 18.
15 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1975), I. iv. 23.
16 A. Baier, Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1994), pp. 95–202.
17 J. Waldron, ‘Locke: Toleration and the rationality of persecution’, in Horton
and Mendus (eds), John Locke, pp. 98–124, at p. 104.
18 Ibid., p. 120.
19 P. Kelly, ‘John Locke: Authority, conscience and religious toleration’, in Horton
and Mendus (eds), John Locke, pp. 125–46, at p. 144.
20 P. Kelly, Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1998), p. 149.
21 Waldron, ‘Locke: Toleration and the rationality of persecution’, pp. 116–17.
22 Our separate, and rather different, attempts to provide such a moral founda-
tion may be found in M. Matravers, Justice and Punishment: The Rationale of
Coercion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) and S. Mendus, Impartiality
in Moral and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Matt Matravers and Susan Mendus 53
MCK2  1/10/2003  10:19 AM  Page 53
3
Toleration and the character 
of pluralism
Catriona McKinnon
This chapter addresses two influential ways of thinking about which 
political principles we ought to adopt. The first way of thinking starts with
expectations about how persons ought to relate to one another in political
discourse. Political principles are justified by reference to these expectations.
The second way of thinking starts with certain values around which, it is
claimed, people ought to structure their lives. Political principles are then
justified by reference to these values. These approaches to political justifi-
cation are in competition, and arguments for political principles of tolera-
tion and beyond can be made on either approach.
In the work of John Rawls we find an example of the first, ‘construc-
tivist’, approach. Constructivist values are taken to be appropriate in 
political justification because people exercising their practical reason to
solve shared problems of justice would be committed to these values. Con-
structivist justificatory values are the values of people who aim at peaceful
co-existence and profitable cooperation in political society. Different
accounts of what counts as peaceful co-existence and, especially, profitable
cooperation yield different constructivist values.1 I shall offer an interpre-
tation of Rawls whereby political principles of toleration and beyond are
justified in virtue of the legitimate expectation that citizens themselves move
beyond toleration in their political discourse by engaging with one another
in public reason.
In the work of Joseph Raz we find an advocate of the second, ‘perfec-
tionist’, approach. Perfectionist justificatory values are to be found in a true
moral theory, or true faith, and are claimed to be appropriate as justifica-
tory values in virtue of their place in a true moral theory, or true faith. Raz
argues for multiculturalist political principles that transcend toleration by
appeal to the perfectionist value of personal autonomy. On this approach,
we start with values embedded in a true moral theory and justify political
principles by reference to these values, independent of the expectations we
have of those to whom the principles are justified.
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My argument will be that one way of pinpointing what is at issue between
perfectionist and constructivist political justifications is to examine assump-
tions about the character of pluralism that inform each approach. These
assumptions relate to the interpersonal attitudes we can expect of people
facing shared problems of justice in conditions of pluralism. I shall argue
that these assumptions are not implicit in – and cannot be derived from –
assumptions about the nature of pluralism, but must instead be argued for
separately. If, as Raz thinks, the most we can expect of persons in plural-
ism is toleration, then the justification of political principles beyond toler-
ation – for example, his multiculturalist principles – cannot be constructed
from expectations about the interpersonal attitudes people will adopt in
pluralism. This makes sense of Raz’s perfectionist appeal to a true moral
theory to support justificatory values beyond political toleration. Raz drives
a wedge between what we can expect of persons and what we can justify
as a matter of political principle with certain claims about the inevitability
and appropriateness of conflict and hostility between people facing politi-
cal problems, whereas these assumptions are absent from Rawls’s con-
structivism. If Raz’s claims are true then Rawls’s approach is undermined,
because the expectations of persons upon which it relies are unrealistic or
inappropriate. If the most that can be expected of citizens is toleration then
the logic of an appeal to perfectionist values to justify political principles
beyond toleration is clarified and the perfectionist approach to political 
justification becomes more attractive.
Let me clear the ground for this argument by making some brief remarks,
in the next section, on the relationship between toleration qua personal 
attitude and toleration qua political principle.
Toleration: political and personal
Toleration can be conceived as a personal attitude or as a political prin-
ciple. All defences of toleration as a personal attitude or as a political 
principle consist of arguments to show that toleration is the appropriate
response to people who differ from us, and whom we dislike or of whom
we disapprove.
The object of toleration in the personal and political spheres is a disliked
or disapproved of person. Persons to be tolerated can differ from us in terms
of their values, practices, beliefs, ends, forms of community and associa-
tion, dispositions, tastes, or preferences. By placing the personal and politi-
cal concepts of toleration on spectrums of possible responses to disliked
and disapproved of people we can clarify what toleration demands. On each
scale, toleration marks a substantial shift of principle or attitude; each stage
subsequent to toleration should be thought of as transcending the previous
stage. Each stage represents a more positive set of responses to disliked and
disapproved of differences than the preceding stage.
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Toleration as a political principle
Repression
Perhaps the historically most common political response to disliked and 
disapproved of people has been the attempt to crush them, repress them,
or drive them out. Principles of repression are sometimes accompanied by
a denial that the disliked and disapproved of person differs, deep down,
from the repressor. But repression born of the denial of difference repudi-
ates its own basis, as repression would be unnecessary if it were true that
difference did not exist. However, not all political repression need contra-
dict its own basis. Repressive states can admit the existence of disliked and
disapproved of people and attempt to justify their repression of these people
by asserting the superiority of a world in which these people cease to differ
from their repressors, and the acceptability of the use of state coercion to
bring about this state of affairs.
Official discouragement
Political agents who agree that a world free of disliked or disapproved of
people is a better world, but who shrink from repression and the coercion
required to create this world, might adopt a policy of official discourage-
ment. Here the attempt is to impede access to ways of life incorporating
the disliked or disapproved of differences without repressing people who
already practise these ways of life. We can see the distinction between
repression and official discouragement by considering certain policies
towards homosexuality. The UK legislation overturned by the 1959
Wolfenden Report was repressive: in making homosexual sex between men
a crime this legislation aimed at preventing the practice of this kind of sex
between existing gay men with the coercive power of the law. But there 
are ways of being intolerant of homosexual people without attempting to
repress them, as evinced in Section 28 of the Local Government Bill in the
UK.2 Section 28 does not explicitly attempt to repress homosexual activity
between gay people but aims instead to restrict the flow of information
about homosexuality, and thereby indirectly to discourage young and 
closeted people from reflecting on their sexual preferences.
Toleration
Toleration of disliked or disapproved of people requires refraining from
repression and official discouragement of the practices constitutive of these
differences. Because interference can take the form of direct coercion, as in
the case of repression, or insidious distortion, as in the case of discourage-
ment, a political principle of toleration demands refraining from both. Prin-
ciples of toleration are adopted by states when they refuse to interfere with
peoples’ pursuit of life styles associated with the disliked or disapproved of
differences by means of force or propaganda. But a tolerant society need
not be one in which people who differ from the majority in disliked or dis-
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approved of ways are invited to participate in the major political and social
institutions of that society. The political principle of toleration is negative:
it demands restraint with respect to the use of state power as it affects
people who lead lives disliked or disapproved of by the majority, or by those
with the most political power. Of course, no thinker recommends that 
the scope of political toleration be unlimited. Dislike and disapproval are
often responses to aspects of persons causing genuine harm to others, or to
society. To accommodate these cases many thinkers use a ‘harm principle’
to set the limits of toleration; where they disagree is on what constitutes
harm.
Political inclusion
Toleration only demands action when abstention has not been observed, so
as to put right the wrongs of official discouragement or repression. But
political responses to disliked and disapproved of people can go beyond 
toleration. In addition to refraining from using political means to interfere
with citizens’ pursuit of disliked and disapproved of lifestyles, the state can
also attempt to include these people in its major political, social and eco-
nomic institutions. This principle can be used to justify equal opportunities
legislation, including policies of positive discrimination and quota systems.
It can also underpin certain policies in education such as citizenship edu-
cation, which asks that children be made to cultivate a range of skills 
necessary for good citizenship and a healthy degree of participation and
interest in the political life of their society. Most non-libertarian political
philosophers endorse some principles of political inclusion.
Official promotion
A final possibility is that the state actively promotes the differences that
prompt dislike and disapproval in the institutions of civil society. Policies
designed to preserve minority languages, to protect opportunity for reli-
gious worship and traditional dress through restrictions on employment 
legislation and schooling requirements, and to enable same-sex and 
religion-based polygamous marriages can all be justified by reference to
principles of official promotion. Official promotion is a strong principle
variously defended as demanded by equal opportunity for self-respect, a
concern for the conditions of personal autonomy, equal concern and
respect, and recognition of relationship between individual freedom and an
agent’s social context, and other liberal and communitarian ideals.
Personal toleration
Repression
As at the political level, a common response to disliked and disapproved of
people at the personal level is an attempt to repress them. Repression is
often motivated by hatred of others, disgust at their way of life, or simple
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indifference towards them. However, repression is also sometimes practised
in the name of the salvation, character, or well-being of the repressed
person. As at the political level, repression at the personal level is some-
times accompanied by the claim that the repressed person is actually no
different at heart from the repressor, and is contradictory in the same 
way.
Toleration
The personal attitude of toleration demands a principled refusal to inter-
fere with disliked or disapproved of people so as to change the aspects of
the person that prompt dislike or disapproval.3 The personal attitude of tol-
eration demands the principled avoidance of the use of force against persons
to eradicate their disliked or disapproved of differences. It also prohibits
the use of propaganda at the personal level. As well as refraining from 
physical coercion as a way of changing the disliked or disapproved aspects
of a person, the tolerant person does not engage in verbal bullying of people
whom she dislikes and of whom she disapproves. This is not to say that
the tolerant person does not attempt to persuade the person whom she tol-
erates of the error of her ways. But there is an important difference (often
hard to discern) between persuasion and harassment. Anti-abortionists 
who picket abortion clinics may conceive of themselves as attempting to
persuade women entering the clinics of the error of their ways; but arguably
they are actually harassing these women. Although personal toleration is
compatible with attempts at persuasion, such engagement is not demanded
by personal toleration. People can exhibit the virtue of toleration by simply
minding their own business. As at the political level, no thinker argues that
toleration at the personal level is appropriate with respect to all disliked
and disapproved of people. Some disliked and disapproved of people are
intolerable.
Engagement
Moving beyond toleration, the next level of response to disliked and 
disapproved of people is an attempt to engage with them as disliked and
disapproved of people (i.e. without denial of their differences). The attitude
of engagement demands that a person attempt to understand the values,
practices, beliefs, ends, forms of community and association, dispositions,
tastes, or preferences of people whom she dislikes and of whom she disap-
proves, either by attempting to engage them in some kind of discussion
about their differences, or by imaginatively reconstructing their point of
view. Engagement requires empathy and an attempt at interpretation of the
other person’s situation so as to understand the meaning of the symbols,
practices, exchanges, and language that constitute that situation. But a
person’s engagement with another does not require that she come to a
complete understanding of the person whom she dislikes and of whom 
she disapproves, let alone that she overcome her dislike or disapproval.
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Engagement simply requires that a person genuinely attempt to understand
the disliked and disapproved of other in terms of her beliefs, motivations,
the relationship between her beliefs and motivations, her history, her 
biography, her self-image, and her values.
As with toleration, it is not the case that engagement is always appro-
priate. The limits of engagement might be set with the harm principle asso-
ciated with toleration (remembering that engagement transcends toleration)
in conjunction with some ‘comprehensibility’ principle. The comprehen-
sibility principle would establish the extent to which persons can, or ought
to, engage with disliked and disapproved of others by specifying the points
at which another’s beliefs or behaviour become incomprehensible. Some
insane people might be beyond the limits of engagement in virtue of their
cognitive disorder; some very evil people might exceed these limits in virtue
of the monstrous nature of their values and preferences.
Appreciation
The final level of personal response to difference asks that people overcome
their dislike of one another even in the face of their disapproval of one
another. Friendship, family relations, and relations of love can all involve
attitudes of appreciation. Appreciation does not demand that a person deny
her differences with others. Such denials are damaging; when one person
subsumes her identity in the identity of another it is a sign of an unhealthy
relationship, not devoted love.
With these rough scales of response to difference in place, we can isolate
three key questions of political justification:
1 What sorts of political principles are justified in conditions of permanent
pluralism?
2 What sorts of personal attitudes can we legitimately expect people to
adopt in response to one another in conditions of permanent pluralism?
3 How, if at all, do the attitudes specified in (2) affect the justification of
principles specified in (1)?
With respect to (1), no political philosopher on the contemporary scene
defends political principles of repression. Some thinkers defend political
principles of official discouragement, but such defences are rare. Most con-
temporary political philosophers defend some principles of toleration, and
all non-libertarian liberal thinkers defend some principles beyond tolera-
tion. The principles specified in answer to (1) will in some part provide an
answer to (2): people ought to adopt those attitudes demanded by the 
political principles of (1). With respect to question (3), one way of seeing
how the attitudes specified in answer to (2) must affect the principles spec-
ified in answer to (1) is through examination of the argument for political
toleration from pluralism. This argument purports to justify political prin-
ciples of toleration without reference to personal attitudes of toleration, 
and by reference only to the incommensurable nature of the differences that
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contribute to pluralism. In criticism of this argument I shall show that some
assumptions about citizens’ personal attitudes must be made before politi-
cal toleration can be claimed to be appropriate. Revealing these assump-
tions shows that reflections on the nature of pluralism are a red herring
with respect to arguments for political toleration: in making such argu-
ments, we must focus instead on the character of pluralism.
Toleration and the nature of pluralism
Pluralism is a view about the nature of the differences between people 
to which personal attitudes and political principles of toleration respond.
Pluralists argue that many differences between values, ends and options 
are incommensurable in two important senses. First, many different values,
practices, ends, or forms of association are not realisable within the life of
a single person or a single community (the thesis of practical incompatibil-
ity). And second, it makes no sense, or is inappropriate, to compare many
different values, practices, ends or forms of association in terms of their
value (the thesis of evaluative incomparability).4 For Raz, the ‘mark of
incommensurability’ is a failure of transitivity with respect to the value of
certain options (ends, values, practices, etc.).5
Two valuable options are incommensurable if (1) neither is better than the
other, and (2) there is (or could be) another option that is better than one but
is not better than the other.6
Taking two options, A and B, the failure of transitivity in (1) shows that
A and B per se cannot compared in terms of their value, and the failure 
of transitivity in (2) shows that there is no master-value C that enables 
comparison of A and B in terms of their value. Raz’s account of evaluative
incomparability improves on Isaiah Berlin’s famous account. Berlin took
the denial of evaluative incomparability to entail the assertion of a master-
value making possible evaluative comparisons. But Raz makes it clear that
options are incommensurable both when they cannot be ranked by refer-
ence to a master-value, and when they simply cannot be ranked.7 The denial
of evaluative incomparability does not entail the assertion of a master-value.
The argument from pluralism for political principles of toleration is as
follows:
1 Given incommensurability conflict between those with different ends and
values is a permanent feature of the world.
2 Given incommensurability it is illegitimate to impose certain values and
ends on people by restricting their negative liberty in such a way as to
force or encourage the adoption of other preferred values and ends.8
3 Therefore, repression and official discouragement are illegitimate. 
Political principles of toleration are the least to which we ought to be
committed.
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The argument is that if differences between people are inevitable and
incommensurable then political principles of toleration will always be 
necessary to ensure that those with power do not use coercive force or pro-
paganda to attempt illegitimately to eradicate those who differ from them.
Political principles of toleration are necessary for preserving peace, stabil-
ity and justice between people divided by incommensurable differences.9
This argument for toleration only succeeds given a commitment to indi-
vidual freedom as negative in Berlin’s sense.10 As my interest here is in the
liberal tradition, and all liberals place some value on negative liberty, I will
not address this commitment (although we might ask what the truth of the
thesis of evaluative incomparability would add to the normative injunction
in (2)). Instead, I want to focus on a more serious flaw in the argument.
Political toleration is a response to disliked and disapproved of differ-
ences. However, the argument from pluralism does not establish that incom-
mensurable differences will prompt dislike or disapproval. The two theses
of incommensurability appearing as premises in the argument from plural-
ism assert the existence of ineradicable and evaluatively incomparable dif-
ferences: they address the nature of pluralism. What they do not establish
is the character of the disagreements between those separated by incom-
mensurable differences. It could be the case that the two theses of incom-
mensurability are true and yet political toleration is unnecessary: those
separated by incommensurable differences might not dislike and disapprove
of one another. Or it could be the case that the two theses of incommen-
surability are false and political toleration is necessary: those separated by
commensurable differences might dislike and disapprove of one another.
Given that the two theses of incommensurability do not establish that those
separated by incommensurable differences will dislike and disapprove of
one another, the argument for toleration from pluralism is a red herring.
To understand the need for toleration, and the prospects for transcending
it, requires an account of the character of pluralism. The focus of this
account will be what personal attitudes towards disliked and disapproved
of others can reasonably be expected of people. All arguments for political
principles of toleration and beyond must operate with some assumptions
about the character of pluralism. Examination of these assumptions as they
appear in the work of Rawls and Raz explains their different approaches
to the justification of political principles.
The character of pluralism: the Rawlsian picture
On Rawls’s view, the values of political justification are derived from the
exercise of persons’ practical reason as it addresses principles securing 
the conditions for peaceful and profitable cooperation in political society.
According to Rawls, people so conceived will address one another in public
reason when attempting to solve their political problems. Rawls’s concep-
tion of justice is justified to the extent that these expectations are legitimate.
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The only resources Rawls has for political justification are these expecta-
tions; Rawls denies that he need invoke any values beyond these expecta-
tions in order to justify his political principles. For citizens to address one
another in public reason demands that they move beyond the personal 
attitude of toleration to attitudes of engagement.
For Rawls, a stable and just society is one in which there is an overlap-
ping consensus among reasonable citizens on a conception of justice. Given
the fact that pluralism is permanent, this conception of justice cannot 
be justified by reference to any one comprehensive moral, religious, or
philosophical doctrine. Citizens who differ on questions of doctrine can
nevertheless reach an overlapping consensus on a conception of justice by
debating political questions in public reason. When citizens address one
another in public reason they present their proposals to one another in
terms that they reasonably expect one another to understand and accept,
and are disposed to act on proposals agreed in public reason, given the
assurance that all other citizens will also act on these principles: ‘The point
of the ideal of public reason is that citizens are to conduct their fundamental
discussions within the framework of what each regards as a political con-
ception of justice based on values that others can reasonably be expected
to endorse, and each is, in good faith, prepared to defend that conception
so understood.’11
When citizens achieve the ideal of public reason they ‘think of themselves
as if they were legislators’ in order to consider which principles and 
policies they would adopt using public reason.12 If they find a discrepancy
between the principles and policies they would adopt in public reason, and
the principles and policies adopted by their actual political representatives,
then they have a duty to use democratic means to change the way in which
their representatives legislate.
Rawls’s public reason demands a personal attitude of engagement
because it is realised in a process of deliberation between citizens. For a
person to determine how to present her political proposals in public reason,
where these proposals are informed by her religious, moral and philosophi-
cal beliefs, requires that she attempt to understand the religious, moral and
philosophical beliefs informing the political proposals of others. Until she
engages with others in this way she cannot engage in public reason. Admit-
tedly, the degree of personal engagement demanded by Rawls’s ideal of
public reason is limited to the political sphere. But given that citizens’ politi-
cal proposals are informed by their non-political values and beliefs, public
reason can demand a substantial degree of engagement with others on 
non-political issues.13 ‘When citizens deliberate, they exchange views and
debate their supporting reasons concerning public political questions. They
suppose that their political opinions may be revised by discussion with other
citizens: and therefore these opinions are not simply a fixed outcome of
their existing private or nonpolitical interests.’14
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Rawls’s description of how overlapping consensus might arise reveals a
dynamic conception of relations between citizens in political community. In
discussion of the sixteenth-century wars of religion he claims that the 
resolution of these wars with principles of religious toleration was not a
result of an overlapping consensus on these principles, but rather the result
of a certain balance of power (and some exhaustion) establishing a modus
vivendi.15 Rawls argues that it is possible to move from such a modus
vivendi, via a constitutional consensus, to an overlapping consensus, and
that moving through these stages of consensus stimulates important changes
in citizens’ attitudes to one another.16
In a modus vivendi, citizens exhausted by war acquiesce to certain politi-
cal principles of toleration. Recognising that these principles secure the
important good of political stability for themselves and those they care 
for, citizens reach a constitutional consensus by coming to agree on liberal
political principles guaranteeing certain basic political rights necessary for
safeguarding democratic electoral procedures. Consensus on such a consti-
tution requires the limited use of public reason: citizens affirm the consti-
tution as a good for themselves and their fellow citizens, disregarding the
balance of power between them.
The move from constitutional to overlapping consensus involves a broad-
ening of the scope of the consensus and a deepening of the relations between
the conception of justice and citizens’ conceptions of the good.17 Once stable
constitutional consensus is established, citizens make their political claims
through the democratic procedures established by the constitution. Within
the framework of minimal political rights necessary for a stable democracy,
citizens discuss wider and more controversial questions of political inclusion
and official encouragement. These involve a discussion of the distribution
of rights to freedom of thought, expression and association per se, ques-
tions of distributive justice, the distribution of power and opportunity in
society, and access to the social bases of self-respect. Citizens addressing
one another in public reason on these questions of political inclusion and
official encouragement must engage with one another on a level deeper than
that required by stable constitutional consensus, because the questions 
of justice they discuss intersect with their comprehensive doctrines to a
much greater degree than constitutional essentials. For example, in a diverse
society there is likely to be far more disagreement over the appropriate 
patterns of economic redistribution than over the principle of universal 
suffrage. Overlapping consensus emerges when citizens agree on principles
of justice to govern, not just the distribution of political rights attaching to
democratic procedures, but also matters relating to the basic structure 
of society: its main political, social, and economic institutions.18 Citizens
moving towards overlapping consensus on political principles beyond 
toleration must adopt personal attitudes of engagement that demand 
more than toleration.19
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To sum up, the fact that Rawls’s central justificatory tool – public reason
– requires engagement on the part of citizens separated by differences shows
that Rawls conceives of the ideal character of pluralism as non-hostile.
Hostility involves a turning away from or rejection of another person: those
separated by differences prompting hostility cannot engage in public reason.
Debate in Rawls’s public reason is only possible between those who differ
– often to the extent of disliking and disapproving of one another – yet who
are willing to make attempts at interpretation and understanding. The
success of Rawlsian political justification relies on the claim that citizens
ought to adopt attitudes of engagement. If it can be shown that citizens are
incapable of adopting these attitudes, or ought not to adopt them, then 
the justification of liberal principles must proceed according to a different
model.
The character of pluralism: the Razian picture
Raz’s argument for political principles beyond toleration invokes the value
of personal autonomy rather than the expectation that individuals them-
selves move beyond the personal attitude of toleration. On Raz’s view, an
appeal to perfectionist values in political justification is necessary because
the competitive character of pluralism makes any expectations that people
move beyond the personal attitude of toleration illegitimate. If this is true
then our expectations of persons ought not to inform our justification 
of political principles beyond toleration, and Rawlsian constructivism in
political justification is called into question.
Competitive pluralism not only admits the validity of distinct and incompati-
ble moral virtues, but also of virtues which tend, given human nature, to
encourage intolerance of other virtues. That is, competitive pluralism admits
the value of virtues possession of which normally leads to a tendency not to
suffer certain limitations in other people which are themselves inevitable if
those people possess certain other, equally valid, virtues.20
The two theses of incommensurability asserted by Raz establish the
inevitability of differences between persons in possession of different sets
of virtues, and that evaluative comparisons between the options to which
these virtues attach is often inappropriate. The claim that Raz adds to these
theses with his characterisation of pluralism as competitive is that these 
conflicts will be accompanied by certain ‘appropriate emotional or attitu-
dinal concomitants or components’ that make personal attitudes of engage-
ment inappropriate.21 This is a claim about the character, rather than the
nature, of pluralism.
Conflict is endemic . . . pluralists can step back from their personal commit-
ments and appreciate in the abstract the value of other ways of life and their
attendant virtues. But this acknowledgement coexists with, and cannot replace,
the feelings of rejection and dismissiveness towards what one knows is in itself
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valuable. Tension is an inevitable concomitant of accepting the truth of value
pluralism.22
Raz thinks that in conditions of competitive pluralism the most we can
legitimately ask of people whose ineradicable conflict with one another
reaches beyond their values, beliefs, practices etc. to their moral emotions
is the personal attitude of toleration. Given that the moral emotions attach-
ing to conflicts between incommensurables are, according to Raz, entirely
appropriate and not to be revised once an all-things-considered judgement
about the conflict has been made by the agent, we cannot expect more of
people than that they refrain from acting on these emotions.
Raz claims: ‘I am not simply wrong in inclining to be intolerant of
another person’s meanness or vulgarity. These rightly trigger intolerant
responses. A person who does not react to them in this way is lacking in
moral sensibility. Yet it is a response which should be curbed.’23
It is important to note that by characterising pluralism as competitive
Raz is not simply making the claim that engagement has limits. All thinkers
can agree on this point. By registering the sorts of differences that Raz
thinks breed appropriate hostility it becomes clear that he conceives of 
pluralism as competitive both at the edges and at the centre. Ordinary vices
like vulgarity, cultural differences, and even professional differences are
Raz’s examples of characteristics for which ‘attitudunal concomitants’ of
hostility are appropriate.24 Hostility in Raz’s competitive pluralism is not
simply reserved – as it should be – for very bad people. Hostility permeates
relations between those with different cultures, religions, professions, and
weaknesses.
If toleration is the most we can ask of people as a personal attitude in
conditions of competitive pluralism, can political principles beyond tolera-
tion be justified? Not on a model of political justification whereby princi-
ples are constructed from our reasonable expectations of citizens. But once
the justification of political principles is detached from what we can legit-
imately expect of citizens, political principles beyond toleration become 
justifiable even when we can expect nothing but toleration from citizens.
Raz’s argument for political principles of official encouragement – his
multiculturalism – does not rely on the expectation that individuals as 
citizens ought to cultivate attitudes of engagement.25 Raz’s argument for
multiculturalism is consistent with the possibility that no person adopts an
attitude of engagement towards those whom she dislikes and of whom she
disapproves. Rather than offering multiculturalist principles as the object
of an overlapping consensus between citizens discussing political questions
in public reason, Raz argues for these principles by reference to the value
of protecting the conditions of personal autonomy for all, which he takes
to be a political value independent of expectations about how citizens ought
to regard this value.26 Raz conceives of personal autonomy as achievable
only in conditions in which a person has a certain minimum of mental 
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faculties, a variety of adequate options from which to choose goals that will
contribute to her well-being, and a degree of freedom from coercion. A prin-
ciple of toleration (the ‘harm principle’) ensures freedom from coercion,
and multiculturalist principles protect a variety of meaningful cultural
options.
Raz’s characterisation of pluralism as inevitably, appropriately and deeply
competitive makes the expectation that citizens move beyond the personal
attitude of toleration in their political discourse illegitimate. This charac-
terisation of pluralism forces liberals to adopt forms of political justifica-
tion that trace connections between moral values and political principles
independent of the question of what sorts of attitudes we can expect from
citizens.
If Rawls is right about the character of pluralism then it is not clear why
we should invoke perfectionist values in justification of political principles
beyond toleration. If Raz is right about the character of pluralism then we
cannot avoid invoking perfectionist values in justification of political prin-
ciples beyond toleration. To decide between these two approaches we need
to know who is right about the character of pluralism. I shall not attempt
to establish this here. Instead, I shall lay out some considerations that each
side might invoke in defence of its characterisation of pluralism.
The prospects for engagement
There are two broad ways of understanding Raz’s claims about the com-
petitive nature of pluralism. One relates to human nature, and the other
relates to the appropriateness of competition in pluralism independent of
facts about human nature.
The first way of understanding the claim about the competitiveness of
pluralism is as a claim about human nature: human psychology makes
engagement between those who dislike and disapprove of one another, if
not impossible, then rare and difficult. If human nature makes certain atti-
tudes inevitable even in the best of conditions then the justification of politi-
cal principles must not demand that these attitudes are overcome. Human
nature means that dislike and disapproval breed repulsion, dismissal, and
avoidance, all of which militate against engagement. Raz seems to make
this claim in stating that ‘[c]ompetitive pluralism not only admits the valid-
ity of distinct and incompatible moral virtues, but also of virtues which
tend, given human nature, to encourage intolerance of other virtues.’27
This account of the competitive character of pluralism relies on a brute
claim about human nature: human psychology makes engagement between
those who dislike and disapprove of one another rare and difficult. This
sweeping claim will be difficult to defend. But Raz’s political perfectionism
can be supported by a far more modest claim about the impossibility, or
rarity and extreme difficulty, of engagement with disliked or disapproved
of others in the political realm in order to discuss questions of justice. If
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this claim is true then any form of political justification reliant on the ex-
pectation that citizens will engage in public reason to discuss political 
questions is threatened.
Such engagement in the political sphere probably is rare and difficult; but
the fact that something is difficult does not mean that it is not required or
appropriate. Furthermore, it is not clear that the best explanation for this
fact is that human nature prevents such engagement at the political level.
As Cohen and Rawls point out, liberal political institutions and procedures
educate citizens to democratic citizenship.28 If human nature is not opposed
to engagement per se, they argue, then moving from modus vivendi through
constitutional consensus to overlapping consensus brings about changes in
citizens enabling them to engage with one another in public reason. The
requirement that citizens engage in public reason is most pressing when a
democratic political culture has evolved against the background of an over-
lapping consensus. Although we have not yet experienced a political com-
munity that approximates to this ideal, the expectation that citizens engage
in public reason can remain central to political justification in virtue of the
claim that, by so engaging, people create political institutions that better
enable them to engage, and that a political community organised around
these institutions is more peaceful and profitable than one without these
institutions. On this view, we might argue that the reason why it is rare to
find citizens engaging in public reason is not that human nature as it is
realised in political life militates against this; rather – being charitable – we
might claim that many states have simply failed to move beyond modus
vivendi, or have failed to achieve the right constitutional consensus, in
which case the conditions in which it becomes easier for people to engage
in public reason are missing. As these failures are corrected the expectation
that citizens address one another in public reason becomes more insistent,
although on this picture the expectation is always legitimate. An alterna-
tive, uncharitable, explanation of this failure might be that people are just
too lazy and weak-willed to do what is required of them qua citizens.
The second way of reading Raz on competitive pluralism is as making a
purely normative claim: the attitudes that thwart engagement are appro-
priate or desirable independent of any facts about human nature that make
these attitudes inevitable. It is hard to envisage an argument for the appro-
priateness of attitudes that thwart engagement in the absence of claims
about how human nature opposes engagement. Such an argument would
have to establish that it is appropriate that, for example, soldiers hate stu-
dents, that corporate raiders sneer at conservationists, and that priests damn
prostitutes. Apart from the fact that these are not typical – perhaps not even
common – attitudes of the first type of person to the second type, it is not
clear in what sense these attitudes could be claimed to be appropriate. Are
they morally desirable? Are they necessary virtues of participation in the
life to which they attach?29 Are they cognitively appropriate to ensure some
sort of coherence in a person’s mental life? Each of these readings of the
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pure normative claim would be difficult to support, but they all have the
same counter-intuitive implication. Soldiers who like students, corporate
raiders who praise conservationists, and priests who bless prostitutes fail
to have attitudes that they ought to have. Defending this implication on any
reading of the pure normative interpretation will be a tall order.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued that strategies of justification with respect to
political principles of toleration and beyond are shaped by conceptions of
the character of pluralism, as opposed to conceptions of its nature. This
means that assessment of these competing strategies must focus on claims
about what can reasonably be expected of persons in conditions of plural-
ism. Until we have a way of settling this question, the jury must remain out
with respect to the question of whether political principles should be justi-
fied by reference to a true moral theory, or instead by reference to the im-
peratives of practical reason as it is exercised by people facing problems of
justice in conditions of pluralism.
Notes
This chapter is based on a paper I presented at the Universities of Reading, Exeter,
Manchester, and York. I would like to thank the audiences at each of these events
for their comments.
1 For a defence of a form of Constructivism that takes self-respect and its social
conditions as a core justificatory value, see my Liberalism and the Defence of
Political Constructivism (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).
2 Section 28 began as a Private Member’s Bill in 1986, and was eventually passed
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4
Toleration, justice and reason
Rainer Forst
In contemporary debates about the idea and the problems of a multicul-
tural society the concept of toleration plays a major but by no means clear
and uncontested role. For some, it is a desirable state of mutual respect or
esteem, while for others it is at best a pragmatic and at worst a repressive
relation between persons or groups.
In the following, I want to suggest an understanding of toleration that
both explains and avoids these ambiguities. First, I distinguish between a
general concept and various more specific conceptions of toleration.1 This
brief discussion shows that the concept of toleration is marked by two para-
doxes that a conception of toleration should be able to resolve. On that
basis, four paradigmatic conceptions of toleration are outlined, but I argue
in favour of one of them, the ‘respect conception’, on normative grounds,
while subsequently I draw out its epistemological implications. The central
thesis that I put forward is that toleration is a virtue of justice and a demand
of reason. The conclusion takes up again the two paradoxes mentioned at
the beginning and how they are solved by the conception I propose.
The concept of toleration and its paradoxes
The general concept of toleration should be explained by six characteris-
tics, which I shall briefly outline below.
(1) First, there is always a particular ‘context of toleration’. This refers,
on the one hand, to the relation between the tolerator and the tolerated: for
instance, between parents and children, between friends, between members
of a religious community, between citizens, and even between ‘strangers’,
who share none of these more specific contexts. Depending on these con-
texts, the reasons for toleration and for its limits can differ. On the other
hand, the question arises as to whether the subjects of toleration are indi-
viduals or groups or ‘the state’, as well as whether the objects of toleration
are practices, single acts, or beliefs, to name just a few possibilities.
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(2) It is essential to the concept of toleration that the tolerated beliefs or
practices are judged to be wrong or bad; following Preston King, this can
be called the ‘objection component’.2 If this component is absent, there is
either indifference or affirmation – two attitudes that are incompatible with 
toleration. The objection must be normatively substantive, but is not nec-
essarily restricted to ‘moral’ reasons; for, when discussing the concept of
toleration generally, it would be inappropriate to exclude other forms of
normative critique, such as, for instance, aesthetic critique.3
(3) Besides the ‘objection-component’, toleration requires a positive
‘acceptance component’ (also King’s term), which does not cancel out the
negative judgement but gives certain positive reasons which trump the neg-
ative ones in the relevant context. The said practices or beliefs, then, are
considered to be wrong, but not intolerably wrong. In the case in which
both the objection and the acceptance reasons are called ‘moral’, this leads
to the much discussed paradox as to how it can be morally right or even a
moral duty to tolerate what is morally wrong or bad.4 In order to resolve
this paradox, a conception of toleration is required that explains the
meaning of ‘moral’ – and of ‘right’ versus ‘wrong’ and ‘bad’ – in a differ-
entiated way.
(4) The concept of toleration entails the idea of certain ‘limits of tolera-
tion’. They lie at the point where reasons for rejection become stronger than
the acceptance reasons (something that still leaves open the question of the
appropriate means of intervention). It is important to see that the reasons
for rejection need not be identical with the reasons for objection;5 they can
be independent or (what is more likely) internally connected to the reasons
of acceptance, which specify certain conditions and limits for that accep-
tance. It furthermore needs to be stressed that there are two limits involved
here. The first one lies between the normative realm of the practices and
beliefs one agrees with, and the realm of the tolerable practices and beliefs
that one finds wrong but still can accept in a certain way. The second limit
lies between this latter realm and the realm of the intolerable, which is
strictly rejected (the limit of toleration properly speaking).
Another paradox emerges here, which is that toleration necessarily
implies intolerance towards those who are seen as intolerable and, quite
often, as intolerant as defined by those limits. The concept of tolerance
makes no sense without certain limits, though as soon as these are sub-
stantively defined, tolerance seems to turn into nothing but intolerance.
There is thus no ‘true’ tolerance.6 To avoid this paradox, a conception of
toleration must be able to show how far its limits can be drawn in a mutu-
ally justifiable and non-arbitrary way.
(5) The exercise of toleration cannot result from compulsion, since the 
tolerating subjects would then be under an impossibility of voicing their
objections and acting accordingly. If this were the case, they would merely
‘endure’ or ‘suffer’ certain practices or beliefs against which they are pow-
erless. To conclude from this, however, that the tolerating party must be in
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a socially dominant position, having the power to interfere with the prac-
tices in question, is not justified. A minority that does not have this kind
of power may still be tolerant and convinced that in the case in which it
had such power it would not use it to the disadvantage of others.7
(6) Finally, toleration as a practice and tolerance as an attitude must be
distinguished. A legal-political practice within a state that guarantees
certain liberties to minorities can be called tolerant, as can also the personal 
attitude of accepting certain practices one finds objectionable. The former,
though, can exist without the latter, for example where a state grants certain
rights to minorities even though the majority of its citizens may disagree
with such a policy, whilst the government acts on purely strategic motives.
An analysis of toleration that is focused on the political-structural level of
the peaceful coexistence of different cultural groups8 thus leaves open the
crucial question as to what kind of attitude or virtue of tolerance citizens
of a state can expect from one another.
Four conceptions of toleration
The following discussion of conceptions of toleration is not to be under-
stood as a reconstruction of a linear historical development, nor should
these conceptions be regarded as ‘regimes of toleration’ located in different
historical and social circumstances. Rather, they represent different under-
standings of what toleration consists in, understandings that can be simul-
taneously present in a society, so that conflicts about the meaning of
toleration may be understood as conflicts between these conceptions.9
The first one I call the permission conception. Here, toleration is a 
relation between an authority or a majority and a dissenting, ‘different’
minority (or various minorities). Toleration then means that the authority
(or majority) gives qualified permission to the members of the minority to
live according to their beliefs on the condition that the minority accepts the
dominant position of the authority (or majority). As long as the expression
of their difference is limited – that is, is an exercitium privatum, as it was
traditionally called – and as long as the groups do not claim equal public
and political status, they can be tolerated on both pragmatic and principled
grounds. On pragmatic grounds, because this form of toleration is regarded
as the least costly of all possible alternatives and does not disturb civil peace
and order as the dominant party defines it (but rather contributes to it). On
principled grounds, because one thinks it is morally wrong (and in any case
fruitless) to force people to give up certain deep-seated beliefs or practices.
The permission conception is one that we find in many historical docu-
ments and precedents illustrating a politics of toleration (such as the Edict
of Nantes in 1598 or the Toleration Act 1689) and that – to a considerable
extent – still informs our understanding of the term. Here toleration means
that the authority or majority, which has the power to interfere with the
practices of a minority, nevertheless ‘tolerates’ them, while the minority
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accepts its dependent position. The situation or the ‘terms of toleration’ are
non-reciprocal: one party allows another certain things on conditions that
the first one specifies. Toleration appears in the sense of a permissio nega-
tiva mali: not interfering with something that is wrong but not ‘intolera-
bly’ harmful. It is this conception that Goethe had in mind when he said:
‘Tolerance should be a temporary attitude only: it must lead to recognition.
To tolerate means to insult.’10
The second conception, which can be called the co-existence conception,
is similar to the permission conception in regarding toleration as the best
means to end or avoid conflict. Here also toleration is not understood as a
value in itself or as a moral duty: it is primarily justified in a pragmatic-
instrumental way. Where the two conceptions differ, however, is in the 
constellation of power between the parties. With respect to the co-existence
conception, its circumstances are not those in which an authority or major-
ity stands over a minority, but rather one of groups, roughly equal in power,
who see that for the sake of social peace and their own interests toleration
is the best of all possible alternatives (a historical example is the Peace
Treaty of Augsburg 1555). These groups prefer peaceful co-existence to
conflict and agree to a reciprocal compromise, to a certain modus vivendi.
The relation of tolerance is no longer vertical but horizontal:11 the subjects
are at the same time the objects of toleration. Here, a state of mutual tol-
erance is preferred to conflict as a matter of practical necessity; thus co-
existence toleration does not lead to a stable social situation in which trust
can develop, because once the constellation of power changes, the reasons
for being tolerant on the side of the more powerful group disappear.12 It is,
however, possible that over time such a fragile modus vivendi can develop
into a more stable system of co-existence and cooperation.13
The third conception of toleration – the respect conception – is one in
which the parties tolerating each other respect one another in a more 
reciprocal sense: on moral grounds they regard themselves and others as
citizens of a state in which members of all groups – majority or minorities
– should have equal legal and political status.14 Even though they hold
incompatible ethical beliefs about the good and right way of life, and differ
greatly in their cultural practices, they respect each other as moral-political
equals in the sense that their common framework of social life should – as
far as fundamental questions of the recognition of rights and liberties 
and the distribution of resources are concerned – be guided by norms that
all parties can equally accept, and that do not favour one specific ‘ethical
community’.15
There are two models of the respect conception: ‘formal equality’ and
‘qualitative equality’. The former operates with a strict distinction between
the political and the private realm, according to which ethical (i.e. cultural
or religious) differences among citizens of a legal state should be confined
to the private realm, so as to avoid differences and strife in the political
sphere. As citizens, all are equal, and as political equals, they transcend their
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more narrow ethical beliefs. This version is clearly exhibited in the ‘secular
republicanism’ (as I would call it) of the French authorities who held that
headscarves with a religious meaning have no place in public schools in
which children are educated to be autonomous citizens.16 But it can also be
found in classical liberal views defending the priority and purity of equal
subjective rights.
On the other hand, the model of ‘qualitative equality’ reacts to the
problem that certain forms of formal equality favour those ethical-cultural
communities whose beliefs and practices make it easier to accommodate the
public/private distinction. In other words, the ‘formal equality’ model tends
to be intolerant toward ethical-cultural forms of life that require a certain
kind of public presence that others either do not require, or – as is most
often the case – that require a public presence that differs from traditional
and hitherto dominant cultural forms. Thus, on the ‘qualitative equality’
model, persons respect each other as political equals with distinct ethical-
cultural identities that must be tolerated as (a) especially important for a
person and (b) providing good reasons for certain exceptions from or
changes to existing legal and social structures, in order to promote 
material and not just formal equality. Social and political equality and 
integration are thus seen to be compatible with cultural difference – within
certain (moral) limits of reciprocity.17
In many debates on toleration, an additional conception is present, which
I call the esteem conception. This implies an even fuller, more demanding
notion of mutual recognition between citizens than that of the ‘respect con-
ception’. Accordingly, being tolerant does not mean respecting members of
other cultural forms of life or religions as moral and political equals though
objecting to their ethical ways of life. Rather, it means having some kind
of ethical esteem for them; that is, regarding their beliefs as ethically valu-
able conceptions that are – even though different from one’s own – in some
way ethically attractive and held for good reasons.18 However, this con-
ception must involve something like ‘reserved esteem’, that is, a kind of 
positive acceptance of a belief that for some reason one still considers to
be less attractive than one’s own. As valuable as aspects of the tolerated
belief may be, it also has other aspects that are viewed as misguided or
wrong, either from one’s personal perspective or from a more objective
point of view.19
The question now is: how do we decide which of these conceptions is the
most justifiable? Should we prefer either the least or the most demanding
conception in terms of mutuality of recognition? Given what has been said
so far, it seems clear that the concept of toleration itself cannot provide us
with an answer to this question, since we have just seen that there are many
conceptions that can be plausibly called conceptions of toleration. Hence,
I suggest that neither the concept of toleration nor a concept such as that
of recognition can help us to decide this question: they are what I call ‘nor-
matively dependent concepts’ that are in need of further, independent 
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normative resources in order to have a certain substance and content. My
thesis is that the concept of justice or, more specifically, a certain concep-
tion of justice in accordance with a notion of practical reason, can provide
such a content.
Justice and the threshold of reciprocity and generality
The reason for my claim that a conception of justice is necessary in arguing
for a conception of toleration is that the context in which the question of
toleration between citizens arises is a context of justice: what is at issue here
is the just – that is, mutually justifiable – legal and political structure for a
pluralistic political community of citizens with different ethical beliefs.
Claims for toleration are raised as claims for justice, and intolerance is a
form of injustice, favoring one ethical community over others without 
legitimate grounds.20 Hence, toleration is a virtue of justice. My thesis is
that, by considering the question of justice, I shall be in a position to show
that, in its form of ‘qualitative equality’, the ‘respect conception’ is supe-
rior to the others.
To cut a long argument short,21 I think that at the centre of a conception
of political and social justice there should be a theory of the intersubjective
justification of norms that can reasonably – that is, with good reasons –
claim to be reciprocally and generally valid. The norms that regulate how
the most important rights and resources are granted and distributed have
to be justifiable with reasons that can be accepted equally by all citizens as
free and equal persons.
The theory of ‘public justification’ that is thereby implied rests upon the
criteria of reciprocity and generality. Reciprocity means that A cannot claim
a right or a resource she denies to B and that the formulation of the claim
and the reasons given must be open to questioning and not be determined
by one party only. If, invoking the principle of reciprocity, A says that it is
right to force B to accept what A regards as true, since she herself would
be happy to accept such an imposition, if she were in B’s position with
regard to the truth, she actually violates true reciprocity. A may believe that
she knows and acts in favour of the truth – and something good and true
for B also – but she puts the truth as she sees it beyond the demand for
mutual justifiability, so that her truth claim turns into an attempt to domi-
nate B. But nobody may deny others their basic (moral) right to justifica-
tion, to be given adequate reasons for actions or norms that affect them in
their status as free and equal persons. In connection with this, generality
means that the reasons that are sufficient to support the validity of norms
should not just be acceptable to, say, two dominant parties in a society
(Protestants and Catholics, for example), but to every person and party
involved. The realm of justification must be identical with the realm of the
validity of a norm. This does not mean that there can be no valid norm
until everybody has actually been persuaded to agree, for there will always
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be people who do not want to compromise their views and interests; rather,
it means that a norm’s validity is insufficiently established as long as the
norm can be ‘reasonably rejected’ with reasons that are themselves recip-
rocally non-rejectable.22
Using the criteria of reciprocity and generality a distinction can be made
between, on the one hand, justifiable general moral norms and, on the other,
ethical values that cannot be generalised in this way but that may never-
theless be justifiably held as values guiding persons in many areas of their
life.23 There is no reified distinction between ‘value spheres’ at work here,
but rather a distinction between different ‘contexts of justification’ sepa-
rated by what I call the threshold of reciprocity and generality. The basic
question is whether a person can give reasons for her claims that can cross
that threshold into the moral realm, or whether she fails in that because
she appeals, for example, to a ‘higher’ truth that is revealed to her rather
than arrived at through intersubjective argument24 and has to concede that
the ‘redemption’ of her claim is dependent upon a particular ethical self-
understanding and therefore not generally valid.25 Ultimately, the validity
of ethical values for a person depends upon the affirmation of these values
through this person in his or her particular ethical identity, and if this iden-
tification is not possible, the argument based on such values has no moral,
categorical force to it. In disputes about the validity of a moral norm,
however, one is required to raise, accept or reject normative claims with
reasons that pass the test of reciprocity and generality. Only then can those
claims have categorical force. Thus, whereas in the context of ethical jus-
tification it is ultimately you (on whatever ‘higher’ ground) who decides
about the direction of your life, in the context of moral justification it is
others to whom you owe good reasons.
Thus, if a particular ethical community tries to generalise some of its 
specific values and present them as a legitimate basis for general legislation,
it must be able to explain why this is justified, given the legitimate interests
of all others who have different identities and conceptions of the good. If
the members of that community succeed in showing that they are not merely
arguing in favour of their ideas of the good, which they want to make or
keep socially dominant – forcing others to ‘tolerate’ their dominance from
a minority position while they only want to ‘tolerate’ the minority as a dif-
ferent, though not politically equal, party – but that they argue in favour
of goals all can agree to, then their claim is justified (for the time being).
To give an example:26 arguments for homosexual marriage can be recipro-
cally justified as an extension of equal rights. In a context of general justi-
fication, this claim cannot legitimately be rejected with arguments that deny
equal rights on the basis of particular ethical-religious views. Whereas such
arguments are clearly reciprocally rejectable in a moral-political context,
strong religious objections to certain ways of life are of course legitimate
in an ethical context, where answers to the question of the good life are at
issue.27
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Citizens are tolerant if they accept the boundary set by the criteria of 
reciprocity and generality as both delineating the justifiability of mutually
binding norms and the limits of toleration. Tolerant citizens are ‘reason-
able’ in accepting that the ‘contexts of justification’ for ethical beliefs and
general norms are different: they see that an ethical objection does not
amount to a legitimate moral rejection; and they also see that they have 
a moral duty to tolerate all those ethical beliefs and practices that they 
disagree with but that do not violate the threshold of reciprocity and 
generality (trying to force their views on others). Such a denial of the basic
right to justification is a form of intolerance that cannot be tolerated. 
This is where the limits of toleration are reached.
It is in this sense that justice and reason are connected: persons recognise
that with respect to questions of justice certain justifiable reasons have to
be given according to validity criteria different from the ones in ethical con-
texts. Persons are tolerant to the extent that, even though they disagree with
others about the nature of the good and true life, they tolerate all other
views within the bounds of reciprocity and generality. This is why tolera-
tion is a virtue of justice and a demand of reason.
With respect to the four conceptions of toleration discussed above this
means the following. As citizens, persons do have a right to have their
ethical identity respected equally, yet they do not have a right to their ethical
views’ becoming the basis of general law. This is the main problem with
the non-reciprocal ‘permission conception’, while the deficiency of the ‘co-
existence conception’ is also that it insufficiently respects the basic right to
justification. Potential weaknesses of one of the groups will therefore turn
into a disadvantaged social position. Both conceptions fall short of the
demand for mutual respect that a morally justifiable conception of tolera-
tion should start from.
Law based on reciprocally and generally justifiable norms can only be a
‘protective cover’ for diverse ethical identities if it is understood according
to the ‘qualitative equality’ conception of respect referred to above. Given
the range of differences among ethical beliefs and practices, equal respect
does not mean imposing rigid formal equality, thereby relegating ‘ethics’ to
the ‘private realm’. Rather, it means that general social practices have to be
sensitive to ethical differences – for example, to the particular demands of
religious duties. Tolerating ethical difference thus implies mutual respect in
this qualitative way – which is less than what is called for by the ‘esteem
conception’. In terms of justice, however, it calls for more than what the
esteem conception allows, since the limits of toleration will not be drawn
on the basis of an ethical judgement of the good: such a judgement creates
the danger of drawing the limits too narrowly.
Yet at this point the normative discussion of toleration as an issue of
justice has to shift and address the question of tolerance as a personal atti-
tude of reasonable persons in more detail. How is this attitude possible?
What notion of ‘reason’ is involved here?
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The finitude of reason
Every conception of tolerance implies a certain form of ethical self-
limitation or ‘self-relativisation’; and in the conception that I am propos-
ing this is understood as a ‘demand of reason’. But how can reason demand
of me that I relativise my deeply held ethical beliefs in this way and accept
that the reasons that are good ethical reasons for me are not (yet) good
reasons in the context of general justification? Do I have to be a sceptic or
a relativist or a ‘comprehensive liberal’ to accept this? That is, do I have to
believe either in no ethical truth, or in the equality of different ethical
beliefs, or in the value of ethical autonomy and the ‘good life’ of being 
a tolerant person? These are large questions, and I can only attempt to 
give a brief account of the notion of reason that I think is required to
address them. The guiding idea is that such a capacity of reason is charac-
teristic of people who accept the threshold of reciprocity and generality as
a reasonable demand, without being sceptics, relativists, or comprehensive
liberals. A theory of toleration must not be built upon such particular
ethical points of view. Instead, what is needed is an account of reason that
also applies to the ‘reasonable’ believer in some particular – say, religious
– truth. What is required is a mild form of ethical self-relativisation as a
reasonable attitude, and this must be neither strategically nor pragmatically
motivated, nor justified as part of the person’s idea of the good in a strong
sense.
I call this form of ethical self-relativisation ‘mild’, because accepting the
argumentative threshold of reciprocity and generality does not imply ques-
tioning the ethical truth of one’s own beliefs, as opposed to a strong, almost
schizophrenic, form of self-relativisation, according to which a tolerant
person has to look at his or her convictions from an objective standpoint
to assess their merits in terms of an ‘impersonal’ judgement.28 It is sufficient
that a tolerant person be aware that there are different contexts of justifi-
cation in which different questions (of the good life or of general norms)
require different answers that have to satisfy different criteria of validity.
Thus, a convincing answer to an ethical question may very well turn out
to be a convincing answer to a general question of justice, though, on the
other hand, it may not be. In the latter case, it can still be a convincing
ethical answer that is not false in this context, even though it is not gener-
ally acceptable. It is in the nature of ethical beliefs that they are shaped by
a number of particular experiences, which is why it would be unreasonable
to assume them to be equally sharable among persons with very different
experiental backgrounds. Hence it is unreasonable both to assume that
there can be no reasonable ethical disagreement between persons capable
and willing to seek a common normative answer given the two criteria of
reciprocity and generality and to assume that the existence of reasonable
disagreement in ethical matters makes it unreasonable or morally false to
hold certain ethical beliefs, be they religious or not.29 The realm of the
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ethical, we may say, is much broader – and maybe also deeper – than the
realm of the mutually non-rejectable.30
In his recent writings, John Rawls offers a productive explanation of this
complex normative-epistemological attitude of reasonable and tolerant
persons. According to Rawls, such individuals are aware of the ‘burdens of
reason’ or ‘burdens of judgment’ that inevitably narrow the realm of what
persons can reasonably agree to. Even those who are seeking to reach a
normative consensus and who share ‘a common human reason’ in the sense
that ‘they can draw inferences, weigh evidence, and balance competing con-
siderations’31 may not reach a consensus owing to various limits on their
capacities for reasonable theoretical and practical judgement. The most
important burden Rawls mentions is that the way individuals assess evi-
dence and weigh moral and political values is shaped by their total experi-
ence and whole course of life, which will always differ between persons,
especially in modern, complex societies. His main point is that reasonable
persons – who hold reasonable ‘comprehensive doctrines’ – are aware that
they as well as others are subject to these burdens, which inevitably lead to
disagreement between individuals who are influenced by very different
experiences, normative backgrounds, and value horizons. Thus, it is not just
a pragmatic and empirical insight that disagreement in normative matters
may arise even between well-intentioned persons; it is a fundamental insight
about the limitations of finite human reason.
The main reason-based argument for tolerance, therefore, is not the idea
of a free and open competition of ideas and values that will separate truth
from falsity in a process of inquiry.32 Rather, the insight into the presup-
positions and the limits of such a competition constitutes the primary ratio-
nale for such an argument: that is, an insight into the irreducible finitude
and plurality of human perspectives, and the limits of falsification in areas
of beliefs that are not ‘beyond reason’ in terms of being irrational or not
open to reasonable discourse, but that are ‘beyond reason’ in so far as they
are based on reasons that may ultimately be neither verifiable nor falsifi-
able by human reason. One can both reasonably hold these beliefs and
accept that others reasonably disagree with them. One believes in their truth
while understanding that others do and may see things differently, given
their perspective; thus one may try to convince others of one’s beliefs,
though one cannot force them upon others who are not unreasonable in
holding other views. Hence ‘being reasonable’ includes epistemological as
well as normative elements.
The epistemological element of being reasonable consists in an insight
into the finitude of both theoretical and practical reason in finding ‘final’
answers to the question of the good that all can agree on. But it also con-
sists in an insight into the possibilities of reason, that is, the capacity of
reaching mutually justifiable normative answers. The finitude of reason does
not imply the impossibility of reasonable discourse, but rather the task of
finding and defending justifiable reasons, because this is what reasonable
80 Toleration, justice and reason
MCK4  1/10/2003  10:24 AM  Page 80
and finite persons – who cannot avoid raising general validity claims in their
social life – owe to each other. This commonality establishes a community
of sharable, but not ultimate reasons.33 Thus the normative element of being
reasonable implies this form of respect for others as reasonable and worthy
of being given adequate reasons; that is, respect for their basic right to jus-
tification. Both elements in combination, the epistemological and the nor-
mative, are the basis for the acceptance and recognition of the threshold of
reciprocity and generality as discussed above. They provide the essential
reasons for being tolerant. Being tolerant thus means seeking reasonable
justification, accepting reasonable disagreement within the limits of reci-
procity and generality, and being aware of the different contexts of justifi-
cation that persons are part of. It implies tolerating other beliefs within
these limits by not rejecting them as unreasonable or immoral, though it
does not imply a qualification of the ethical truth of one’s own beliefs. Taken
together, then, the epistemological and the normative elements explain my
definition of toleration as a demand of reason and a virtue of justice.34
Resolving the paradoxes
In conclusion, let me briefly return to the two paradoxes of toleration out-
lined at the beginning and see whether the conception I have proposed can
resolve or avoid them.
Briefly stated, the first paradox consists in the problem of how it can be
morally right to tolerate what is morally wrong. Given the discussion above,
one can say that it is morally required of reasonable persons to justify norms
that they think should be generally binding for everyone with reciprocally
and generally justifiable reasons. It is in this sense that they must respect
the epistemic and moral autonomy of other persons with ethical beliefs dif-
ferent from their own – that is, beliefs that they may disagree with and even
find ethically wrong and insufficient as answers to questions of the good
life, but that they cannot accuse of violating the boundary set by the crite-
ria of reciprocity and generality. It is morally required and right to tolerate
what you find ethically disagreeable and wrong within the limits of rea-
sonableness and reciprocity that all have to accept; the fact that you find
some beliefs and practices ethically wrong does not make them unreason-
able to hold or immoral. Thus, the paradox is avoided by clarifying the
acceptance, objection and rejection components of toleration with the help
of a distinction between moral and ethical justification.
The second paradox says that toleration, as soon as its limits are defined
by a certain content, becomes intolerant toward those ‘outside’. As an
answer to this, everything depends on whether one wants to call both the
suppression of any form of dissent and the suppression of this form of sup-
pression ‘intolerance’. But this seems a misuse of the term: we cannot call
any form of moral critique ‘intolerance’, because then we lose the concept
of toleration completely. Instead, by drawing the ‘limits of toleration’ with
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the help of the criteria of reciprocity and generality, we draw them, as I
have tried to argue, in the widest possible way given the existence of a large
diversity of world-views, without sacrificing one for the sake of the unjus-
tifiable claims of another. Thus there is no arbitrary substantive content that
defines the tolerable; this content is open to dispute and argument, and pro-
tection is given to those voices in danger of being marginalised.35 Those
who violate the basic form of mutual respect implied by that cannot claim
to be the victims of intolerance. For otherwise, not only the concept of tol-
eration, but also the concept of justice would lose its meaning.
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For some time now, the forces of progressive politics have been divided into
two camps. On one side stand the proponents of ‘redistribution’. Drawing
on long traditions of egalitarian, labour, and socialist organising, political
actors aligned with this orientation seek a more just allocation of resources
and goods. On the other side stand the proponents of ‘recognition’. Drawing
on newer visions of a ‘difference-friendly’ society, they seek a world where
assimilation to majority or dominant cultural norms is no longer the price
of equal respect. Members of the first camp hope to redistribute wealth from
the rich to the poor, from the North to the South, and from the owners to
the workers. Members of the second, in contrast, seek recognition of the
distinctive perspectives of ethnic, ‘racial’, and sexual minorities, as well as
of gender difference. The redistribution orientation has a distinguished
philosophical pedigree, as egalitarian redistributive claims have supplied 
the paradigm case for most theorising about social justice for the past 150
years. The recognition orientation has recently attracted the interest of
political philosophers, however, some of whom are seeking to develop a new
normative paradigm that puts recognition at its centre.
At present, unfortunately, relations between the two camps are quite
strained. In many cases, struggles for recognition are dissociated from strug-
gles for redistribution. Within social movements such as feminism, for
example, activist tendencies that look to redistribution as the remedy for
male domination are increasingly dissociated from tendencies that look
instead to recognition of gender difference. And the same is largely true 
in the intellectual sphere. In the academy, to continue with feminism, 
scholars who understand gender as a social relation maintain an uneasy
arms-length co-existence with those who construe it as an identity or a cul-
tural code. This situation exemplifies a broader phenomenon: the wide-
spread decoupling of cultural politics from social politics, of the politics of
difference from the politics of equality.
In some cases, moreover, the dissociation has become a polarisation.
Some proponents of redistribution see claims for the recognition of differ-
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ence as ‘false consciousness’, a hindrance to the pursuit of social justice.
Conversely, some proponents of recognition reject distributive politics as
part and parcel of an outmoded materialism that can neither articulate nor
challenge key experiences of injustice. In such cases, we are effectively pre-
sented with an either/or choice: redistribution or recognition? Class politics
or identity politics? Multiculturalism or social equality?
These, I have argued elsewhere, are false antitheses.1 Justice today
requires both redistribution and recognition; neither alone is sufficient. As
soon as one embraces this thesis, however, the question of how to combine
them becomes pressing. I maintain that the emancipatory aspects of the two
problematics need to be integrated in a single, comprehensive framework.
The task, in part, is to devise an expanded conception of justice that can
accommodate both defensible claims for social equality and defensible
claims for the recognition of difference.
Morality or ethics?
Integrating redistribution and recognition is no easy matter, however. On
the contrary, to contemplate this project is to become immediately
embroiled in a nexus of difficult philosophical questions. Some of the
thorniest of these concern the relation between morality and ethics, the right
and the good, justice and the good life. A key issue is whether paradigms
of justice usually aligned with ‘morality’ can handle claims for the recog-
nition of difference – or whether it is necessary, on the contrary, to turn to
‘ethics’.
Let me explain. It is now standard practice in moral philosophy to dis-
tinguish questions of justice from questions of the good life. Construing the
first as a matter of ‘the right’ and the second as a matter of ‘the good’, most
philosophers align distributive justice with Kantian Moralität (morality)
and recognition with Hegelian Sittlichkeit (ethics). In part this contrast is a
matter of scope. Norms of justice are thought to be universally binding;
they hold independently of actors’ commitments to specific values. Claims
for the recognition of difference, in contrast, are more restricted. Involving
qualitative assessments of the relative worth of various cultural practices,
traits, and identities, they depend on historically specific horizons of value,
which cannot be universalised.
Much of recent moral philosophy turns on disputes over the relative
standing of these two different orders of normativity. Liberal political 
theorists and deontological moral philosophers insist that the right take 
priority over the good. For them, accordingly, the demands of justice trump
the claims of ethics. Communitarians and teleologists rejoin that the notion
of a universally binding morality independent of any idea of the good is
conceptually incoherent. Preferring ‘thick’ accounts of moral experience to
‘thin’ ones, they rank the substantive claims of culturally specific com-
munity values above abstract appeals to ‘reason’ or ‘humanity’.
Nancy Fraser 87
MCK5  1/10/2003  10:25 AM  Page 87
Partisans of the prior claims of the right, moreover, often subscribe to
distributive models of justice. Viewing justice as a matter of fairness, they
seek to eliminate unjustified disparities between the life-chances of social
actors. To identify these disparities, they invoke standards of fairness 
that do not prejudge those actors’ own (varying) views of the good.
Partisans of the good, in contrast, reject the ‘empty formalism’ of distribu-
tive approaches. Viewing ethics as a matter of the good life, they seek 
to promote the qualitative conditions of human flourishing (as they un-
derstand them), rather than fidelity to abstract requirements of equal
treatment.
These philosophical alignments complicate the problem of integrating
redistribution and recognition. Distribution evidently belongs on the moral-
ity side of the divide. Recognition, however, seems at first sight to belong
to ethics, as it seems to require judgments about the value of various prac-
tices, traits, and identities. It is not surprising, therefore, that many deon-
tological theorists simply reject claims for the recognition of difference as
violations of liberal neutrality, while concluding that distributive justice
exhausts the whole of political morality. It is also unsurprising, conversely,
that many theorists of recognition align themselves with ethics against
morality; following the same reasoning as their liberal counterparts, they
conclude that recognition requires qualitative value judgements that exceed
the capacities of distributive models.
In these standard alignments, both sides agree that distribution belongs
to morality, recognition belongs to ethics, and never the twain shall meet.
Thus, each assumes that its paradigm excludes the other’s. If they are right,
then the claims of redistribution and the claims of recognition cannot be
coherently combined. On the contrary, whoever wishes to endorse claims
of both types courts the risk of philosophical schizophrenia.
It is precisely this presumption of incompatibility that I aim to dispel.
Contra the received wisdom, I shall argue that one can integrate redistribu-
tion and recognition without succumbing to schizophrenia. My strategy 
will be to construe the politics of recognition in a way that does not deliver
it prematurely to ethics. Rather, I shall account for claims for recognition
as justice claims within an expanded understanding of justice. The initial
effect will be to recuperate the politics of recognition for Moralität and thus
to resist the turn to ethics. But that is not precisely where I shall end up.
Rather, I shall concede that there may be cases when ethical evaluation is
unavoidable. Yet because such evaluation is problematic, I shall suggest
ways of deferring it as long as possible.
Identity or status?
The key to my strategy is to break with the standard ‘identity’ model of
recognition. On this model, what requires recognition is group-specific cul-
tural identity. Misrecognition consists in the depreciation of such identity
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by the dominant culture and the consequent damage to group members’
sense of self. Redressing this harm means demanding ‘recognition’. This in
turn requires that group members join together to refashion their collective
identity by producing a self-affirming culture of their own. Thus, on the
identity model of recognition, the politics of recognition means ‘identity
politics’.2
This identity model is deeply problematic. Construing misrecognition as
damaged identity, it emphasises psychic structure over social institutions
and social interaction. Thus, it risks substituting intrusive forms of con-
sciousness engineering for social change. The model compounds these risks
by positing group identity as the object of recognition. Enjoining the 
elaboration and display of an authentic, self-affirming, and self-generated
collective identity, it puts moral pressure on individual members to conform
to group culture. The result is often to impose a single, drastically simpli-
fied group identity, which denies the complexity of people’s lives, the 
multiplicity of their identifications, and the cross-pulls of their various
affiliations. In addition, the model reifies culture. Ignoring transcultural
flows, it treats cultures as sharply bounded, neatly separated, and non-
interacting, as if it were obvious where one stops and another starts. As a
result, it tends to promote separatism and group enclaving in lieu of trans-
group interaction. Denying internal heterogeneity, moreover, the identity
model obscures the struggles within social groups for the authority, and
indeed for the power, to represent them. Consequently, it masks the power
of dominant fractions and reinforces intragroup domination. In general,
then, the identity model lends itself all too easily to repressive forms of
communitarianism.3
For these reasons, I shall propose an alternative analysis of recognition.
My proposal is to treat recognition as a question of social status. From this
perspective – I shall call it the status model – what requires recognition is
not group-specific identity but rather the status of group members as full
partners in social interaction. Misrecognition, accordingly, does not mean
the depreciation and deformation of group identity. Rather, it means social
subordination in the sense of being prevented from participating as a peer
in social life. To redress the injustice requires a politics of recognition, to
be sure, but this no longer means identity politics. In the status model,
rather, it means a politics aimed at overcoming subordination by establish-
ing the misrecognised party as a full member of society, capable of partici-
pating on a par with other members.4
Let me elaborate. To view recognition as a matter of status is to examine
institutionalised patterns of cultural value for their effects on the relative
standing of social actors. If and when such patterns constitute actors as
peers, capable of participating on a par with one another in social life, then
we can speak of reciprocal recognition and status equality. When, in con-
trast, institutionalised patterns of cultural value constitute some actors as
inferior, excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible, and hence as less than
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full partners in social interaction, then we should speak of misrecognition
and status subordination.
On the status model, then, misrecognition arises when institutions struc-
ture interaction according to cultural norms that impede parity of partici-
pation. Examples include marriage laws that exclude same-sex partnerships
as illegitimate and perverse, social-welfare policies that stigmatise single
mothers as sexually irresponsible scroungers, and policing practices such as
‘racial profiling’ that associate racialised persons with criminality. In each
of these cases, interaction is regulated by an institutionalised pattern of
cultural value that constitutes some categories of social actors as normative
and others as deficient or inferior: straight is normal, gay is perverse; ‘male-
headed households’ are proper, ‘female-headed households’ are not; ‘whites’
are law-abiding, ‘blacks’ are dangerous. In each case, the result is to deny
some members of society the status of full partners in interaction, capable
of participating on a par with the rest.
In each case, accordingly, a claim for recognition is in order. But note
precisely what this means: aimed not at valorising group identity, but rather
at overcoming subordination, claims for recognition in the status model
seek to establish the subordinated party as a full partner in social life, able
to interact with others as a peer. They aim, that is, to deinstitutionalise
patterns of cultural value that impede parity of participation and to replace
them with patterns that foster it.
This status model avoids many difficulties of the identity model. First, by
rejecting the view of recognition as a valorisation of group identity, it avoids
essentialising such identities. Second, by focusing on the effects of institu-
tionalised norms on capacities for interaction, it resists the temptation to
substitute the re-engineering of consciousness for social change. Third, by
enjoining status equality in the sense of parity of participation, it valorises
cross-group interaction, as opposed to separatism and group enclaving.
Fourth, the status model avoids reifying culture – without denying culture’s
political importance. Aware that institutionalised patterns of cultural value
can be vehicles of subordination, it seeks to deinstitutionalise patterns 
that impede parity of participation and to replace them with patterns that
foster it.
Finally, the status model possesses another major advantage. Unlike the
identity model, it construes recognition in a way that does not assign that
category to ethics. Conceiving recognition as a matter of status equality,
defined in turn as participatory parity, it provides a deontological account
of recognition. Thus, it frees recognition claims’ normative force from direct
dependence on a specific substantive horizon of value. Unlike the identity
model, then, the status model is compatible with the priority of the right
over the good. Refusing the traditional alignment of recognition with ethics,
it aligns it with morality instead. Thus the status model permits one to
combine recognition with redistribution – without succumbing to philo-
sophical schizophrenia. Or so I shall argue next.
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Justice or the good life?
Any attempt to integrate redistribution and recognition in a comprehen-
sive framework must address four crucial philosophical questions. First, is
recognition a matter of justice, or is it a matter of self-realisation? Second,
do distributive justice and recognition constitute two distinct, sui generis,
normative paradigms, or can either of them be subsumed within the other?
Third, does justice require the recognition of what is distinctive about
individuals or groups, or is recognition of our common humanity sufficient?
And fourth, how can we distinguish those claims for recognition that are
justified from those that are not?
How one answers these questions depends on the conception of recog-
nition one assumes. In what follows, I will employ the status model in order
to provide a deontological account. Drawing on that model, I shall expand
the standard conception of justice to accommodate claims for recognition.
By stretching the notion of morality, then, I shall avoid turning prematurely
to ethics.
I begin with the question, ‘Is recognition an issue of justice, and thus of
morality, or one of the good life, and thus of ethics?’ Usually, recognition
is understood as an issue of the good life. This is the view of both Charles
Taylor and Axel Honneth, the two most prominent contemporary theorists
of recognition. For both Taylor and Honneth, being recognised by another
subject is a necessary condition for attaining full, undistorted subjectivity.
To deny someone recognition is to deprive her or him of a basic prerequi-
site for human flourishing. For Taylor, for example, ‘nonrecognition or
misrecognition . . . can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a
false, distorted, reduced mode of being. Beyond simple lack of respect, it
can inflict a grievous wound, saddling people with crippling self-hatred. Due
recognition is not just a courtesy but a vital human need.’5 For Honneth,
similarly, ‘we owe our integrity . . . to the receipt of approval or recogni-
tion from other persons. [D]enial of recognition . . . is injurious because it
impairs . . . persons in their positive understanding of self – an understand-
ing acquired by intersubjective means.’6 Thus, both these theorists construe
misrecognition in terms of impaired subjectivity and damaged self-identity.
And both understand the injury in ethical terms, as stunting the subject’s
capacity for achieving a good life. For Taylor and Honneth, therefore,
recognition is an issue of ethics.
Unlike Taylor and Honneth, I propose to conceive recognition as an issue
of justice. Thus, one should not answer the question ‘What’s wrong with
misrecognition?’ by saying that it impedes human flourishing by distorting
the subject’s ‘practical relation-to-self’.7 One should say, rather, that it is
unjust that some individuals and groups are denied the status of full part-
ners in social interaction simply as a consequence of institutionalised
patterns of cultural value in whose construction they have not equally
participated and that disparage their distinctive characteristics or the dis-
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tinctive characteristics assigned to them. One should say, that is, that mis-
recognition is wrong because it constitutes a form of institutionalised
subordination – and thus, a serious violation of justice.
This approach offers several important advantages. First, by appealing
to a deontological standard it permits one to justify claims for recognition
as morally binding under modern conditions of value pluralism.8 Under
these conditions, there is no single conception of the good life that is uni-
versally shared, nor any that can be established as authoritative. Thus any
attempt to justify claims for recognition that appeals to an account of the
good life must necessarily be sectarian. No approach of this sort can estab-
lish such claims as normatively binding on those who do not share the
theorist’s horizon of ethical value.
Unlike such approaches, the status model of recognition is deontological
and nonsectarian. Embracing the spirit of ‘subjective freedom’ that is the
hallmark of modernity, it assumes that it is up to individuals and groups to
define for themselves what counts as a good life and to devise for them-
selves an approach to pursuing it, within limits that ensure a like liberty for
others. Thus the status model does not appeal to a conception of the good
life. It appeals, rather, to a conception of justice that can – and should – be
accepted by those with divergent conceptions of the good life. What makes
misrecognition morally wrong, in this view, is that it denies some individ-
uals and groups the possibility of participating on a par with others in social
interaction. The norm of participatory parity invoked here is non-sectarian
in the required sense. It can justify claims for recognition as normatively
binding on all who agree to abide by fair terms of interaction under con-
ditions of value pluralism.
Treating recognition as a matter of justice has a second advantage as well.
Conceiving misrecognition as status subordination, it locates the wrong in
social relations, not in individual or interpersonal psychology. To be mis-
recognised, in this view, is not simply to be thought ill of, looked down on,
or devalued in others’ conscious attitudes or mental beliefs. It is rather to
be denied the status of a full partner in social interaction and prevented
from participating as a peer in social life as a consequence of institution-
alised patterns of cultural value that constitute one as comparatively un-
worthy of respect or esteem. When such patterns of disrespect and disesteem
are institutionalised, they impede parity of participation, just as surely as
do distributive inequities.
Eschewing psychologisation, then, this approach escapes difficulties that
plague rival approaches. When misrecognition is identified with internal
distortions in the structure of self-consciousness of the oppressed, it is but
a short step to blaming the victim, as imputing psychic damage to those
subject to racism, for example, seems to add insult to injury. Conversely,
when misrecognition is equated with prejudice in the minds of the oppres-
sors, overcoming it seems to require policing their beliefs, an approach that
is illiberal and authoritarian. For the status model, in contrast, misrecog-
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nition is a matter of externally manifest and publicly verifiable impediments
to some people’s standing as full members of society. And such arrange-
ments are morally indefensible – whether or not they distort the subjectiv-
ity of the oppressed.9
Finally, by aligning recognition with justice instead of the good life, one
avoids the view that everyone has an equal right to social esteem. That view
is patently untenable, of course, because it renders meaningless the notion
of esteem.10 Yet it seems to follow from at least one prominent rival account.
In Axel Honneth’s theory, social esteem is among the ‘intersubjective
conditions for undistorted identity formation’ that morality is supposed to
protect. It follows that everyone is morally entitled to social esteem.11 The
account of recognition proposed here, in contrast, entails no such reductio
ad absurdum. What it does entail is that everyone has an equal right to
pursue social esteem under fair conditions of equal opportunity.12 And such
conditions do not obtain when, for example, institutionalised patterns of
cultural value pervasively downgrade femininity, ‘non-whiteness’, homo-
sexuality, and everything culturally associated with them. When that is the
case, women and/or people of colour and/or gays and lesbians face obsta-
cles in the quest for esteem that are not encountered by others. And every-
one, including straight white men, faces further obstacles if they opt to
pursue projects and cultivate traits that are culturally coded as feminine,
homosexual, or ‘non-white’.
For all these reasons, recognition is better treated as a matter of justice,
and thus of morality, than as a matter of the good life, and thus of ethics.
And construing recognition on the model of status permits us to treat it as
a matter of justice. But what follows for the theory of justice?
Expanding the paradigm of justice
Supposing that recognition is a matter of justice, what is its relation to dis-
tribution? Does it follow, turning now to our second question, that distri-
bution and recognition constitute two distinct, sui generis conceptions of
justice? Or can either of them be reduced to the other?
The question of reduction must be considered from two different sides.
From one side, the issue is whether existing theories of distributive justice
can adequately subsume problems of recognition. In my view, the answer
is no. To be sure, many distributive theorists appreciate the importance of
status over and above the allocation of resources and seek to accommodate
it in their accounts.13 But the results are not wholly satisfactory. Most such
theorists assume a reductive economistic-cum-legalistic view of status,
supposing that a just distribution of resources and rights is sufficient to
preclude misrecognition. In fact, however, not all misrecognition is a 
by-product of maldistribution, nor of maldistribution plus legal discrimi-
nation. Witness the case of the African-American Wall Street banker who
cannot get a taxi to pick him up. To handle such cases, a theory of justice
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must reach beyond the distribution of rights and goods to examine institu-
tionalised patterns of cultural value. It must consider whether such patterns
impede parity of participation in social life.14
What, then, of the other side of the question? Can existing theories of
recognition adequately subsume problems of distribution? Here, too, I
contend the answer is no. To be sure, some theorists of recognition appre-
ciate the importance of economic equality and seek to accommodate it in
their accounts. But once again the results are not wholly satisfactory. Axel
Honneth, for example, assumes a reductive culturalist view of distribution.
Supposing that all economic inequalities are rooted in a cultural order that
privileges some kinds of labour over others, he believes that changing that
cultural order is sufficient to preclude all maldistribution.15 In fact, however,
not all maldistribution is a by-product of misrecognition. Witness the case
of the skilled white male industrial worker who becomes unemployed owing
to a factory closure resulting from a speculative corporate merger. In that
case, the injustice of maldistribution has little to do with misrecognition. It
is rather a consequence of imperatives intrinsic to an order of specialised
economic relations whose raison d’être is the accumulation of profits. To
handle such cases, a theory of justice must reach beyond cultural value 
patterns to examine the structure of capitalism. It must consider whether
economic mechanisms that are relatively decoupled from structures of 
prestige and that operate in a relatively impersonal way impede parity of
participation in social life.
In general, then, neither distribution theorists nor recognition theorists
have so far succeeded in adequately subsuming the concerns of the other.16
Thus, instead of endorsing one of their conceptions to the exclusion of the
other, I propose to develop an expanded conception of justice. My con-
ception treats distribution and recognition as distinct perspectives on, and
dimensions of, justice. Without reducing either perspective to the other, it
encompasses both dimensions within a broader, overarching framework.
As has already been noted, the normative core of my conception is the
notion of parity of participation.17 According to this norm, justice requires
social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact
with one another as peers. For participatory parity to be possible, I claim,
at least two conditions must be satisfied.18 First, the distribution of mater-
ial resources must be such as to ensure participants’ independence and
voice. This I call the objective condition of participatory parity. It precludes
forms and levels of material inequality and economic dependence that
impede parity of participation. Precluded, therefore, are social arrange-
ments that institutionalise deprivation, exploitation, and gross disparities
in wealth, income, and leisure time, thereby denying some people the means
and opportunities to interact with others as peers.19
In contrast, the second condition requires that institutionalised patterns
of cultural value express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal
opportunity for achieving social esteem. This I call the intersubjective
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condition of participatory parity. It precludes institutionalised norms that
systematically depreciate some categories of people and the qualities 
associated with them. Precluded, therefore, are institutionalised value 
patterns that deny some people the status of full partners in interaction –
whether by burdening them with excessive ascribed ‘difference’ or by failing
to acknowledge their distinctiveness.
Both the objective condition and the intersubjective condition are neces-
sary for participatory parity. Neither alone is sufficient. The objective con-
dition brings into focus concerns traditionally associated with the theory of
distributive justice, especially concerns pertaining to the economic structure
of society and to economically defined class differentials. The intersubjec-
tive condition brings into focus concerns recently highlighted in the phi-
losophy of recognition, especially concerns pertaining to the status order of
society and to culturally defined hierarchies of status. Thus, an expanded
conception of justice oriented to the norm of participatory parity encom-
passes both redistribution and recognition, without reducing either one to
the other.
This approach goes a considerable way toward resolving the problem with
which we began. By construing redistribution and recognition as two mutu-
ally irreducible dimensions of justice, and by submitting both of them to the
deontological norm of participatory parity, it positions them both on the
common terrain of Moralität. Avoiding turning prematurely to ethics, then,
it seems to promise an escape route from philosophical schizophrenia.
Recognising distinctiveness?
Before proclaiming success, however, we must take up our third philo-
sophical question: Does justice require the recognition of what is distinc-
tive about individuals or groups, over and above the recognition of our
common humanity? If the answer proves to be yes, we will have to revisit
the question of ethics.
Let us begin by noting that participatory parity is a universalist norm in
two senses. First, it encompasses all (adult) partners to interaction. And
second, it presupposes the equal moral worth of human beings. But moral
universalism in these senses still leaves open the question whether recogni-
tion of individual or group distinctiveness could be required by justice as
one element among others of the intersubjective condition for participatory
parity.
This question cannot be answered, I contend, by an a priori account of
the kinds of recognition that everyone always needs. It needs rather to be
approached in the spirit of a pragmatism informed by the insights of social
theory. From this perspective, recognition is a remedy for social injustice,
not the satisfaction of a generic human need. Thus, the form(s) of recogni-
tion justice requires in any given case depend(s) on the form(s) of mis-
recognition to be redressed. In cases where misrecognition involves denying
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the common humanity of some participants, the remedy is universalist
recognition; thus, the first and most fundamental redress for South African
apartheid was universal ‘non-racial’ citizenship. Whereas, in contrast, mis-
recognition involves denying some participants’ distinctiveness, the remedy
could be recognition of specificity; thus, many feminists claim that over-
coming gender subordination requires recognising women’s unique and dis-
tinctive capacity to give birth.20 In every case, the remedy should be tailored
to the harm.
This pragmatist approach overcomes the liabilities of two other, mirror-
opposite views. First, it rejects the claim, espoused by some distributive 
theorists, that justice requires limiting public recognition to those capac-
ities all humans share. Favoured by opponents of affirmative action, that
approach dogmatically forecloses recognition of what distinguishes people
from one another, without considering whether such recognition might be
necessary in some cases to overcome obstacles to participatory parity.
Second, the pragmatist approach rejects the opposite claim, equally decon-
textualised, that everyone always needs their distinctiveness recognised.21
Often favoured by recognition theorists, this second approach cannot
explain why it is that not all, but only some, social differences generate
claims for recognition – nor why only some of those claims, but not others,
are morally justified. More specifically, it cannot explain why those 
occupying advantaged positions in the status order, such as men and
heterosexuals, usually shun recognition of their (gender and sexual) dis-
tinctiveness, claiming not specificity but universality.22 Nor why, on those
occasions when they do seek such recognition, their claims are usually spu-
rious. By contrast, the approach proposed here sees claims for the recogni-
tion of difference pragmatically and contextually – as remedial responses
to specific pre-existing injustices. Putting questions of justice at the centre,
it appreciates that the recognition needs of subordinated actors differ from
those of dominant actors and that only those claims that promote parity of
participation are morally justified.
For the pragmatist, accordingly, everything depends on what precisely
currently misrecognised people need in order to be able to participate as
peers in social life. And there is no reason to assume that all of them need
the same thing in every context. In some cases, they may need to be unbur-
dened of excessive ascribed or constructed distinctiveness. In other cases,
they may need to have hitherto underacknowledged distinctiveness taken
into account. In still other cases, they may need to shift the focus onto 
dominant or advantaged groups, outing the latter’s distinctiveness, which
has been falsely parading as universal. Alternatively, they may need to
deconstruct the very terms in which attributed differences are currently
elaborated. Finally, they may need all of the above, or several of the above,
in combination with one another and in combination with redistribution.
Which people need which kind(s) of recognition in which contexts depends
on the nature of the obstacles they face with regard to participatory parity.
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We cannot rule out in advance, therefore, the possibility that justice may
require recognising distinctiveness in some cases.
Justifying claims for recognition
Up to this point, I have managed to answer three major philosophical ques-
tions about recognition while remaining on the terrain of Moralität. By con-
struing recognition on the model of status, I have given it a deontological
interpretation. And by expanding the standard paradigm of justice, I have
treated redistribution and recognition as two mutually irreducible dimen-
sions of, and perspectives on, justice, both of which can be brought under
the common norm of participatory parity. Thus I have so far avoided the
turn to ethics and escaped philosophical schizophrenia.
At this point, however, the question of ethics threatens to return. Once
we accept that justice could, under certain circumstances, require recogni-
tion of distinctiveness, then we must consider the problem of justification.
We must ask: what justifies a claim for the recognition of difference? 
How can one distinguish justified from unjustified claims of this sort? The
crucial issue is whether a purely deontological standard will suffice – or
whether, on the contrary, ethical evaluation of various practices, traits, and
identities is required. In the latter event, one will have to turn to ethics after
all.
Let us begin by noting that not every claim for recognition is warranted,
just as not every claim for redistribution is. In both cases, one needs an
account of criteria and/or procedures for distinguishing warranted from
unwarranted claims. Theorists of distributive justice have long sought to
provide such accounts, whether by appealing to objectivistic criteria, such
as utility maximisation, or to procedural norms, such as those of discourse
ethics. Theorists of recognition, in contrast, have been slower to confront
this question. They have yet to provide any principled basis for distin-
guishing justified from unjustified claims.
This issue poses grave difficulties for those who treat recognition as an
issue of ethics. Theorists who justify recognition as a means to self-
realisation are especially vulnerable to objections on this point. According
to Axel Honneth, for example, everyone needs their distinctiveness recog-
nised in order to develop self-esteem, which (along with self-confidence and
self-respect) is an essential ingredient of an undistorted identity.23 It seems
to follow that claims for recognition that enhance the claimant’s self-esteem
are justified, while those that diminish it are not. On this hypothesis,
however, racist identities would seem to merit some recognition, as they
enable some poor Europeans and Euroamericans to maintain their sense 
of self-worth by contrasting themselves with their supposed inferiors.
Antiracist claims would confront an obstacle, in contrast, as they threaten
the self-esteem of poor whites. Unfortunately, cases like this one, in which
prejudice conveys psychological benefits, are by no means rare. They suffice
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to disconfirm the view that enhanced self-esteem can supply a justificatory
standard for recognition claims.
How, then, should recognition claims be judged? What constitutes an
adequate criterion for assessing their merits? The approach proposed here
appeals to participatory parity as an evaluative standard. As we saw, this
norm overarches both dimensions of justice, distribution and recognition.
Thus, for both dimensions the same general criterion serves to distinguish
warranted from unwarranted claims. Whether the issue is distribution or
recognition, claimants must show that current arrangements prevent them
from participating on a par with others in social life. Redistribution 
claimants must show that existing economic arrangements deny them the
necessary objective conditions for participatory parity. Recognition claim-
ants must show that institutionalised patterns of cultural value deny them
the necessary intersubjective conditions. In both cases, therefore, the norm
of participatory parity is the standard for warranting claims.
In both cases, too, participatory parity serves to evaluate proposed reme-
dies for injustice. Whether they are demanding redistribution or recogni-
tion, claimants must show that the social changes they seek will in fact
promote parity of participation. Redistribution claimants must show that
the economic reforms they advocate will supply the objective conditions for
full participation to those currently denied them – without significantly
exacerbating other disparities. Similarly, recognition claimants must show
that the sociocultural institutional changes they seek will supply the needed
intersubjective conditions – again, without substantially worsening other
disparities. In both cases, once again, participatory parity is the standard
for warranting proposals for reform.
This represents a considerable improvement over the ‘self-realisation’
standard just discussed. Focusing on capacities for participation, the status
model condemns the institutionalisation of racist values even in cases where
the latter provide psychological benefits to those who subscribe to them.
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the norm of participatory parity
is by itself sufficient to distinguish justified from unjustified claims for the
recognition of difference.
Same-sex marriage, cultural minorities, and the double requirement
The problem is that not all disparities are per se unjust. Theorists of dis-
tributive justice have long appreciated this point with respect to economic
inequalities. Seeking to distinguish just from unjust economic disparities,
some of them have drawn the line between those inequalities that arise as
a result of individuals’ choices, on the one hand, and those that arise as a
result of circumstances beyond individuals’ control, on the other, arguing
that only the second, and not the first, are unjust.24 Analogous issues arise
with respect to recognition. Here, too, not all disparities are unjust –
because not all institutionalised value hierarchies are unjust. What is
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needed, consequently, is a way of distinguishing just from unjust dispari-
ties in participation. The key question here, once again, is whether the deon-
tological norm of parity of participation is sufficient for this purpose – and
whether, if not, one must turn to ethics.
To answer this question, let us apply the standard of participatory parity
to some current controversies. Consider, first, the example of same-sex 
marriage. In this case, as we saw, the institutionalisation in marital law of
a heterosexist cultural norm denies parity of participation to gays and
lesbians. For the status model, therefore, this situation is patently unjust,
and a recognition claim is in principle warranted. Such a claim seeks to
remedy the injustice by deinstitutionalising the heteronormative value
pattern and replacing it with an alternative that promotes parity. This,
however, can be done in more than one way. One way would be to grant
the same recognition to homosexual partnerships that heterosexual part-
nerships currently enjoy by legalising same-sex marriage. Another would be
to deinstitutionalise heterosexual marriage, decoupling entitlements such as
health insurance from marital status and assigning them on some other basis,
such as citizenship and/or territorial residency. Although there may be good
reasons for preferring one of these approaches to the other, both of them
would serve to foster participatory parity between gays and straights; hence
both are justified in principle – assuming that neither would exacerbate other
disparities. What would not be warranted, in contrast, is an approach, like
the French PACS or the ‘civil union’ law in the US state of Vermont, that
establishes a second, parallel legal status of domestic partnership that fails
to confer all the symbolic or material benefits of marriage, while reserving
the latter, privileged status exclusively for heterosexual couples. Although
such reforms represent a clear advance over existing laws and may command
support on tactical grounds, as transitional measures, they do not fulfil the
requirements of justice as understood via the status model.
Such tactical considerations aside, the case of same-sex marriage presents
no difficulties for the status model. On the contrary, it illustrates a previ-
ously discussed advantage of that model. Here, the norm of participatory
parity warrants gay and lesbian claims deontologically, without recourse 
to ethical evaluation – without, that is, assuming the substantive judge-
ment that homosexual unions are ethically valuable. The self-realisation
approach, in contrast, cannot avoid presupposing that judgement, and thus
is vulnerable to counter-judgements that deny it.25 Thus, the status model
is superior in handling this case.
Perhaps, however, this example is too easy. Let us consider some pre-
sumptively harder cases involving cultural and religious practices. In such
cases, the question arises whether participatory parity can really pass muster
as a justificatory standard, whether, that is, it can serve to warrant claims
deontologically, without recourse to ethical evaluation of the cultural and
religious practices at issue. In fact, as we shall see, participatory parity
proves adequate here as well – provided it is correctly applied.
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What is crucial here is that participatory parity enters the picture at two
different levels. First, at the intergroup level, it supplies the standard for
assessing the effects of institutionalised patterns of cultural value on the 
relative standing of minorities vis-à-vis majorities. Thus, one invokes it
when considering, for example, whether erstwhile Canadian rules mandat-
ing uniform headgear for Mounted Police constituted an unjust majority
communitarianism, which effectively closed that occupation to Sikh men.
Second, at the intragroup level, participatory parity also serves to assess the
internal effects of minority practices for which recognition is claimed – that
is, the effects on the groups’ own members. At this level, one invokes it
when considering, for example, whether Orthodox Jewish practices of sex
segregation in education unjustly marginalise Orthodox girls and whether
those practices should be denied recognition in the form of tax exemptions
or school subsidies.
Taken together, these two levels constitute a double requirement for
claims for cultural recognition. Claimants must show, first, that the insti-
tutionalisation of majority cultural norms denies them participatory parity
and, second, that the practices whose recognition they seek do not them-
selves deny participatory parity – to some group members as well as to non-
members. For the status model, both requirements are necessary; neither
alone is sufficient. Only claims that meet both of them are deserving of
public recognition.
To apply this double requirement, consider the French controversy over
the foulard. Here the issue is whether policies forbidding Muslim girls to
wear headscarves in state schools constitute unjust treatment of a religious
minority. In this case, those claiming recognition for the foulard must estab-
lish two points: they must show, first, that the ban on the scarf constitutes
an unjust majority communitarianism, which denies educational parity to
Muslim girls; and second, that an alternative policy permitting the foulard
would not exacerbate female subordination – in Muslim communities or in
society at large. Only by establishing both points can they justify their claim.
The first point, concerning French majority communitarianism, can be
established without difficulty, it seems, as no analogous prohibition bars
the wearing of Christian crosses in state schools; thus, the current policy
denies equal standing to Muslim citizens. The second point, concerning the
non-exacerbation of female subordination, has proved controversial, in
contrast, as some French republicans have argued that the foulard is itself
a marker of such subordination and must therefore be denied recognition.
Disputing this interpretation, however, some multiculturalists have rejoined
that the scarf’s meaning is highly contested in French Muslim communities
today, as are gender relations more generally; thus, instead of construing it
as univocally patriarchal, which effectively accords male supremacists sole
authority to interpret Islam, the state should treat the foulard as a symbol
of Muslim identity in transition, one whose meaning is contested, as is
French identity itself, as a result of transcultural interactions in a multi-
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cultural society. From this perspective, permitting the foulard in state
schools could be a step toward, not away from, gender parity.26
In my view, the multiculturalists have the stronger argument here. (This
is not the case, incidentally, for those who would recognise what they call
‘female circumcision’ – actually, genital mutilation, which clearly denies
parity in sexual pleasure and in health to women and girls.) But that is not
the point I wish to stress here. The point, rather, is that the argument is
rightly cast in terms of parity of participation. For the status model, this is
precisely where the controversy should be joined. As in the case of same-
sex marriage, so in the case of cultural and religious claims, too: partici-
patory parity is the proper standard for warranting claims. Differences in
its interpretation notwithstanding, the norm of participatory parity serves
to evaluate such recognition claims deontologically, without any need for
ethical evaluation of the cultural or religious practices in question.27
In general, then, the status model sets a stringent standard for justifying
claims for the recognition of cultural difference. Yet it remains wholly 
deontological. Applied in this double way, the norm of participatory parity
suffices to rule out unwarranted claims, without any recourse to ethical
evaluation.
Ecology without ethics?
The question remains, however, whether participatory parity suffices in
every case, or whether it must be supplemented by ethical considerations
in some. In the latter event, not all claims that passed the deontological test
would be justified. Rather, only those that survived a further round of
ethical examination would be deemed worthy of public recognition. On this
hypothesis, participatory parity would be a necessary but not sufficient con-
dition of justification. While serving to filter out claims that are unaccept-
able on deontological grounds, it would be incapable of supplying the final
step, namely, assessing the ethical value of contested practices. Thus, it
would be necessary, in the end, to turn to ethics.
This prospect arises when we consider cases that are not amenable to
pluralist solutions. These would be cases, unlike same-sex marriage or 
l’affaire foulard, that cannot be handled by institutionalising toleration. 
In those two cases, people with different ethical views of the good life could
agree to disagree and opt for a regime of live-and-let-live. Suppose, however,
we encountered a case in which people’s ethical visions were so directly
antithetical, so mutually undermining, that peaceful coexistence was an
impossibility. In that event, the society would be forced to choose between
them, and parity of participation would cease to be a relevant goal. With
that deontological standard no longer applicable, it would be necessary to
evaluate the alternatives ethically. Citizens would have to assess the rela-
tive worth of two competing views of the good life.
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Certainly, such cases are in principle possible. But they are not as
common as those who assign recognition to ethics believe. Consider the
hypothetical case of a society committed to ensuring the integrity and sus-
tainability of the natural environment. Let us suppose that the social
arrangements in this society institutionalise eco-friendly patterns of cultural
value. Let us also suppose that the effect is to disadvantage a minority of
members who identify with eco-exploitative cultural orientations. Suppose,
too, that those members mobilised as a cultural minority and demanded
equal recognition of their cultural difference. Suppose, that is, that they
demanded the institutionalisation of a new pattern of cultural value that
ensured parity for eco-friendly and eco-exploitative cultural practices.
Clearly, this is a case that is not amenable to a pluralist solution. It makes
no sense to institutionalise parity between eco-friendly and eco-exploitative
orientations within a single society, as the latter would undermine the
former. Thus, society is effectively constrained to opt for one orientation or
the other. The question is what can justify the choice. Proponents of ethics
assume that the grounds must be ethical. As they see it, citizens must decide
which orientation to nature better conduces to a good form of life; and they
must justify their choice on such ethical grounds. If citizens opt for envi-
ronmentalism, for example, they must appeal to value judgements rooted
in an ecological world-view; if they opt for anti-environmentalism, on the
contrary, they must appeal to anti-ecological values. Such appeals are
problematic, however, for reasons we have already noted. Both invoke jus-
tifications internal to a world-view that the other side explicitly rejects.
Thus, neither side can justify its position in terms that the other could in
principle accept. And so neither can avoid casting the other outside the
circle of those entitled to such justification.28 Yet that is itself a failure of
recognition – of one’s fellow citizens qua citizens. In general, then, if no
other – non-ethical – justification is available, misrecognition, and there-
fore injustice, cannot be avoided.
Fortunately, the difficulty is less intractable than it first appears. In fact,
a non-ethical resolution is available, as the anti-ecologists’ claim violates
the deontological standard of participatory parity – well before ethical 
evaluation has to kick in. Specifically, it violates the second prong of the
double requirement, which holds that proposed reforms must not exacer-
bate one disparity of participation in the course of remedying another. In
this case, the anti-ecologists seek to remedy their own disparity vis-à-vis
their eco-friendly fellow citizens – but they would do so at the expense of
future generations. By instituting parity now for practices that would
worsen global warming, they would deny their successors the material pre-
requisites for a viable form of life – thereby violating intergenerational
justice. Thus, the anti-ecologists’ claim fails the test of participatory parity.
And so this case, too, like same-sex marriage and l’affaire foulard, can be
adjudicated on deontological grounds. No recourse to ethics is necessary.
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The moral here is that one should proceed cautiously before turning to
ethics. Ethical evaluation, after all, is problematic. Always contextually
embedded, it is subject to dispute whenever divergent evaluative horizons
come into contact. Thus, one should take care to exhaust the full resources
of deontological reasoning before taking that step. In fact, as this example
shows, cases that seem initially to require ethics can often be resolved by
deontological means. This is not to say that cases requiring ethical evalua-
tion are impossible in principle. But it is to insist that the determination
that one has in fact encountered such a case can be made only at the end
of a long line of moral reasoning. To fail to complete that chain is to turn
prematurely to ethics. In that event, one embarks on a dubious enterprise.
Appealing to substantive horizons of value that are not shared by everyone
concerned, one sacrifices the chance to adjudicate recognition claims
definitively – in ways that are binding on all.
Conclusion
For this reason, as well as for the others I have offered here, one should
postpone the turn to ethics as long as possible. Alternative approaches,
favoured, alas, by most recognition theorists, turn prematurely to ethics.
Foreclosing the option of developing a deontological interpretation of
recognition, they miss the chance to reconcile claims for the recognition of
difference with claims for egalitarian redistribution. Thus, they miss the
chance to restructure the conceptual terrain that is currently fostering philo-
sophical schizophrenia.
Given that unpalatable alternative, it is reassuring to see just how far one
can get with a deontological interpretation of recognition. And we did get
remarkably far here. By employing the status model, with its principle of
participatory parity, it was possible to handle apparently ethical questions,
such as the recognition of same-sex marriage, on the one hand, and ques-
tions of minority religious and cultural practices, on the other, without in
fact turning to ethics. Even the seemingly harder case of environmental
ethics proved susceptible to deontological resolution.
In general, then, the argument pursued here supports a rather heartening
conclusion: there is no need to pose an either/or choice between the poli-
tics of redistribution and the politics of recognition. It is possible, on the
contrary, to construct a comprehensive framework that can accommodate
both – by following the path pursued here. First, one must construe recog-
nition as a matter of justice, as opposed to ‘the good life’. This, in turn,
requires replacing the standard identity model of recognition with the alter-
native status model sketched here. Next, one must expand one’s conception
of justice to encompass distribution and recognition as two mutually irre-
ducible dimensions. This involves bringing both dimensions under the deon-
tological norm of participatory parity. Finally, after acknowledging that
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justice could in some cases require recognising distinctiveness over and
above common humanity, one must subject claims for recognition to the
justificatory standard of participatory parity. This, as we saw, means scru-
tinising institutionalised patterns of cultural value, and proposals for chang-
ing them, for their impact on social interaction – both across and within
social groups. Only then, after all these steps, might one encounter a situa-
tion in which it could prove necessary to turn to ethics. Apart from such
cases, one will succeed in remaining on the terrain of Moralität and in
avoiding the ethical turn.
It is possible, I conclude, to endorse both redistribution and recognition
while avoiding philosophical schizophrenia. In this way, one can prepare
some of the conceptual groundwork for tackling what I take to be the
central political question of the day: How can we develop a coherent
orientation that integrates redistribution and recognition? How can we
develop a framework that integrates what remains cogent and unsurpass-
able in the socialist vision with what is cogent and irrefutable in the new,
apparently ‘post-socialist’ vision of multiculturalism? If we fail to ask this
question, if we cling instead to false antitheses and misleading either/or
dichotomies, we will miss the chance to envision social arrangements that
can redress both economic and cultural injustices. Only by looking to inte-
grative approaches that unite redistribution and recognition can we meet
the requirements of justice for all.
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Part II
The contexts of toleration
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6
Reflexive toleration in 
a deliberative democracy
James Bohman
Any feasible ideal of democracy must face the unavoidable social fact that
the citizenry of a modern state is heterogeneous along a number of inter-
secting dimensions, including race, class, religion and culture. If that ideal
is also deliberative, and thus requires that citizens commit themselves to
making decisions according to reasons they believe are public, then such
diversity raises the possibility of deep and potentially irresolvable conflicts.
When conflicts do emerge, such a form of democracy requires that all citi-
zens should have equal standing and influence in any deliberation about
their resolution. In the circumstances of wide pluralism (that is, of plural-
ism along a number of dimensions), toleration would seem to be both part
of the ideal of public reason and an important virtue for citizens to exer-
cise in their deliberative institutions. Yet deliberation also demands more
of citizens than silent toleration regarding the reasons of those with whom
they disagree, especially if they accept that an important goal of public
deliberation is to find the best possible mutually acceptable solution to a
problem or conflict. It demands the critical engagement of citizens in a delib-
erative polity. How can such engagement be critical without being intoler-
ant, and tolerant without being uncritical? That is the task of a deliberative
theory of tolerance.
When is deliberative tolerance needed? In a democracy, tolerance is
exercised in resolving conflicts that are motivated by differences in belief.
It would seem, then, that toleration in deliberation requires that citizens
adopt some impartial or neutral stance and avoid directly confronting each
other on the most contentious issues. At the same time, it is also equally
unlikely that citizens would be able to deliberate about the sources of their
conflicts and disagreements at all if toleration entails, as Rawls holds, that
‘central to the idea of public reason is that it neither criticises nor attacks
any comprehensive doctrine, religious or non-religious’.1 Rawls goes on to
offer the following exception: criticism of any such doctrine is permissible
‘insofar as it is incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a
democratic polity’. Such a doctrine would then be criticised as ‘unreason-
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able’, even if in the ‘wider background culture of civil society’ such doc-
trines may be criticised without the restrictions of public reason.2 Is such
an account sufficiently tolerant given the fact of pluralism as it is mani-
fested today? Does it provide the correct basis for criticism that would
improve the deliberative process while allowing all to participate as free
and equal citizens?
Proponents of deliberative democracy might find these restrictions too
weak. They might argue that the requirements of public reason are suffi-
cient to exclude any such appeal to comprehensive doctrines at all, since
those who do not accept them have no reason to accept such reasons.3
Suppose that we take the perspective of the proponent of such a doctrine
instead of the critic. How else could the proponent challenge any particu-
lar law when it is just the conflict with such reasons that is salient? More
importantly, citizens who seek to challenge the regime of toleration itself
simply have no recourse other than to appeal to their own comprehensive
doctrines if they are to show why it is unacceptable to them or to anyone
else who holds beliefs similar to theirs. It would seem, then, that it would
be best to make it a demand of tolerance that participants in deliberation
accept any reason as public, particularly when toleration and its limits are
at stake. However, public deliberation cannot be so tolerant as to make citi-
zens unable to make any distinctions at all among better or worse reasons.
All reasons must be subject to critical scrutiny, especially by those who do
not believe that they are compelling. This requires that comprehensive doc-
trines be criticised more thoroughly and substantively than the standard of
‘reasonableness’ permits. It must also, following Kant, be critical of itself,
of its own ‘essentials’, if it is not to become intolerant and violate the politi-
cal equality of all citizens, some of whom properly challenge the current
interpretation of the limits and scope of publicity and toleration. If this is
the case, then there is nothing special about the essentials of public reason
and democracy, since they, too, are proper subjects for deliberation, and
indeed part of the continuum of forms of deliberation in public life in a
pluralist society.
Even if we may challenge the essentials of any political conception of
justice, toleration must still impose some limits on deliberation if it is to
support rather than undermine democracy. A reflexive conception of tolera-
tion clearly pulls in two directions and reveals tensions in the deliberative
ideal under the condition of pluralism. On the one hand, its ideal is demo-
cratic, and for that reason accepts that all have equal voice in an inclusive
political community. On the other hand, a deliberative ideal seeks the best
reasons, and can do so only if some of the reasons citizens offer will have
to be revised and even rejected in public discussion. My goal here is to show
that this tension can be resolved if toleration becomes reflexive, that is, only
if it is an ideal that is itself open to the demands of free and open public
deliberation and the qualities of public communication that make that pos-
sible. Deliberative toleration is distinctive, I argue, in so far as it is reflex-
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ive in two senses at once. First, it opens up standards and regimes of 
toleration to public deliberation rather than removing them from debate.
Second, deliberative toleration is reflexive because it is not concerned
directly with freedom of expression or even with the quality of the reasons
that others offer in public discussion. Rather, it is reflexive because its object
is not the content of speech, but the maintenance of a free and open struc-
ture of communication in a pluralist society. Reflexive toleration still has
to serve the purpose of promoting public deliberation, and it does so not
only by testing its current procedures and substance, but also by being
directed at a fundamental democratic value of political equality. Toleration
in a deliberative democracy serves to support ‘political egalitarianism’,
broadly understood as the ‘equal access for all to influence political delib-
eration’, especially in those decisions that become collectively and legally
binding. Intolerant regimes are then rejected on political egalitarian
grounds, and the proof that any regime is intolerant is that it is inegali-
tarian and undermines inclusive deliberation.
The public role of religious expression provides an interesting test case
for reflexive toleration, especially since it is tolerated religions that typically
challenge the nature and limits of religious toleration. The debate about
religion and the public square has largely focused on the wrong problem:
the crucial issue in a reflexive and deliberative regime of toleration is not
whether religious reasons are public or not, but how it is that standards of
public reason and toleration themselves can properly be challenged and
widened with the expanding moral and political community. Such conflicts
over toleration will be the result of specific sorts of conflicts in which inter-
secting dimensions and overlapping domains of social and cultural diver-
sity become salient. The conflicts that are the object of reflexive toleration
can be resolved only by creating the conditions for an inclusive deliberative
community. Thus, toleration is not merely openness to others in discourse,
but the capacity to treat them as free and equal members of a community
of deliberation and judgement. As a regulative ideal, toleration maintains
such a community; it deems intolerant those who deny that conflicts can
be solved in such a way as to maintain the equal membership of all.
Toleration, conflict and pluralism old and new
The need for toleration in any modern polity, whether democratic or not,
emerges from general facts of modern societies, in particular ‘the fact of
pluralism’. Just how this fact is characterised has much to do with the con-
tours of a theory of toleration, particularly in dealing with the nature and
scope of toleration. For Rawls, ‘the fact of pluralism’ is simply the diver-
sity of moral doctrines in modern societies, a permanent feature of modern
society that is directly relevant to political order because its conditions ‘pro-
foundly affect the requirements of a workable conception of justice’.4 Such
facts are permanent, in that modern institutions and ideals developed after
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the Wars of Religion, including constitutional democracy and freedom of
expression, promote rather than inhibit the development of further plural-
ism. This fact of pluralism alters how we are to think of the feasibility of
a political ideal under the conditions of pluralism.5 Since what is established
in any such ideal is a system of cooperation, the essentials of political justice
concern what anyone could accept regardless of their moral doctrine. In
this section I want to develop an alternative account of the need for tolera-
tion using examples of intersecting or ‘deep conflicts’ that characterise a
new threshold of diversity that is no longer captured by the model of reli-
gious conflict. These examples show that the greatest difficulty is not the
everyday challenges to principles and standards of deliberation, but rather
those conflicts that intersect at various levels, dimensions and domains 
in extremely diverse societies. The key to their solution is subjecting the
regime of toleration to the regulative principle of equal standing or non-
subordination in an inclusive community.
The defining historical moment of the liberal regime of toleration is the
emergence of religious pluralism and the distinctive zero-sum character of
religious conflict within a particular political community. With the emer-
gence of genuinely multicultural and even global polities, religion has lost
its central place, and become only one aspect of pluralism among many. It
has at the same time taken on increasing significance between societies,
exacerbated today by unprecedented migration and the rise of religious
fundamentalism throughout the world. In the light of this historical differ-
ence between the newer and the older situations of religious toleration, it
is now important to disaggregate the fact of pluralism in two ways if we
are to make sense of the need for a new regime of toleration: pluralism now
needs to be distinguished according to aspects and dimensions. These dis-
tinctions will in turn suggest further differences in types of conflicts accord-
ing to their complexity and degree of tractability and to the demands of
toleration.
Under contemporary social conditions, the fact of pluralism has a number
of different aspects having to do with different sorts of diversity. Such
aspects can be defined along several axes: cultural, social, and epistemic
diversity. Cultural diversity concerns the presence of different groups with
different interpretations of their identities; it has been discussed in terms of
multiculturalism and recent disputes about ‘identity politics’, including
ethnic and various religious conflicts over the character of national culture.
Epistemic diversity is a relatively recent phenomenon having to do with the
cognitive division of labour and the emergence of scientific expertise and
its claims to authority. Finally, I include social pluralism, which is not the
pluralism of self-identified groups but of various social positions, as having
a particular place in a structure or process, such as at the periphery of a
society or as being a subordinate in a social hierarchy.
Each aspect of diversity can be measured along various deliberative
dimensions: in terms of values, opinions and perspectives. These roughly
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correspond to the main aspects of diversity: diversity in terms of basic moral
or political norms (including conceptions of the common good); in terms
of different opinions (including beliefs about the way in which beliefs are
justified); and in terms of the perspectives afforded by different social posi-
tions (primarily emerging with the range and type of experience of one’s
society). Divergence in values, opinions, and perspectives can be quite wide,
and in this way produce conflicts. Taken singly, however, such divergences
need not be ‘deep’; a conflict is deep only if it occurs along a number of
different and overlapping dimensions. It is these deep and overlapping con-
flicts that best reveal the scope of toleration in pluralist societies, since
democracy in general and deliberative democracy in particular is a way of
settling differences of value and opinion in ways that make possible solu-
tions that everyone could reasonably accept. Ordinary politics employs the
egalitarian norms of democracy to settle disputes and to accommodate even
permanent disagreements along one dimension.
Conflicts of opinion are settled in fairly standard ways, using recognised
procedures and assumptions. Even when these do not work, toleration of
differences of opinion can leave wide disagreements in place. In practices
of inquiry, diversity of opinion is instrumentally valuable for the goal that
Mill describes as ‘having the truth win out in the marketplace of ideas’. But
epistemic diversity also has a negative side that produces potential conflicts
when it overlaps with other aspects of the fact of pluralism, such as the plu-
rality of values. Epistemic diversity is valuable in the Millian sense only in
light of shared commitments to procedures and practices of evidence. In
Christian Science refusal cases or disputes about evolution in schools, the
conflict is not along a single dimension but involves overlapping disagree-
ments of values and opinion (especially beliefs about how to settle differ-
ences of opinion). Diversity of values alone is not problematic given
commitments to democracy and its norms of freedom and equality; freedom
defines the scope of reasonable disagreement about values, limiting the
degree to which one group may impose their values on others and thereby
restrict their freedom. Such ideals commit participants in democracy to
finding solutions that can be agreed upon by all those affected. But once
again this solution becomes problematic when the norms of democracy are
called into question by moral values such as cultural self-determination (in
terms of which some forms of democracy itself are seen as oppressive) or
epistemic values that see little worth in dialogue or discussion (as in the
case of religious fundamentalism). Similarly, differences in perspective can
be overcome by shared experiences in a wider background culture that
bridge the gap; commitment to other values such as democracy may make
citizens willing to undergo a democratic process that entails subjecting
oneself to such experiences to achieve a shift in perspectives, as was the case
in the American Civil Rights Movement.
In the light of the problem of deep conflicts, a democratic pluralism might
seem to be self-defeating. On the one hand, democracy seems to be directly
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challenged by pluralism, since it seems to be a way of settling conflicts along
a single dimension according to the single and perhaps abstract aspect of
their political significance. On the other hand, democracy seems directly to
challenge pluralism by pointing out its possible limits. One way out of this
paradox is to eliminate those alternatives that challenge the principles of a
democratic polity from the domain of public deliberation. Because such
challenges are ipso facto ‘unreasonable’ and as such can be excluded from
deliberation, it is hard to see how these criteria are consistent with the
‘inclusive view’ that Rawls wishes now to profess. While this solution is
not obviously self-defeating, it does not solve the problem. The fact of plu-
ralism can no longer be characterised in such a way that any particular con-
ception of justice, liberal or otherwise, can be regarded as reasonable and
others not. It is not possible to exclude such challenges as unreasonable,
since the fact of pluralism now demands that conflicts be settled by public
deliberation on the essentials of democracy themselves. Given the fact of
the ‘new’ pluralism, the only satisfactory way out of this paradox is to offer
an account of the basic norms and ideals governing democratic process
based on a stronger conception of toleration consistent with wide and deep
pluralism. That is, the facts of pluralism demand that we now must trans-
form how we think about basic democratic conceptions and ideals, while
preserving their normative core, if they are to be effective regulative prin-
ciples for deliberation. The problem of a democratic pluralism is then to
transform such norms in such a way as to be able to avoid or to resolve
overlapping conflicts.
The first task of a democratic pluralism that is at the same time delib-
erative is to rethink what it means to resolve a conflict in the light of 
possibly permanent disagreement, even while retaining the ideal of a delib-
erative community. Such conflicts seem less trenchant once the goal of de-
liberation in a tolerant democracy is not to resolve disagreements into
consensus, but rather to maintain ongoing public communication and egal-
itarian social relations. Even this more feasible goal requires rethinking
basic ideals of publicity, impartiality, and the rule of law. What guides this
transformation? Here it is necessary to consider more closely why citizens
should be tolerant of each other in a deliberative democracy. The reason
why they ought be tolerant is not to avoid conflict by excluding contentious
reasons, but rather to provide for respect for all as equal members of a
deliberative community. They can do so only if all groups may participate
in such a community without domination or subordination. Because of the
central roles of political egalitarianism and deliberative responsiveness, such
an account of toleration is also able to redraw the limits of toleration con-
sistently by resolving deep and overlapping conflicts that liberal toleration
cannot. This alternative can be developed by showing how it solves the
paradox of toleration in a democracy while permitting mutual and critical
exchange among citizens. I consider the liberal and deliberative views of
religious toleration as the test case.
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Toleration: liberal or deliberative?
As the product of the specific historical situation of religious pluralism,
many now argue that liberal toleration is increasingly inadequate to deal
with pluralism along more than one dimension at a time. Depending on the
target, critics argue that liberalism is either too thin or too thick. For some
critics, liberal toleration is purely negative, having to do with prohibiting
arbitrary interference with others rather than with engaging them morally.
These critics argue that thin liberal neutrality leads to a ‘dynamic of tolera-
tion and oppression, sustained by the morally minimal and instrumental
nature of liberal toleration’.6 Instead, a positive or ‘liberating’ conception
of toleration is not based on discovering the functional requirements for
stability in a democracy from some observer’s perspective, but rather upon
taking up the perspective of the citizen who seeks redress from forms of
subordination that inhibit her ability to give effective voice to her dissent.7
Other critics take the opposing side, seeing liberal toleration as based on
the culturally specific conception of autonomy and thus as imposing liberal
norms and a comprehensive moral doctrine on those deemed intolerant.8 A
deliberative conception is not liberal, in that it too rejects toleration based
on neutrality and autonomy. But, like the liberal conception, it asks how it
is that toleration could be morally justified to free and equal citizens, each
from his or her own point of view.
It has historically been the case that those who are tolerated, rather than
those who are tolerating, more often challenge regimes of toleration. For
example, current challenges to the liberal regime of toleration now in place
come from religious groups, which from the liberal perspective seem to be
merely ‘the recurrence of sectarian and cultic religiosity and of fundamen-
talist theologies’.9 Contrary to the liberal view, such a religious challenge
could very well be legitimate in a deliberative context. More often than not,
it takes the form of the contestation of certain regulative principles guiding
deliberation. Consider Gutmann and Thompson’s principle of reciprocity.10
The constraint of reciprocity, they claim, putatively undermines claims such
as those of religious fundamentalists in Tennessee decided in Mozert v.
Hawkins County Board of Education not to have their children read
various books because they violate their religious beliefs: ‘The parents’ rea-
soning appeals to values that can and should be rejected by citizens of a
pluralist society committed to protecting the basic liberties and opportu-
nities of all citizens.’11 In excluding religious reasons as ‘non-reciprocal’ or
‘unreasonable’, the substantive principle of reciprocity begins to look very
much like either the liberal conception of autonomy or a principle of neu-
trality that simply eliminates religious reasons even when they are the con-
dition for meaningful participation by some parties in discussion of the issue
at hand.
This example raises several issues. Granted that democratic discussion
takes place under some constraints, are these sorts of constraints proper
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and deliberation-promoting? Should citizens (especially religious ones)
rationally accept such ex ante constraints in order to participate in public
deliberation? Reciprocity cannot be invoked as the overriding constraint if
the issue is to treat all parties in the deliberation as equal members of the
same deliberative community. Joshua Cohen makes the same point about
the constraint of reasonableness: ‘If one accepts the democratic process,
agreeing that adults are, more or less without exception, to have access to
it, then one cannot accept as a reason within that same process that some
are worth less than others or that the interests of one group are to count
for less than others.’12 If the reasons of some are not to be worth less 
than those of others, and if we accept that reasonableness as a norm is
constrained by such larger democratic requirements, then the parents in
Hawkins County, even if unreasonable in Rawls’s sense, are owed a justi-
fication for the practice they are challenging. Not to offer a justification to
the unreasonable is to exclude them from the community of judgement and
thus to violate the democratic commitment to political egalitarianism.13
Thus, even if we may say that the parents’ doctrine was unreasonable or
non-reciprocal, or even if certain citizens do not themselves engage in tol-
erant perspective-taking, these facts in no way undermine their reflexive
challenge. A second-order challenge is legitimate only if it shows that the
regime of toleration as practised is indeed exclusionary, as when public
reasons are considered secular or when religious reasons have no worth in
the context of democratic deliberation. Gutmann and Thompson’s sub-
stantive criterion of reciprocity is exclusionary in just this sense, to the
extent that it violates the principle of political egalitarianism.
Such a criticism of criteria such as reciprocity or reasonableness is quite
common in any theory based on deeper democratic commitments. The
guiding ideal of deliberative democracy shows that fair procedures are insuf-
ficient by themselves if democracy demands all participants be given equal
standing and have their particular reasons taken seriously. In this way, citi-
zens could justifiably contest a deliberative regime of toleration even if it is
based on principles of reciprocity and reasonableness. Religious citizens
could argue on egalitarian grounds that these principles are interpreted in
such a way that (other things being equal) they could not expect their reasons
would have any influence on important issues regarding political liberties.
When excluded from the community of judgement, citizens can appeal to
democratic principles to urge that the regime be revised. In this case it cannot
be justified to them as participants in public deliberation, all of whom as
citizens are owed a justification whether they are reasonable or not. Accord-
ing to this argument, then, toleration in a deliberative democracy is based
on the commitment to the principle of political egalitarianism: that is, the
equal access to political influence of all citizens over all decisions that affect
them.14 When the issue being contested is that important reasons are being
excluded on some disputable epistemic ground or judgement of the nature
of the reason, whether citizens are reasonable or unreasonable is irrelevant
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prior to deliberation on this very point. Thus, even to say that justification
is owed to the unreasonable person qua citizen does not quite capture the
demanding requirements of deliberative toleration.
How might we think of the Mozert case given a different account of the
fact of pluralism and reflexive toleration based on political egalitarianism?
The solution that takes seriously the parents’ concerns would seek some
form of accommodation consistent with the deeper democratic principles
on which the parents implicitly rely. In this way, school officials could seek
a principled compromise from a list of mutually acceptable books.15 While
these parents continue to participate in the wider set of economic, social
and political practices, groups like the Amish or indigenous peoples seek
less cooperation with the wider society and warrant the widest possible
accommodation on this issue (as the Court has already decided in many
cases). It is not unreasonable for them to adopt a stance toward the terms
of social cooperation that they do not believe others will hold. This atti-
tude is not that of ‘mere toleration’ that Gutmann and Thompson fear will
‘leave social divisions intact’ and fail to provide ‘a positive basis for resolv-
ing moral disagreement in the future’,16 since it still regards these groups as
members of the inclusive deliberative community. Those groups that deny
the deeper democratic principles upon which a reflexive challenge is based
will not receive uptake and accommodation, since they reject rather than
seek to modify the regulative framework for common deliberation, nor do
they seek any positive basis for resolving moral disagreement. Thus, the
deliberative conception of tolerance is not less tolerant than the liberal one,
just tolerant in a different and more engaged way.
With these debates about reciprocity and reasonableness in mind, the
main difference between a liberal and deliberative conception of toleration
can then be put this way: those tolerated in a democracy have to be
addressed as equals rather than subordinates, however fairly they are
treated when they have no capacity to influence decisions. Furthermore,
those tolerated in a deliberative democracy must be able to see that their
deeply held convictions, when expressed as reasons for others, have the
same public worth as the reasons of others. The recognition of their value
does not mean that those reasons will or should carry the day, since they,
too, must be reflexively acceptable to those for whom they are offered as a
justification without subordination. This justification cannot merely be a
matter of the self-expression of a sincere belief; nor can it be justified to the
community from a third-person perspective as a requirement of social sta-
bility or the common good. Neither of these attitudes establishes sustained
critical engagement with the reasons of those to whom one has addressed
the justification of a regime of toleration.
Why call such a justification reflexive? A deliberative regime of tolera-
tion is ‘reflexive’ precisely because the appeal to a free and open process of
public deliberation is able to make sense of and to countenance just such
challenges in ways that a liberal regime cannot. It is reflexive in a stronger
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sense as well; it connects toleration to norms and obligations of public com-
munication, as the medium in which toleration as a standard of critical
engagement is contested and deliberated upon. Deliberative toleration is
connected to communication in three ways. First, it is an attitude toward
the reasons of others; they must be taken seriously, even as they are criti-
cised or rejected. That is, they must be understood and taken up in discus-
sion in a way that the original speakers cannot reject. Second, it is an
attitude toward the speakers, who are equals without subordination only
if their communication is treated in such a way that it may be effective.
Third, it must also be a communicative attitude toward the perspectives of
those to whom one is attempting to justify a decision in deliberation. In a
deliberative context, toleration requires the capacity not merely to let the
other person or group alone regardless of our negative attitudes, but to take
up their perspective. Intolerance is thus a failure of perspective-taking, so
that the limits on the scope of toleration may not be sufficient to maintain
the free and open public communication needed for deliberation inclusive
of all citizens. Neither demanding that citizens exercise virtues of civility
nor prohibiting uncivil speech legally is sufficient to maintain the structure
of communication necessary for deliberation among equals.
Toleration, democracy and communication
Depending upon the practices, attitudes of toleration have various poten-
tial objects. At the most abstract level, toleration ought to be extended to
all persons as bearers of human rights, including rights of self-expression.
This may be expressed in duties not to interfere with or to prohibit such
expression. But these negative, perfect duties may not be the most appro-
priate level of description for democratic contexts in which citizens are
already engaged in practices of deliberation. The language of rights, per-
missions and prohibitions is not sufficient, in that we do not violate the
rights of others to self-expression when we fail to consider seriously their
reasons in deliberation. In order to capture the obligations of public delib-
eration, Onora O’Neill correctly argues that it is communication itself that
is ‘the proper object of toleration’ in a democracy.17 In deliberative settings,
citizens manifest their equality with each other not only by refraining from
interfering with each other’s acts of expression; they also do so by sustain-
ing the conditions for communication. How do they do this? They do so
reflexively, in their communication with each other in public deliberation
and in their attitudes towards others as participants in a public process.18
This concern of participants with the publicity of communication has
special importance when the inclusive character of both discussion and
reason-giving are themselves the special object of deliberation. Toleration
in this sense is discursive openness.
If publicity is the more general norm and attitude of concern for the struc-
tures and processes of communication in a democracy, then toleration
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demands that citizens be concerned with the structural features of public
debate and discussion through which deliberation takes place. Two aspects
of such communication are the more specific objects of toleration. First, tol-
eration in a weak sense is directed towards the reasons that others offer in
communication: they must be taken seriously and not disqualified ex ante
(either in principle or in fact). Toleration is needed in the public process
aimed at discovering whether a reason is a publicly acceptable one or not.
Publicity is in this sense historical rather than formal. If the public charac-
ter of a reason in this sense is better seen as an outcome of an actual process
of discussion, then it is not necessarily significant if the reason is religious
or secular.19 When communicating with an audience as heterogeneous as
the citizens of a large and pluralistic polity, such disqualification threatens
the public character of political communication in which reasons are con-
sidered on their own merits. However, taking a reason seriously does not
entail that we refrain from criticising it (even if we think it is reasonable in
Rawls’s sense). Indeed, the opposite is true: no reason can be expected to
receive uptake by others unless it passes their critical scrutiny; that is, a crit-
icism must be addressed to them as one that they could accept. Being tol-
erant thus does not exclude criticism; it in fact demands it, since without it
others will not form the expectation that their reasons as publicly expressed
shaped the course of the debate. Toleration is directed both towards poli-
cies that might accommodate a minority view and also towards the minor-
ity’s reasons put forward in deliberation. This inclusion of other citizens’
salient reasons, such as they are, is a means toward preserving the public
character of communication and the inclusive character of the democratic
community of citizens.
This brings us to the second feature of communication that is the object
of toleration. Taking reasons seriously is not all that deliberation requires.
Toleration in the strong sense does not extend directly to the reasons as such
but to the perspectives that inform these reasons and give them their cogency.
Before a reason can first be seen as a reason and then potentially as one that
passes the critical scrutiny of all citizens, the perspectives of others and the
experiences that inform them must be recognised as legitimate; in the light
of this inclusion of their perspective, groups recognise themselves as con-
tributing to democratic decisions. The toleration of others’ perspectives is
then part of recognising them as equal members of a political community,
where membership is recognised despite the potential for persistent dis-
agreements and deep conflicts. As Scanlon puts it, what toleration expresses
is recognition of common membership that is deeper than these conflicts,
recognition of others as ‘just as entitled as we are to contribute to the defi-
nition of our society’.20 A regime of toleration is illegitimate if it denies such
an entitlement by falsely generalising the perspective of the tolerating group
so that they can reject the claims and reasons of the tolerated group. Tolera-
tion in this sense is a property of a regime; a regime of toleration is just if
it permits citizens to fulfil their obligations to justification to all and respects
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the entitlement of each to contribute to the definition of their society. The
toleration of perspectives is not only a matter of first-order communication,
but of the second-order properties of the regime that aim at protecting the
integrity of communication and deliberation.
The distinction between reasons and perspectives in deliberation and thus
between toleration as an attitude in communication and as a property 
of a regime is central to understanding the nature of disagreements among
free and equal citizens. In the case of conflicts or disagreement, delibera-
tion cannot simply be guided by toleration in the weak sense common when
we say ‘those are their reasons’, any more than we might expect that saying
‘these are my reasons’ will add any weight to them. First-order conflicts and
disagreements about whether this or that reason is best are the normal busi-
ness of public deliberation, and public communication over such first-order
disagreements is preserved by respectful and mutual criticism and scrutiny.
In order to do so, the variety of perspectives as such is not the subject of
debate. When we say that all are equally entitled to shape deliberation in
a democracy, then the clear pragmatic implication is that each perspective
must be considered even if the particular reasons tied to it on particular
issues do not pass critical scrutiny.21 In this respect, toleration is a second-
order property of the framework that creates the deliberative community:
whether the deliberative framework includes enough reasons to grant all
citizens equal standing as members of a community that makes binding
judgements.
In this section, I have argued that public communication requires a
complex set of attitudes of toleration. First, deliberative democracy requires
the ‘weak’ toleration of reasons to make communication possible, as the
give and take of reasons in dialogue and their possible uptake by an audi-
ence. Second, it is an attitude toward any perspective as necessarily included
in a community of all citizens who are all equally entitled to shaping the
definition of their society. Thus, the inclusion of reasons requires attitudes
of toleration by participants in communication; the inclusion of perspec-
tives requires the justice of the deliberative framework (including its regime
of toleration) that creates an inclusive political community. Next, I argue
that the traditional ‘paradoxes of toleration’ themselves have reflexive form:
they state that practices of toleration may themselves be intolerant. Far from
undermining deliberative toleration, this sort of claim makes perfect sense
in a deliberative democracy: democratic deliberation permits formal and
informal regimes of toleration to become the topic of public communica-
tion and criticism and thus to test its explicit standards of inclusion for
reasons and its implicit exclusion of perspectives.
Toleration and participation in a deliberative community
For all its open, inclusive and reflexive character, deliberative toleration still
must be able to distinguish the tolerant from the intolerant. Such a dis-
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tinction might paradoxically be deemed intolerant, especially in the light of
the democratic standard of the inclusion of all perspectives in deliberation.
What if some citizens refuse to adopt the perspectives of other citizens they
deem immoral or simply false? This suspicion might be further reinforced
by the fact that while all reasons are admissible in discussion, only those
reasons that are able to withstand public scrutiny appear to be favoured.
Those reasons will be just those favoured by the views that I have criticised.
Even if I have failed to rid such accounts of their inherent difficulties, it is
clear that a deliberative procedure clearly ought not to favour intolerant
attitudes of whatever kind that undermine the obligations and entitlement
of political egalitarianism. In this section, I want to argue that reflexive tol-
eration can solve another paradox of toleration, the need to tolerate what
one finds to be false or wrong in some instances. Toleration is an attitude
that is for something: for participation in an inclusive and pluralist politi-
cal community.
Even with such attitudes of toleration so specified, we could still ask why
citizens should adopt them in their democratic deliberation, as the fact of
the ‘new pluralism’ suggests that they should.22 Here the tension in the
deliberative ideal could emerge once again. Should they be adopted just
because they make it more likely that decisions will be acceptable to more
citizens under the circumstances? Or do we have independent reasons to
accept such standards, such as fairness or the epistemic value of such pro-
cedures? These sorts of second-order questions have to be raised precisely
because they must be answered in order that a deliberative regime not be
self-defeating. It is not self-defeating given that the aim of a deliberative
regime of toleration is to provide the framework for an inclusive demo-
cratic community. We tolerate what is wrong and false because it is part of
our justificatory obligations to fellow members of a deliberative commu-
nity. The regime promotes wide toleration because of the entitlements of
members as political equals to shape the course of deliberation. Such a
regime does not undermine itself, since reflexive challenges to it are legiti-
mate only if they reflexively appeal to the political egalitarianism on which
these obligations and entitlements are based, that is, only if the expansion
of the limits of toleration advocated makes it such that all members of the
society have greater access to political influence and for that reason con-
tinue to cooperate.
From the participants’ perspective, deliberation begins when there is a
commonly perceived problematic situation, such as a conflict or a problem
to be resolved. In deliberation these conflicts or problems may be mani-
fested in a variety of ways, such as in disagreements over the cogency of
various reasons. Deliberation under democratic constraints is not simply
about which reasons are better or more likely to be correct; it is rather the
attempt to find a solution that is best and acceptable to all those involved.
From an observer’s perspective, we could always say that some type of
reason is better than another, perhaps because it is stated in a general
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fashion and thus is more likely to be acceptable to a broader audience or
perhaps because it takes certain facts into account that others do not. Even
if true, this feature does not mean that any particular universal reason or
appeal to facts will be acceptable to everyone in the discussion. The same
could be said for epistemic properties: for example, some reasons might be
better because they support a policy that experts agree is more likely to
achieve commonly accepted goals. For some participants will reject defin-
ing the problem as a matter for experts. In the face of such conflicts, David
Estlund argues that a deliberative procedure must take the epistemic
‘quality’ of the reasons into account rather than simply egalitarian consid-
erations such as equal access or availability of influence over a decision.23
Despite his proper insistence that such a standard should not be based upon
‘invidious comparisons’, I argue that it is still intolerant of the diversity of
citizens’ perspectives, and any principle that justifies considerations of epis-
temic quality over equal access to influence is open to the same sort of
reflexive objections as I raised earlier to Gutmann and Thompson’s use of
the principle of reciprocity.
A closer look at Estlund’s argument shows that it is based on the 
claim that all citizens could accept that ‘the epistemic advantages of wider
discussion might outweigh the disadvantages of some degree of unequal
influence’.24 This concern seems to resemble reflexive toleration in that
maintaining the structure of public communication is its main object. Does
extensiveness alone capture the requirements of toleration? Since it is doubt-
ful that extensiveness alone ensures that all in fact share the advantages of
wider discussion, it is reasonable for some to reject it (as might be argued
in unlimited private campaign finance in the United States). Nor does exten-
siveness capture ‘the epistemic value of equality’, since a discussion is more
extensive in quantity even if the same messages are repeated over and over.
Quantity then is insufficient to capture the epistemic value of diversity. It
is only when more speakers are included that more discussion increases 
the epistemic value of deliberation. Pace Estlund, there is, then, no conflict
between epistemic quality and political egalitarianism, since both depend
on the quality of communication in a society. The corrective value of diver-
sity is essential particularly in the case of second-order questions concerned
with the effectiveness of participation in a political community.
It is not clear that those whose perspective has been excluded would
accept either ‘the epistemic value of quantity’ (‘a greater quantity of input
at the same level of equality’) or ‘the epistemic difference principle’ (which
permits each to gain ‘more input’ at the price of inequality).25 The increase
is in overall input, and thus without the correlative expectation that such
extensive discussion also increases the opportunity for being heard and
hence for the equal exercise of influence. Otherwise, participants are asked
by Estlund’s epistemic difference principle to accept not only the dispersal
of influence in a wider body of citizens but also that some quantity of ‘epis-
temic compensation’ is sufficient for them to exchange for the lesser worth
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of their political liberty. But this difference principle can no more pass the
reflexivity test than could reciprocity, since it would demand that some 
citizens surrender their potential influence without any process of collective
authorisation. Such authorisation usually depends on a prior agreement
about what counts as a good reason in a particular context. Citizens could
then enjoy the same epistemic gains through authorising experts without
any loss of access to influence, particularly if they can challenge the appro-
priateness of the authorisation of experts in some given cases, as often
occurs in issues of risk and safety.
In this way, any consideration of epistemic quality either rides piggyback
on the diversity of perspectives or is acceptable to all only if each could
reflexively endorse the division of labour from their own point of view, 
not by some independent standard identified from an observer’s perspec-
tive. As is the case with average utility, such standards do not respect the
differences among persons. Whatever the intrinsic merits of some inde-
pendent standard or intrinsic value (whether it be reasonableness, reciproc-
ity or epistemic value), it may be reflexively challenged as intolerant from
the participants’ perspective of disadvantaged citizens.26 The difference prin-
ciple does not apply when disadvantaged participants have no reason to
accept the justification that they have benefited from the inequality, except
through the illicit and intolerant generalisation of the perspective of those
who do exercise influence. This dependence of any application of the dif-
ference principle on the perspective of those disadvantaged by it does not
leave us without standards. Those standards are rather the regulative ideals
of a democratic community.
With these resources it is possible to solve another potential paradox of
toleration. It is not only equal membership, but also the regulative ideal of
an inclusive democratic community that provides the basis for tolerating
those whom we judge to be wrong or immoral.27 But this community is not
the actual political community, in which the tolerated and the tolerator may
stand in a social relationship of inequality or subordination. Rather, such
a democratic community has a just regime of toleration to the extent not
only that it promotes the proper attitudes of communication, but that it
also organises a framework for deliberation that makes possible participa-
tion in a pluralist political community. Although Rawls accepts that each
can accept such ideals for their own reasons, he sees such a framework as
‘essentials’, as having a special place that then becomes the basis for all
further deliberation. Habermas makes deliberation more open and dynamic
by arguing against Rawls that citizens cannot employ norms of publicity
determining in advance what reasons are likely to be accepted in delibera-
tion. Nonetheless, he insists that mutually acceptable reasons will have to
be impartial and general such that ‘the consensus brought about through
argument must rest on identical reasons that are able to convince the parties
in the same way’.28 Both either suggest a more substantial unity than a delib-
erative community requires or are insufficiently robust to solve the prob-
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lems of deep conflict. Instead, it is better to appeal to the regulative ideal
of an inclusive community in both challenging and setting the limits on
deliberative toleration.
The central place of the deliberative community points towards another
sort of case that evades this reflexive solution and thus falls outside the
deliberative ideal of toleration. Some tolerated groups may even ask not to
be tolerated in the sense that they do not wish to be part of an inclusive
community, as is the case for the Amish and many indigenous peoples. Here
the appeal is to some other ideal, such as the recognition of their equal
freedom to pursue their definition of their own society. Such groups are
accommodated though the right not to be included in the common life of
a community in which they do not wish to have the entitlement to define
and in this way change the dynamic away from tolerant inclusion to the
differentiation of citizenship. How might such differentiation enter into a
just regime of toleration?
I argued earlier that the Amish and indigenous groups do not enter into
a close cooperative relationship with the larger tolerating community and
thus accept being democratically unequal in influence over some decisions,
in exchange for the maximum degree of non-interference possible. It is
important to see that this is an exception. The existence of such groups does
not challenge the ideal of toleration, but presents limits to its capacity to
solve problems of difference in a highly heterogeneous society. They attempt
to create a different sort of social relationship of non-subordination outside
rather than within a democratic society. In contrast, intolerant groups
cannot claim to offer a reflexive challenge, since the purpose of the regime
of toleration is precisely to protect the integrity of communication in the
deliberative process and in doing so to create a pluralistic community.
Challenges to toleration and its legal regime are constrained by the regula-
tive ideal of an inclusive deliberative community that informs the regime of
toleration, as one might imagine in the case of certain demands of moral
constraint on expression proposed by some non-accommodationist funda-
mentalist religious groups or by racial or ethnic separatists. Such groups
violate the demands of toleration, since they cannot intelligibly be construed
as widening the deliberative community. As opposed to the Amish, they do
not gain their own religious or cultural non-subordination for the tolera-
tion of the larger community’s democratic ideals. Multiple memberships of
a certain kind are thus consistent with citizenship.
The second-order character of toleration, the proper object of which is
public communication, is in this way sufficient to accommodate reflexive
challenges to the ideal and regime of toleration without falling into con-
tradiction or paradox. But because it seeks to expand the democratic 
community of equal citizens and maintain its structures of free and open
communication, it is pluralist without being morally neutral. Because it
permits the mutual criticism of reasons offered in deliberation, it is also not
epistemically abstinent. Neither the standards of public reason nor those of
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toleration are themselves fixed points beyond critical scrutiny. Indeed,
public reason can improve deliberation and reliably perform its role of
solving problems and conflicts ‘only when it is itself subject to revision and
correction in light of public standards that are open, accessible and avail-
able to all’.29 The possibility of such self-correction itself requires not only
public standards, but also the openness and accessibility demanded by the
normative attitudes and instituted in egalitarian practices of toleration. The
practices in which such attitudes are exercised require the regulative frame-
work of an expansive deliberative community.
Conclusion: challenging toleration, extending political community
The superiority of the deliberative over a liberal regime of toleration 
consists in its ability to deal with the main problems of wide pluralism:
second-order challenges and overlapping and intersecting deep conflicts. In
a deliberative democracy, debates about the basic principles of governance
and shared political life belong on one end of the continuum of delibera-
tive problem-solving. Far from being avoided, appeals to the interpretation
of fundamental principles are an everyday occurrence in a deliberative
democracy, especially when pluralism produces conflicts along a number of
dimensions (as is the case in debates about the wall of separation of church
and state and the accommodation of religious minorities in schooling). Such
debates can become pitched conflicts, whose constant recurrence indicates
a lack of problem-solving capacity in the current deliberative framework.
The community that this framework creates is not one that is pluralistic
across sufficient dimensions. Spurred by persistent deep conflicts (and not
merely everyday persistent disagreement), debates about the framework for
deliberation and the ideal of democratic community can lead to a period
of ‘constitutional politics’ such as was the case in the Reconstruction period
and the New Deal in United States history, when the deliberative frame-
work of rights and powers had to shift to solve problems and conflicts.30
The deliberation that occurs in periods of constitutional politics is much
more fundamental than the development of acceptable exemptions and
privileges typical of current calls for ‘differentiated citizenship’. Rather, it
demands rethinking the normative framework that operates in the back-
ground of democratic deliberation and provides the basis for deciding to
which reasons institutions must be responsive. The regulative ideal of an
inclusive political community is the basis for deliberating about such a
transformation of the obligations and entitlements of citizenship.
Religious toleration has played a crucial role in the emergence of modern
citizenship. It became the basis for a distinctly universal identity within the
political community of a modern nation-state that united citizens across
social and cultural differences. Both multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism
challenge the adequacy of this universal identity. Deliberative toleration
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looks at the problem of inclusion from the other way around. Precisely
because of the successful inclusion of ever more citizens in a non-
naturalistically or culturally based community of principle, the conflicts
inherent in wide pluralism challenge the institutional framework that made
this inclusion possible. Once again, current religious conflict over tolera-
tion provides a ready example. The emerging challenges to the liberal
regime of toleration even in its expanded multicultural form are increas-
ingly transnational, given the fact that global migration has spurred new
levels of pluralism in liberal democratic societies. This migration will call
into question the requirements of citizenship, as people no longer live their
lives within the boundaries of a particular nation-state. Here we might con-
sider the extent to which traditional liberal and republican conceptions can
provide the basis for mutual toleration among diverse citizens. As Rawls
put it, liberal toleration applied in the international sphere ‘asks of other
societies only what they can reasonably grant without submitting to a 
position of inferiority or domination’.31 Given the fact of wide pluralism,
cosmopolitanism begins at home. It may well be that the deliberative
framework in societies characterised by migration and wide pluralism will
have to incorporate interactions among many different inclusive commu-
nities. The laws of an inclusive community would have to protect and regu-
late a variety of different statuses surrounding citizenship.
By now it should be clear exactly how reflexive toleration is different
from other conceptions. Broadly understood, it belongs to a family of con-
ceptions related to the standards of justification in a deliberative democ-
racy. In this way, it bears family resemblances to many of the views criticised
here, such as those of Rawls, Gutmann and Thompson, and Habermas. The
differences emerge in response to the various levels of the challenges entailed
by the deep conflicts engendered by the fact of the new pluralism. At the
level of the joint activity of common deliberation about such conflicts,
reflexive deliberation has the integrity of communication as its main object,
where each perspective is given a full hearing without prior constraints on
the publicity of a reason. Intolerance is evidenced in the inability of citizens
to raise vital and significant concerns in deliberation, by excluding them as
acceptable reasons or by illicitly generalising the dominant or majority per-
spective. Second, reflexive toleration establishes a different ideal, not merely
of mutually granted rights and immunities from interference, but of a shared
community of deliberation and judgement. In justifying toleration, a delib-
erative conception of political community not only provides for the nature
and limits of challenges to the regime of toleration, but also provides 
toleration with its aim or purpose. Guided by its practical orientation to
successful public communication and the ideal of an inclusive community,
reflexive toleration is both a means and an end for furthering democrati-
sation in a situation of undiminished pluralism. If such ideals are to be
maintained, then the contemporary facts of pluralism require a more reflex-
ive understanding of norms that guide deliberation and a wider variety of
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institutional settings in which citizenship is exercised and conflicts are
resolved.
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City life and community: 
complementary or incompatible ideals?
Andrew Mason
The words ‘city’ and ‘community’ conjure up very different images. The
city is often pictured as an arena where diverse social groups or networks
may co-exist in an atmosphere of mutual toleration, while the community
is seen as a cohesive unit where conformity is fostered at the expense of
diversity, thereby breeding intolerance. So understood, community is an
unattractive ideal, unlikely to endear itself to those with liberal sympathies.
It may be able to meet the needs of its members to feel that they belong;
but it does so at a high cost to them and to others. Cities, in contrast,
promise to provide their inhabitants (and indeed their visitors) with a
diverse range of possibilities that, even if they do not represent options that
can be combined harmoniously, may nevertheless co-exist together.
My aim is to assess whether this picture of city life and community, and
their relative merits, can be sustained. Some may find it hard to believe that
it can withstand critical scrutiny: on the one hand it seems to idealise the
city, while on the other ignoring the possibility of communities that are
open to difference and respectful of it. But there are those such as Iris Young
who think that this picture does represent a deeper truth that can be given
philosophical defence. Without glamorising actually existing cities, Young
argues that city life contains within it a liberating promise. In contrast, com-
munity in her view is a deeply flawed ideal: it manifests what she calls the
logic of identity, which entails excluding or repressing difference.
Community is a complex notion, however. Against Young I shall main-
tain that her picture of city life is compatible with the ideal of community
when the latter is properly conceived. Young’s real target is a form of com-
munitarianism that envisages a network of self-contained groups in which
relations are face-to-face and wholly transparent. But those who value com-
munity need not be offering this vision. They can allow that communal 
relations may exist between those who do not know each other and do 
not fully understand each other. They can also acknowledge the value and
importance of non-communal relations, and celebrate the way in which, in
the context of the city, members of different communities can learn from
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each other while at the same time coming to appreciate the limits of their
own understanding and experience.
Following a path that has been well trodden, I shall also suggest that city
life and community can be complementary ideals in another way. Not only
may cities permit and encourage a variety of different communities to flour-
ish, they may also themselves constitute communities of a kind that could
facilitate an activist local politics committed to urban renewal, coupled with
modest redistributive programmes.
Community and difference
Young has three main complaints against the ideal of community.1 First,
she contends that it requires full and complete mutual understanding and
identification. As such, she believes it is valued as a means to satisfy a rather
infantile desire for fusion, or as a way of accommodating ‘a longing for
harmony among persons, for consensus and mutual understanding’.2 She
maintains that in so far as full mutual understanding and identification are
possible at all, they are likely to occur only between those who are alike 
in terms of history, cultural background, or point of view on the world.3
Therefore in practice community can be realised only by excluding some
from membership or by repressing difference.
Second, Young maintains that those who value community are in the grip
of a false ideal of face-to-face relations, conceiving these relations as trans-
parent, unmediated and harmonious. Young argues that face-to-face rela-
tions cannot be transparent in the way required by ideals of community,
for an individual is never fully present to herself let alone to others.4 These
relations are necessarily mediated, since, for example, they involve the inter-
pretation of speech and gestures. Furthermore, face-to-face relations are not
necessarily harmonious, because they contain the possibility of separation
and violence.5
Third, Young argues that the privileging of face-to-face relations inher-
ent in the ideal of community serves to devalue non-communal encounters
and divert our attention away from their importance. Relations between
those who are not personally acquainted are judged to involve some degree
of alienation simply because they are mediated. But, Young maintains, non-
communal relations need not involve alienation and can be mutually enrich-
ing. In virtue of their commitment to the value of face-to-face relations,
communitarians often envisage a society that consists of small decentralised
units. But, Young maintains, this is unrealistic and fails to confront the
political question of how different communities should relate to one
another.6
In Young’s view, city life provides a much more attractive social and po-
litical ideal than community, for it can allow difference to be truly respected.
(When she talks of city life, she intends to include living in what we ordi-
narily call ‘towns’; her ideal is not restricted to the huge metropolis.)7 City
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life, as she conceives it, is a form of being together with strangers that
involves encountering those with different cultures, histories and points of
view.8 Modern cities can thereby cultivate a sense of difference: dwellers in
them come to appreciate that there are forms of experience beyond their
own, occurring in or near public spaces, and that as a result they will never
be able fully to grasp the city as a whole.9 In cities there can be social dif-
ferentiation without exclusion;10 individuals can be members of groups that
overlap and intermingle, the character of which may change over time and
the boundaries of which are porous. According to Young, this ideal of city
life, unlike the ideal of community, does not require face-to-face relations,
nor does it require full mutual understanding: relations in the city are often
mediated by time and space, and we are made constantly aware of the limits
of our understanding of others.
In Young’s view, city life potentially incorporates the ideal of ‘openness
to unassimilated otherness’.11 Young does not fully unpack this notion, but
it is safe to infer that openness of this kind goes beyond what is required
by toleration, although it is not incompatible with the latter ideal.12 Toler-
ation is called for only in contexts where one person or group disapproves
of what others do. Openness to others, in contrast, is needed primarily when
understanding is lacking. It is an ideal that should enter in before tolera-
tion becomes an issue, and in that sense is prior to it. It is manifested as a
willingness to learn from others and to refrain from judging them when one
lacks full understanding; as an appreciation that there may be valuable
modes of being that one cannot fully grasp given the limits of one’s own
experience; and as a refusal to deny difference by illegitimately assimilat-
ing it to something familiar and already understood.
In order to evaluate Young’s critique of community, and her proposal that
city life can provide us with an alternative ideal, we need to be clear about
what she means by ‘community’. She points out that there are normative
and non-normative uses of the term, and that her concern is with its nor-
mative use: for example, she has no objection to the sociologial use of the
term in the context of community studies, where it usually means some-
thing like a ‘small town’ or ‘neighbourhood’.13 Here I agree with Young
that some distinction needs to be drawn, but I think that more needs to be
said about it.
‘Community’ is a much over-used term, both in ordinary language and
in academic debates. So much so that we are entitled to some degree of
scepticism about whether it can serve any useful analytical purpose. In my
view, however, it is worth retaining the term, so long as we are clear about
the different notions it is used to express.14 To develop my argument against
Young, I propose to distinguish between an ordinary and a moralised sense
of community by reference to two ideal types.15 According to the first ideal
type, which I shall refer to as the ordinary concept or ordinary sense, a
community is a group of people who share a range of values and a way of
life, whose members identify with the group and its practices, and acknowl-
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edge each other as members of that group. This account of community in
the ordinary sense does not specify precise necessary conditions: a group of
people may constitute a community in this sense even if, for example, they
share only some of the same values, and the way of life in which they 
participate is not all-encompassing. As a result, community may be realised
in degrees, and the ordinary concept of community is inherently vague: its
application requires a judgement about whether members of a group share
enough values, whether they participate in a way of life that is sufficiently
encompassing, whether they identify sufficiently strongly with the group,
and whether there is sufficient agreement amongst them concerning who
counts as a member of the group.
According to the second ideal type, which I shall refer to as the moralised
concept or moralised sense, two further conditions need to be met before
a group can constitute a community. First, its members must be mutually
concerned. What counts as mutual concern depends on the nature and scale
of the group; but minimally it means that they must give each other’s inter-
ests some non-instrumental weight in their practical reasoning. Second,
there must be no systematic injustice or, at least, no systematic exploitation
occurring between them. Like my account of community in the ordinary
sense, however, this does not provide a precise list of necessary conditions
for a group to be a community in the moralised sense, because it allows
that people may constitute such a community even if, for example, they 
do not share a wide range of values. So, like the ordinary concept, the
moralised concept allows for degrees of community. It also allows that 
communities may be of different kinds and exist at different levels.16 (The
moralised concept is to be found particularly in the socialist tradition; but
there are liberal, feminist, and conservative variants that provide their own
distinctive interpretations of what counts as mutual concern, exploitation
or injustice.)
It is clear, I think, that Young’s critique is directed against ideals of com-
munity in the moralised sense.17 She in effect argues that they are incoher-
ent: she maintains that it is impossible for communities to be free from
exploitation and oppression in the way advocates of the ideal maintain,
because they must inevitably repress or deny difference. But this argument
cannot get off the ground without the premise that community requires its
members fully to identify with each other and fully to understand each
other. Young believes that this is impossible, and that striving for it results
in either exclusion or the repression of difference. But full mutual identifi-
cation and understanding is not essential for community as I have charac-
terised it, even according to the moralised sense. A person can be concerned
for the well-being of others without being in a face-to-face relationship with
them and without identifying with them in the way that Young thinks the
ideal of community requires. Nor do communal relations in the moralised
sense need to be transparent or harmonious. Community does require some
degree of shared values and some shared way of life, but these minimal
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requirements can be satisfied in the face of considerable divergences in
values and considerable variations in the way members lead their lives.
Young might argue that I have misunderstood the main thrust of her
argument. In her view community is valued as a means to satisfy a desire
for fusion, and that desire could only be met by repressing difference. At
best I think this is a partial truth. Many communitarians have valued com-
munity for other reasons. They have argued that it satisfies a widespread
desire to belong or to be recognised by others. (Some of them would say
that this is a human need rather than simply a widely held desire, but they
do not have to make such an extravagant claim.) Although a person might
acquire a secure sense of belonging by fusing with other members of a
group, such a sense might also be obtained without abandoning one’s inde-
pendence in the way that fusion would require. Recognition by others is
not merely compatible with retaining one’s independence, but appears to
require it. For part of what it is to be recognised by others is to receive
acknowledgement of one’s own separate existence and independent worth.
Even if the attractions of community life cannot be explained by the idea
that it is valued as a means to fusion, could it nevertheless be true that it
is valued because of its (ultimately unrealistic) promise of harmony and con-
sensus? In a critique of community that resonates with Young’s, Elizabeth
Frazer argues that ‘the aspiration to community is an aspiration to a kind
of connectedness that transcends the mundane and concrete tangle of social
relations’.18 She maintains that such an experience of transcendence will be
fleeting at best, and that the longing for it may be politically dangerous
because it diverts attention away from the material conditions that are 
necessary for successful political organisation and action.19 Frazer is surely
right that experiences of fully-fledged community in its moralised sense are
likely to be rare and brief (even though communities of this sort may be
realised in a truncated form more frequently). But it would be a mistake to
suppose that the ideal of community requires complete harmony and 
consensus for its realisation. And although I do not want to deny that an
exclusive preoccupation with ideals of community can have the damaging
consequences that Frazer fears, it is hard to see why a commitment to these
ideals cannot be coupled with a hard-headed appreciation of their limita-
tions and material preconditions.
In some sense communities must exclude. Putting aside the possible
exception represented by the ideal of global community, it is part of the
logic of community that it will never be fully inclusive and there will always
be insiders and outsiders.20 But even Young must accept that this is true of
the groups that will encounter each other in cities. The question is: why
must communities, unlike these groups, exclude in an objectionable way,
or stand opposed to her ideal of openness to unassimilated otherness? 
Communities too may overlap and intermingle; their membership may be
fluid and their boundaries porous. And in principle there is no reason why
members of a community shouldn’t acknowledge, struggle to understand,
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and even celebrate, the existence of diversity within their community, or the
existence of other communities with different histories involving different
values or ways of life.
Are there any arguments of a more empirical kind that might show that
communities are likely to repress difference or fail to be open to it in one
way or another? Young declares that self-identification as a member of a
community ‘often occurs as an oppositional differentiation from other
groups, who are feared, despised or at best devalued’.21 It is not hard to
find examples of communities in the ordinary sense that are in conflict with
one another, dismissing each other’s achievements and ways of life without
making any genuine attempts to understand. But is there any general reason
to think that relations between communities (in either the ordinary or
moralised sense) will tend to be like this or worse? Joseph Raz appears 
to think so. He argues that even though communities founded upon very
different ways of life may each be worthwhile because they realise incom-
patible values, individuals who are part of one way of life will tend to
devalue the others because commitment to their way of life will encourage
a dismissive attitude towards the genuine values contained in the others:
‘pluralists can step back from their personal commitments and appreciate
in the abstract the value of other ways of life and their attendant virtues.
But this acknowledgement co-exists with, and cannot replace, the feelings
of rejection and dismissiveness towards what one knows is valuable’.22 If
Raz is right, members of a community will tend to repress or deny the reality
of valuable difference when they encounter it, even when they have some
appreciation of it. In effect, Raz’s argument throws into question the extent
to which Young’s ideal of openness can be realised.23
But even if there is an inevitable tension in practice between being com-
mitted to a way of life that realises one set of values, and admiring or
respecting ways of life that realise different values, the nature of this tension
will surely vary. One can participate in different ways of life and indeed be
a member of a number of communities. Under such conditions, the ten-
dency to devalue, which Raz claims is inevitable, may be relatively insig-
nificant. It may be that it is acute only under adverse conditions, for
example, when ways of life are geographically separated from each other
or under threat in some way, or when there is a conflict of material inter-
ests between them. It is not naive to suppose that under relatively hospitable
conditions city life may provide a good antidote to any tendency to devalue
other ways of life, especially given the proximity of these ways of life and
the likelihood that they will become interwoven.
City life and voluntary community
I would not want to exaggerate my disagreement with Young. I think that
she fails to appreciate what many regard as the main source of the value
of community, namely the way in which it satisfies a widely shared desire
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to belong or to be recognised by others, and that this failure is reflected in
the account of community she gives. But I do not deny that her critique 
is successful against some ideals of community.24 Like her, I think that a
vision of a society ‘composed of decentralized, economically self-sufficient, 
face-to-face communities functioning as autonomous political identities’ is
deeply flawed and ‘wildly utopian’.25 And I agree with her that city life can
provide us with an ideal of social existence. But I would put the point rather
differently in order to draw out the way in which the ideal of city life and
belonging to communities can be compatible. In my terms, city life could
in principle be the setting for a vibrant civil society, in which a multiplicity
of voluntary associations and communities in the ordinary sense flourish
(existing alongside more transient networks of social relations), enriching
each other in the process.
Civil society potentially provides an important sphere in which people
might find fulfilment. As Michael Walzer points out, this conclusion is rein-
forced when we contemplate the main alternatives.26 Work will provide
some with fulfilling lives; but given the limits imposed by the division of
labour, it is surely too optimistic to hope that it could do so for all. There
are ways in which work could be reorganised so as to provide greater
opportunities for self-realisation, perhaps even without compromising
efficiency. But it would be unrealistic to expect such changes to eliminate
boring or repetitive jobs, or even make them scarce. Political activity is
sometimes held up as a practice within which individuals can transcend the
realm of necessity and find fulfilment. But a life of political participation is
not to everyone’s taste, and it would be unjustifiable to regard it as an essen-
tial ingredient of a good life for everyone. In short, work and politics can
provide fulfilment for some, but not for everyone. When there is a healthy
civil society, the network of communities and voluntary associations that
constitute it provide an important alternative source of fulfilment.
The idea that city life can be valuable in virtue of providing people with
the space to form and join associations or communities that enable them
to lead fulfilling lives might be questioned by some communitarian thinkers,
on the grounds that civil society can provide only impoverished forms 
of community, or what Robert Bellah and his co-authors call ‘lifestyle
enclaves’.27 Expressed in terms of language whose meaning is familiar from
the work of Ferdinand Tonnies, these communitarian thinkers believe that
only Gemeinschaft – something that one is born into and grows within –
and not Gesellschaft, can meet our needs.28 According to this view, the com-
munities that are really important to us are those into which we are born
rather than those we join, for only those we enter at birth are truly ours;
only our ancestral communities, such as our families or ethnic communi-
ties, can satisfy our deeply felt need to belong or be recognised by others,
and give depth to our practical reasoning.29
To some extent at least this scepticism about the ability of civil society
to respond to out deepest needs is misconceived. Even if civil society is
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viewed as a network of voluntary associations and communities, this does
not mean that it excludes the communities into which people are born.
These can properly be regarded as voluntary so long as their members are
free to leave, even if they had no choice in the first place about whether to
become members. What constitutes freedom to leave is, of course, a hard
question. The mere possibility of leaving does not seem sufficient to justify
saying that a person is free to leave. For that to be the case, she must have
meaningful alternatives available to her. She must also be in a position to
assess the risks of leaving, at least in some rough and ready way, which
requires that she have the capacities and information to do so. If these con-
ditions are satisfied for the members of a community, they would seem to
possess the freedom to leave it, and the community can properly be regarded
as voluntary.
In any case, forms of communitarianism that attach overriding impor-
tance to people’s ancestral communities seem to involve considerable exag-
geration: people can often satisfy their need to feel that they belong, or to
be recognised by others, by joining communities and associations, and their
decision to join can be based upon deep commitments and need not be arbi-
trary. But we should not recoil from these exaggerated forms of communi-
tarianism to the opposite extreme, namely, the idea that cities are valuable
because they make space for the only authentic form of existence in the
modern world, ‘the cosmopolitan life’. The cosmopolitan in this context is
someone who shops around, appropriates different cultural materials, and
adapts them for his own purposes in the light of his own conception of
what is worthwhile.
Jeremy Waldron presents this vision of the cosmopolitan in the follow-
ing passage:
The cosmopolitan may live all his life in one city and maintain the same citi-
zenship throughout. But he refuses to think of himself as defined by his loca-
tion or his ancestry or his citizenship or his language. Though he may live in
San Francisco and be of Irish ancestry, he does not take his identity to be com-
promised when he learns Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothes made in Korea,
listens to arias by Verdi sung by a Maori princess on Japanese equipment,
follows Ukranian politics, and practices Buddhist meditation techniques.30
I do not deny that such an individual can flourish, and that he may
represent the realisation of something genuinely valuable.31 But I have
reservations about the provocative thesis that Waldron toys with, that the
way of life of ‘the cosmopolitan individual’ is the only authentic one for us
nowadays.32 For many people, the communities into which they are born
exert a powerful attraction, and continue to provide deep sources of fulfil-
ment. It is not obvious why their lives must be inauthentic if they see them-
selves as partly defined by membership of those communities and seek to
protect and preserve what they regard as the best in them, by whatever
legitimate means are at their disposal.
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Giving clear content to the notion of what it is to be defined, or to think
of oneself as being defined, partly or wholly, by one’s membership of some
community, is not easy. But it does not seem to preclude giving due weight
to the fact that the community (or communities) that define a person’s
identity are likely to be fluid. These will evolve in the face of changing
circumstances, and in the process the identity of their members will be
transformed. Nor does the idea that a person’s communal membership is
constitutive of her identity imply that she cannot be true to herself whilst
learning from other ways of life and seeking to change her own. Indeed she
may remain authentic whilst striving to realise Young’s ideal of openness
to others.
The model of city life and civil society I have been presenting must steer
a path between the two extremes I have described. It must acknowledge the
importance many people attach to their ancestral communities, and accept
that these communities co-exist and may sometimes interact in mutually
enriching ways with other communities in the city, even permitting their
members to carve out untraditional lives within them. But the model must
also recognise the value of being able to reject one’s inherited communities
more radically, by ceasing to define oneself in terms of them and living a
cosmopolitan life: when these communities allow their members genuine
freedom to leave, city life can provide access to a range of cultural ma-
terials, social networks and ways of life. So cities can in principle provide
a space in which individuals come to terms with their various inheritances,
remain open to difference, and determine within limits their own mode of
being with others.
Of course, this is a description of an ideal. No one – especially not Young
– is claiming that cities as we know them always (or indeed ever) provide
the respectful and open environment that would allow a variety of differ-
ent associations and communities to flourish, and that would make pos-
sible a meaningful and enriching encounter between these communities. 
But we can see the way in which cities could provide a unique setting for
this to happen, since they concentrate together a large and diverse group
of people. What other conditions would be required to facilitate this is a
complex issue. Social justice is no doubt important, and forms of civic edu-
cation that cultivate not only respect for others but also openness to other
ways of life.33
Cities as communities
I began by drawing attention to two contrasting images projected by the
terms ‘city’ and ‘community’: cities as a context of choice where diversity
and toleration can thrive, and communities as claustrophobic, fostering uni-
formity at the expense of diversity. I have spent some time trying to dis-
lodge the second of these images in order to make space for the thought
that community and city life might provide us with complementary ideals.
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But I have not yet entertained the idea that cities could themselves be com-
munities. This idea has been presupposed by a number of those who defend
the importance of a vibrant and activist local politics.
One feature of the concept of community, the importance of which has
often been ignored by communitarian thinkers, is that community can, in
principle at least, be realised at different levels. For example, it might be
realised below the level of the state, between groups of its citizens, or at
the level of the state, between all or most of its citizens; and there may be
transnational communities that cut across the borders of states. In the
context of the city, therefore, we can hardly avoid the question of whether
it is possible to make sense of the idea that the inhabitants of a city might
together form an overarching community.
Young would no doubt respond that this is a dangerously ‘totalising’
vision – that a community of this sort would have to deny difference. The
diversity present within cities means that it would be rash to dismiss such
a response out of hand. How could those who differ in terms of race, eth-
nicity, sexual orientation, class and income be bound together in a single
community? How could individuals residing in new housing developments,
protected by gates and security systems, be in community with those who
live in impoverished circumstances beyond those gates, perhaps under the
daily threat of violence?
Divisions of these kinds act as a serious barrier to the idea that the
inhabitants of really-existing cities might constitute communities. But we
should not forget that community can be a matter of degree (and co-exist
alongside voluntary associations and social networks of various kinds).
Many cities seem already to be communities, in what I have called the
ordinary sense, to some degree and in some respects. The inhabitants of a
city often identify with it and describe themselves with pride as, for
example, Londoners, Glaswegians or Geordies. Identification with the city
may be strengthened by support for its football team, or where there is more
than one, through local rivalries. Cities often support a distinctive way of
life for their inhabitants, perhaps partly in virtue of the climate they suffer
and their geographical setting, or perhaps in virtue of their festivals 
and their use of public spaces. Indeed cities may go some way towards
satisfying the need to belong that communitarian theorists have claimed is
important.
By partly defining the identities of their inhabitants, cities might also
provide a locus for the realisation of other values. Some philosophical
nationalists have maintained that a shared national identity makes feasible
active citizenship and a politics of the common good. By extension, could
it be argued that a shared local or civic identity provides the foundation for
an activist local politics of a kind that seems badly needed if urban renewal
or regeneration is to be more than just rhetoric in the mouths of politicians?
This is the question I propose to explore briefly in the remainder of the
chapter.
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The philosophical nationalists I have in mind argue that only if citizens
have a sense of belonging together will they attach importance to active cit-
izenship. David Miller, for example, says that ‘nationality gives people the
common identity that makes it possible for them to conceive of shaping
their world together’.34 Miller also believes that in practice a shared national
identity is important for the cultivation of social trust. That trust is ne-
cessary for a politics of the common good, since without it people will 
meet as advocates of particular groups, rather than ‘as citizens whose main
concerns are fairness between the different sections of the community and
the pursuit of common ends’.35 By extension it might be claimed that a
shared civic identity makes possible active participation in local politics,
and the successful implementation of policies that look to the good of the
inhabitants of the city as a whole rather than a particular group of them,
perhaps giving priority to the needs of the worst off, for example, by
subsidising services of various kinds for the local homeless or unemployed.
I have not defended the value of participation in local politics or the le-
gitimacy of redistribution of resources within the city.36 And even those who
share these normative commitments might regard the extension of the philo-
sophical nationalist’s position from nations to cities as far-fetched. The
reason why some nationalists have thought that a shared national identity
is important in a polity is precisely because it provides its citizens with a
sense of belonging together. When citizens share a national identity there is
a widespread belief amongst them that there is some reason why they should
associate together other than that they happen to have ended up in the same
polity. And it is just that which is missing in cities. Given the movement 
to and from cities, often driven by the labour market, it would require a
massive dose of self-deception for city dwellers to believe that there is 
some special reason why they should associate together other than that 
they happen to have ended up in the same city. It might be replied that co-
nationals as well require self-deception to sustain their belief that they
belong together. But there is surely a difference in degree here, for move-
ment across national borders is controlled in a way that movement to and
from cities within the same state is not. The myths that play a role in binding
together nations often cannot survive close scrutiny; but they are not usually
manifestly false.
There is nevertheless a potential objection to the nationalist position,
which makes possible a re-thinking of the conditions that are required for
active citizenship and a politics responsive to the common good. This objec-
tion can be cast in the form of a question: why cannot politics take this
shape when people have a sense of belonging to the appropriate political
unit, even if they lack a sense of belonging together in the relevant sense?
I do not propose to explore this question in the depth it would require to
give it a proper answer; but let me explain the distinction it presupposes
between a sense of belonging together and a sense of belonging to some
political unit.37
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Suppose we stipulate that a person has a sense of belonging to some po-
litical unit, such as a polity or a city, if and only if she identifies with some
of its major institutions and practices and feels at home in them. In princi-
ple at least, the inhabitants of a polity or city could identify with some of
their institutions and practices, and feel at home in them, without believ-
ing that there was any deep reason why they should associate together of
the sort that might be provided by the belief that they shared a culture,
history, or particular conception of the good. In other words, the inhabi-
tants of a city, or the citizens of a polity, might have a sense of belonging
to it without thinking that there was any real sense in which they belonged
together. People may move to a city for a variety of different reasons, for
example, employment or easier access to the place where they already work,
better leisure facilities, higher quality-schools – but they may nevertheless
all come to feel that they belong to it. So the suggestion is that a partici-
patory politics at the local level, involving a commitment to urban regen-
eration and modest forms of redistribution, might be possible without local
inhabitants’ possessing a sense of belonging together so long as they shared
a sense of belonging to the locality.
This is hardly a novel idea. Many advocates of more robust forms of
local democracy have said something similar. It is an empirical claim,
however, and cannot be justified by armchair reflection alone, despite the
attraction to the philosophically inclined of doing what Robert Nozick 
calls ‘normative sociology’. Proper research on these matters appears, at
best, inconclusive. William Hampton in his study of the connection be-
tween community and political activity in Sheffield concludes that a sense
of belonging to a given area ‘is connected only very tenuously to the
enhanced civic consciousness which might be expected’.38 In their study of
six localities in Britain, Geraint Parry, George Moyser and Neil Day express
some scepticism towards the idea that a sense of belonging to an area fosters
participation in its political life, concluding that the best which can be said
is that it is ‘not proven’.39
Though existing research does not support the idea that a sense of belong-
ing to a locality fosters political participation, it is not sufficiently advanced
to undermine the intuitive plausibility of that idea or some refined version
of it. Indeed this research appears to leave open the possibility that some
suitably qualified claim (of the form, ‘under certain specifiable conditions,
a sense of belonging to a locality will facilitate participation’) might be 
sustained in the face of the evidence. A hypothesis of this kind can allow
that other social conditions, including various non-communal relations (for
example, social networks or coalitions formed around shared interests) are
often more important for facilitating local political participation, and can
concede that participation of this kind does not necessarily require a shared
sense of belonging to a locality.
If a sense of belonging to a city can, under some circumstances, play a
role in facilitating an activist local politics, this leaves open the question of
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what conditions are conducive to fostering such a sense of belonging. Some
of these conditions seem uncontroversial. It will be harder for those who
live on housing states where they experience constant threats to their person
or possessions to feel a sense of belonging to the city that fails to provide
them with adequate security. Those who are constantly at the receiving end
of racist abuse will also find it difficult to identify with the city in which
they live. To the extent that the character and way of life of a city exclu-
sively reflect the concerns of the dominant cultural community, this will
make it difficult for those from other cultural communities to feel at home
in it. In principle, however, none of these threats to a widespread sense of
belonging is impossible to counter. In practice, whether they are countered
will depend to a large extent on the existence of the necessary political will.
Conclusion
Far from being incompatible with the realisation of community, cities could
in principle provide the setting for a robust civil society in which voluntary
associations and communities offer important sources of fulfilment, and in
which their individual members display what Young calls ‘an openness to
unassimilated otherness’. The notion of community is far less hostile to dif-
ference than Young maintains. Indeed, cities may themselves be communi-
ties in the ordinary sense, and under some circumstances fostering a sense
of belonging to them may facilitate a vibrant local politics informed by a
concern for the common good.
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8
Social ethos and the dynamics 
of toleration
Jonathan Wolff
‘The difficulty with toleration’, writes Bernard Williams, ‘is that it seems to
be at once necessary and impossible.’1 Toleration is necessary if groups with
fundamentally different and conflicting values and beliefs are to live in peace
together, but, so it is said, prima facie impossible under such circumstances.
Why so? The idea of toleration only seems appropriate when a conflict of
values or beliefs goes so deep that groups may think that ‘they cannot accept
the existence of each other’. Williams sums up: ‘Toleration, we may say, is
required only for the intolerable. That is its basic problem.’2
Although Williams, unlike many others, refrains from calling this the
‘paradox of toleration’, there is something of a genuine puzzle here. As
Williams indicates, formulating the apparent conditions under which tol-
eration is required makes it rather difficult to see how those conditions
could be satisfied. After all, it is not the case that all differences call for tol-
eration.3 Under normal circumstances differences in hair colour do not call
for toleration (although this is not to say that one cannot think of abnor-
mal circumstances). Nor is it the case that all differences in beliefs, or values,
call for toleration. Only differences of a certain kinds require toleration, so
it seems; perhaps differences of a certain depth or fundamental nature. And
it may be that when we spell out the nature of such differences the possi-
bility of toleration may be remote.
The supposition that there is a puzzle or paradox here seems to presup-
pose what we could call the ‘toleration presupposes repugnance’ view. This
is the view that the question of whether I should tolerate something only
arises when I find myself revolted or otherwise offended by it. If I am
untroubled, so it is said, toleration is not at issue.
It is not clear, though, that this is correct, at least in all cases. Is there
anything wrong with the language of the person who says ‘I’m a pretty tol-
erant sort of person: I don’t find any beliefs or practices offensive or revolt-
ing’? Some will say that toleration lies between ‘indifference’ and ‘empathy’,
and so this apparently super-tolerant person is not tolerant at all, but either
indifferent or abundantly empathetic. Behind this verbal squabble, though,
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there is something of importance. There is no doubt that there is a norma-
tive element to toleration. It only makes sense to say that one tolerates
beliefs or practices that fall into a certain class. Yet it is less clear that that
class is ‘the beliefs and practices I personally find revolting’. The alterna-
tive is to say that it is ‘the beliefs and practices that often, or normally, are
found revolting around here, or have been until recently (or if not here,
then in places similar to this one)’. Thus, we can agree that overcoming, or
somehow suspending, personal revulsion will often be part of the process
of toleration; but it need not be.4 And, as has often been noted, when tol-
eration of a practice becomes widespread enough – of interracial friend-
ship, for example – describing this in terms of toleration normally loses its
point.
It is probably important, though, to distinguish the issue of toleration as
an individual virtue from that of the nature of a tolerant society, which is
our central concern here. Yet there are bound to be some similarities (I will
return to this later), and I think we have seen enough to be sympathetic 
to the idea that, in general, toleration requires an ‘overcoming’. Thus,
although it doesn’t follow that we must see things this way, it makes sense
to think of toleration as a particular process, and of a tolerant society as
one that develops in a particular way. In other words, a tolerant society is
one that has a certain dynamics. To bring this out it will be helpful to con-
trast it with another view. The view I question in its pure form – and
whether anyone has ever explicitly held it is not at issue here – asserts that
a tolerant society is the same thing as a politically liberal society, and that
a politically liberal society is a society that is neutral between competing
conceptions of the good. In sum, then, on this view, a tolerant society is a
neutral society.
There is, no doubt, much to be said in favour of such a view, and it may
well be that the alternative perspective I shall offer differs primarily only in
emphasis. But note first that if we define a tolerant society in terms of
whether or not it is neutral between certain competing conceptions of the
good we seem to be looking at what we could call a structural feature of
that society. We look at it not so much in its development but in its statics;
what Nozick calls a ‘current-time slice’.5 We take an inventory of laws and
practices and examine them to see whether they are neutral or not.
What it means to pass this test will depend on the notion of neutrality
at play. According to ‘outcome neutrality’ the essence of whether a society
is tolerant depends on the consequences of its laws and practices for people’s
ability to live according to their own conceptions of the good. According
to ‘justification neutrality’ the test will be whether or not assumptions about
the relative superiority or inferiority of one conception of the good, or a
range of conceptions, explicitly or implicitly enter into the justification of
a society’s laws and practices.6
Is there anything wrong with the claim that a tolerant society is a (justi-
fication-) neutral society? One obvious flaw is that we have never encoun-
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tered an entirely neutral society; indeed, on many views, no actual society
has ever remotely come close. Yet we think we have encountered tolerant
societies. Should we say, then, that social tolerance comes in degrees, and
a society is tolerant to the degree that it is neutral? Perhaps, but let us look
at a richer characterisation of a tolerant society; one that more centrally
judges a society in terms of how it responds to change – in the dynamics
of the system. An analogy from epistemology might help. Consider the ques-
tion: how might we define a rational believer? One, apparently trivial, nec-
essary condition of being rational is to have a set of consistent beliefs: the
‘statics’ of a rational believer. But this encounters one important problem:
as a matter of fact, no one does. When the logical implications of every-
thing a given person believes are fully spelt out, inconsistencies will be
revealed. We have never encountered a truly consistent believer. Now we
could try to define degrees of rationality, so that some inconsistencies of
belief are still compatible with being rational to a high degree. However, a
number of epistemologists have responded in a different way: by trying to
define rationality at least in part in terms of the processes by which one
updates one’s beliefs in the light of new evidence. Thus, there are books
called Knowledge in Flux,7 Change in View,8 and The Dynamics of Belief9
(which was also the working title of Knowledge in Flux!).
There are, as with any analogy, limits to this one, which I introduce just
to illustrate the possibility, and the possible advantages, of a shift of empha-
sis from statics to dynamics. My question is whether this shift might help
us understand the nature of a tolerant society. The idea would be to say
that a tolerant society should be understood not as neutral society but as a
society that responds in certain ways to certain challenges. But challenges
to what? And what are these challenges? And how should it respond? These
are our questions.
Social ethos
If we are to take seriously the idea that a tolerant society is one with certain
dynamics, then we need to come to an understanding of what it is that
changes or, at least, is threatened with change. Here I want to appeal to the
idea of a ‘social ethos’. In general I want to say that everything that we
would recognise as a society has a social ethos. This is not, however,
intended as a definition of a society (as smaller groups too can have an
ethos), but as one necessary condition. Some societies have a tolerant social
ethos, and some do not, although this is going to be a matter of degree. But
what, it will be said, is a social ethos?
It will be helpful, I think, to start with a model case, and then try to apply
the lessons learnt there back to the case of an entire society. The case I want
to consider is that of a big city firm of accountants,10 who pride themselves
on the idea that ‘here we work hard, but we play hard too’, perhaps stating
as much in their recruitment material on their website. This slogan, or prin-
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ciple, is likely to be exemplified in certain practices. The staff are likely to
get to work early and stay late, and work through their lunch break. But
on Friday nights they go out for drinks together, and at weekends they play
team sports for the company against similar companies.
The ‘work hard–play hard’ slogan may seem at the core of the company’s
corporate ethos, but is itself expressive of some underlying values: prof-
itability and collegiality, most likely. The company wants to make money,
but it also, either for the same reason or independently out of goodwill,
wants a workforce who get on with each other and identify with the
company. So we can see here we have three levels to the company’s ethos:
first, fundamental values; second, slogans or principles; and third, practices.
No doubt there are intermediate levels too, but for simplicity let us ignore
them for now. My claim is that the corporate ethos is constituted by all
three levels: each of values – which may only be implicit – principles and
practices must all be in place for us to say that there is a genuine ‘work
hard–play hard’ ethos. For consider another firm, which says exactly the
same on its website, and the workers believe that they work hard and play
hard, but in fact they don’t: they get in late, do the easy crossword before
starting work, and always get their regular trains home. Here we may say
that there isn’t so much an ethos in place as an ideology. Indeed, although
there are no doubt many other uses of the term ‘ideology’, one important
sense seems to be ‘degenerate ethos’. An ideology, in this sense, is a
deformed ethos where the principles and the practices do not match. (We
might also consider whether an ethos could be deformed in other ways, but
I will leave this to one side.)
When should we say that an individual shares the social ethos? One suf-
ficient condition, presumably, would be when she values the values, believes
and recites the principles, and follows the practices that exemplify the prin-
ciples. Each of these, again, will be a matter of degree, and may allow us
room to make a distinction between a strong and a weak social ethos. There
are at least two dimensions by which a social ethos can be judged strong
or weak. The first is that of those individuals who hold the ethos, how
strongly they do so. With how much conviction do they recite the slogans,
and how directly motivated are they to act on them? I say ‘directly’ moti-
vated as a way of making Kant’s distinction between acting from a princi-
ple and acting in accordance with it, perhaps out of the fear of the
consequences of not doing so. Strength of an ethos is measured, in part, by
action from the principle, governed by the values, rather than merely in
accordance with it.11
The second dimension of strength is the proportion of the population of
the society who adhere to the ethos. Thus it is obvious that an ethos can
be strong according to one dimension and weak according to another. We
might also add a third dimension of strength, which we could call perva-
siveness. To explain, suppose we view a society as a complex set of rela-
tions, and suppose that an ethos is a set of norms to govern those relations:
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which relations should it govern? There are, for example, relations between
citizens qua citizens; between citizens qua economic actors; between citi-
zens and the state; between the state and individuals outside the state;
between the state and other states, and so on, and so on. If a society that,
say, in other ways values equality of opportunity nevertheless enforces fairly
rigorous trade barriers we could say that this ethos is less pervasive than it
might be. Whether we treat this as a third dimension of strength, or as an
independent feature, may be a merely terminological question.
The mechanics of toleration
We introduced the idea of a social ethos as a way of pursuing the dynamic
account of toleration: in effect the idea is that a tolerant society is one that
has a social ethos that responds to challenges in a certain, tolerant, way.
What I mean by a ‘tolerant way’ of responding will be clarified, but it is
worth noting that ‘tolerance’ is, itself, sometimes, a mechanical, or at least
an engineering, term. We talk about certain measurements having a degree
of tolerance, meaning a margin of error, and to extend this use we could
use the term ‘tolerant’ as the opposite of ‘highly tuned’. A highly tuned
engine, we might say, is one that responds badly to interference, or ‘noise’:
it is intolerant, or unforgiving. This is exactly what so many people find so
infuriating about computers. A more tolerant machine might still manage
to do what it is meant to, even if the wrong key is pressed, or a little sand
gets in the works. In other words, a tolerant machine is one that can fulfil
its function even in the face of some dysfunctional elements. An intolerant
machine, on the other hand, needs a sterile environment and operators
wearing white gloves.
Should we say that a tolerant society is merely a society with a weak
ethos; one that is held by few people, or by many people but only to a low
degree? This, I think, is quite wrong. What is correct is that a tolerant
society can have a weak ethos; and sometimes it can be tolerant because it
has a weak ethos; but it seems to me just as likely that a society will be
intolerant precisely because it has a weak ethos. That is because the ethos
would crumble if it were not protected; it has to be protected from chal-
lenges through intolerance. This, indeed, may be how some totalitarian
regimes have acted: because the ethos was so weak, no one is permitted to
consider alternatives, for fear that alternatives would prove too attractive.
If this is right, then tolerance is independent of strength.
So how should we model tolerance? Consider again the firm of account-
ants, happy in their ‘work hard–play hard’ ethos. Suppose, now, someone
who does not share this ethos miraculously gets through the selection
process. Suppose that this person subscribes to the ‘family values’ ethos.
This means not routinely getting in early and routinely staying late, not
socialising with workmates after hours or at weekends, but generally
working efficiently enough that normal work tasks can be completed in
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normal working hours, in order to make room for a strong family life. How
will the company respond?
Clearly there are several ways that the company may behave. It may well
be said, for example, that this person is not a ‘team player’ and does nothing
to contribute to an attractive working environment. Indeed, they may even
be considered a disruptive influence by setting a bad example. If so, it may
well be that they will be frozen out: perhaps they will not survive the pro-
bationary period. If such a decision is taken for this reason, we should say
that this firm is extremely intolerant.
Of course they need not act this way. Another possibility is that, while
strongly disapproving of the person’s behaviour, they may decide not to
dismiss them. This could be for various reasons: a feeling that to do so
would be unfair – after all the person’s work is adequate – or a feeling that
this would draw a certain type of unwelcome attention on the firm. Rather
than bring the issue to a head by firing this worker, perhaps they would
adopt a different strategy: making the workplace discouraging enough to
encourage them to leave of their own accord, but not doing anything to
force the issue. This would mean passing them over for promotion, finding
reasons why bonuses went to others, and so on. There must be many real-
life examples of this. This is a form of toleration; but not the only form: if
Marcuse hadn’t taken the term for other uses we could call it repressive tol-
eration; but here I shall call it ‘grudging’ tolerance. Toleration is adopted
as a type of defensive strategy.
There is, though, another possible line of response. When confronted
with the example of someone who works effectively, but to a different
model, perhaps the senior management will take pause. It may be that they
will reflect on the idea that there is more than one way of getting what they
most want – profit – and feel that they should reconsider their principles
and/or practices. After reflection they may start to review such things as
their recruitment material, the type of activities they sponsor, and the
general image they present. In other words they will treat the alternative
working style on its merits, and come to appreciate and welcome it as a
valuable alternative. To act this way is to be ‘accommodatingly tolerant’.12
I said that we might define a tolerant society in terms of how it responds
to certain challenges. We had three questions: what is it that is challenged;
what are the challenges, and how does a tolerant society respond? We have
seen answers in the accountants example: the ethos is constituted by the
values, principles, and practices of the firm; it is challenged by someone
who does not share the working principles, and it responds by recognising
that there are other valid ways of working. Before trying to apply the lessons
of this model back to the case of a whole society, it is worth bringing 
out the point that this model also shows something about the limits of 
toleration.
Recall that the model of an ethos involved a three-way distinction
between values, principles and practices. At any time some collection of
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values, principles and practices constitutes the ethos of the group. We have
examined the example of a person who joins the group but wishes to live
by alternative principles. But why should we assume that all challenges
appear at the level of principles? There could be challenges to practices and
challenges to values too. Suppose someone comes up with the idea that
everyone should get in an hour earlier in the morning for a group session
in the gym, or that some other modification of sporting or social arrange-
ments should take place. Again the three responses are possible: intoler-
ance, grudging toleration or accommodating toleration. Facing such
challenges is likely to put very little strain on the organisation, and the
evaluation will simply be a question of whether this is a more effective 
way of putting the ‘work hard–play hard’ slogan into practice. Thus, the
organisation needs to decide whether it will get more or less work out of
its workers if they have the extra gym session, and whether encouraging
this behaviour will improve morale or have the reverse effect.
At the other extreme consider another employee who, after gaining the
confidence of the firm, proposes that the company should make many more
charitable donations, and that it should seek out worthwhile organisations
it can help at reduced or no fees, and who personally declines to work for
clients whose activities he or she finds morally dubious, advocating very
publicly that the company should drop these clients irrespective of the effect
on profitability. This employee may, however, thoroughly approve of the
‘work hard – play hard’ part of the ethos. The conflict in this case is not at
that level, but at the level of fundamental values. In this case the employee
wishes to modify ‘profitability’ with ‘social responsibility’ at the level of
core value.
Again the three responses are possible; however, in this case intolerance
appears overwhelmingly likely to be the response. Grudging toleration is
just about conceivable, provided a method of containment for this employee
can be found, but accommodating tolerance seems unlikely in the extreme.
It would be a complete rethinking of corporate goals, and why should the
company do that? This is not to say that there cannot be large accountancy
firms for whom social responsibility is important; but change is much more
likely to be top-down than bottom-up.
Yet need it be that in order to be considered tolerant the firm has to
change? A firm that gives serious consideration to the question of whether
it should be more socially responsible – even if it ultimately rejects the pro-
posal – is surely more tolerant than a firm that rejects the suggestion out
of hand, other things being equal. Indeed, firms or organisations that make
important changes without serious consideration would seem not to be so
much tolerant as irresponsible. But what does it mean to give a challenge
‘serious consideration’? In the case of challenges to practices or principles
this is relatively easy to understand. Each is evaluated in terms of how it
coheres with, develops or interprets some aspect at a more fundamental
level within the ethos. So a proposed new practice may be evaluated by how
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well it exemplifies the principles, and a new principle by how well its imple-
mentation will realise the values. But how can we evaluate a challenge to
the values? It seems that there is nothing more fundamental to which we
can appeal, and if we take literally the idea that a value must be assessed
on its own merits it will always win.
This is too quick, though. First, the idea of a three-level structure to an
ethos is an over-simplification. In reality there are an indefinite number of
levels and some values will be subordinate to others. Therefore, a similar
structure of evaluating the less fundamental in terms of the more funda-
mental is possible. Second, we can evaluate values in the light of other
values, even values at the same level. We can consider how well they mesh
or cohere, or – a point of great importance – fall into an apparently natural
pattern of change. Third, in some cases certain influences or pressures
reflecting ‘the spirit of the age’ may be relevant. If a proposed new value is
assessed in these, or other, ways, but is considered to be taking things ‘too
far’, or in the wrong direction, it seems a bit hard to call the society that
made this decision flatly intolerant. Perhaps we could introduce a category
of ‘reasoned intolerance’. This is a way of applying Mill’s distinction
between rejecting a view because it has been defeated after a full and fair
hearing, and refusing to consider it altogether. However, although reasoned
intolerance generally seems at least a step in the right direction, there may
nevertheless be cases where this form and degree of calculation comes over
as rather sinister, and may be found less excusable than mere bigotry.13 But
clearly cases will differ.
Back to society
So much for the accountants. What, though, do we learn about the nature
of a tolerant society as a result of this discussion? Earlier, I contrasted the
view I favour with the view that, ultimately, a tolerant society is a neutral
society. I suggested that a problem with this view is that we have never seen
a fully neutral society. Yet, there is a more basic shortcoming with the neu-
tralist view. The trouble is that we simply don’t know how to be neutral
until we know what we are meant to be neutral between. Neutralism
requires us to be ready for anything, but who was prepared for the chal-
lenges Western societies have faced in recent times? We have discovered
numerous ways in which our political and social institutions have turned
out to be non-neutral in unexpected ways with respect to gender, race,
sexual orientation, religion, disability and so on.
In reply it will be said that although we may have found our societies to
be ‘outcome non-neutral’ it does not follow from this that they are ‘justifi-
cation non-neutral’. For this would be to say that the justification of its
laws and/or practices depends implicitly or explicitly on assumptions about
the relevant merits of different conceptions of the good. Clearly it is right
that such a case needs to be made out more carefully, and cannot be inferred
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from the mere observation of non-neutral outcomes. But nevertheless, the
claim still seems obviously true. For example, a great deal of recent and
current law rests on assumptions about the ‘ideal’ family, and a certain
amount of recent legal reform has been the consequence of the struggle to
try to eliminate such assumptions in many areas of law. Thus, our societies
are both outcome non-neutral and justification non-neutral. Yet we believe
Western societies to be tolerant, and broadly I think we are correct.
But whatever we think about its desirability, I do not think that the goal
of making societies justification-neutral is a reasonable one. We cannot
predict what future challenges will be made to our unthinking assumptions.
And even if we could, it will be both very difficult and very wasteful to
make preparations to allow a place for new life styles or beliefs before we
know whether any or many people will show much interest in living that
way. The dynamic approach, by contrast, encourages us to react to what
exists, including what has just come into being, rather than what is merely
possible.
One good example of the dynamic approach is the way in which liberal
societies are slowly adapting themselves to the existence of gay life styles.
Although the nature of the challenge is different in different places, it seems
fairly clear that a large proportion of people in Western societies were, and
perhaps still are, revolted by the idea of homosexuality, and this had been
encoded in various repressive laws. Toleration takes the form, first, of non-
enforcement of law, and then repeal. Yet, as Mill and Marx both point out,
the law can be tolerant without society being so, and discrimination con-
tinues to take many unofficial and indirect forms. Nevertheless, the situa-
tion is largely such that Western democracies have accepted the obligation
of trying to work out ways in which gay people can be accommodated into
society while overcoming or at least allaying the fears of those non-gays
who, somehow, feel threatened. This may well be a case where society is
more tolerant than the average of its people.
Now change is a long process, and is not complete. But this is something
we should expect on the dynamic view. Because we have an existing ethos,
and one that is not standing ready to plug in just any new life style or beliefs,
whatever they are, change can take a long time. It is a way of working out
how to fit different things together. This is, in part at least, an experimen-
tal question and can be solved in different ways in different places. Some
moves may be seen to be counterproductive and unhelpful, and may be with-
drawn. The lesson is that toleration can hardly mean instant acceptance.
How do these comments, though, relate to the ‘accountancy’ model?
What insight does that model give us with this case, and others like it? I
would prefer to approach this question from the other direction. Clearly, I
would have not introduced it unless I thought it does a great deal to help
illustrate the nature of social ethos; what it is for a social ethos to be strong
or weak; and what it is for a social ethos to be tolerant or intolerant. But
others may not be as charitable to my analogy as I am myself, and may
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argue that it fails to be illuminating. The main criticisms will centre on the
claim that it is simply incorrect to say that contemporary liberal societies
have an ethos in any way comparable to that of a firm of accountants,
however large the firm, or small the society.
The most obvious difficulty, it will be noted, is at the level of fundamental
values. If, as is sometimes said, liberal society does not attempt to advance
fundamental values then, ultimately, the idea of new life styles presenting
challenges does no work: there is nothing to challenge.
The equally obvious answer is that it simply isn’t true that liberal society
promotes no values in particular. This becomes particularly clear when we
look at the theorists of liberalism. Early on in the Second Treatise, Locke
makes the claim that human beings are naturally free, equal and indepen-
dent. Other triads of rights or values are offered. Locke also gives us life,
liberty and estate. We are also familiar with the calls for life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness; and liberty, fraternity and equality. Rawls worries
that leaning too hard on these, or similar, values would make liberalism
‘but another sectarian doctrine’,14 but it seems to me that Rawls (with his
followers) are the exception to the tradition. As Rawls himself notes, by
this standard the doctrines of Locke, Kant, Mill, and contemporary theo-
rists such as Raz, are not properly forms of liberalism. Yet, however desir-
able one finds Rawls’s position, it seems to me best to view it as a possible
aspiration for society, rather than an account of existing liberal theory or
practice. Liberal society does have some particular root values, although
they tend to be rather vague and inclusive, and held ‘implicitly’.15
Although it has played little explicit role in the philosophical tradition,
the idea of ‘the pursuit of happiness’ may be central to our liberal ethos.
Each individual has the right to pursue happiness16 in their own way, subject
to constraints concerning harm to others, and, possibly, the use of resources.
Conventional life styles embody folk wisdom about where happiness, and
perhaps other values, are to be found. We might say, for example, that part
of this conventional wisdom is the implicit principle that ‘every man should
have a wife, kids, and a job’. Now I cannot recall anyone actually saying
this to me, but one can hardly doubt that it has determined many people’s
expectations for many generations.
Typically, conventional patterns of life or belief tend to become ossified
and become treated as values in themselves, independently of the question
of how well they realise the values to which they are instrumental. There
is very good reason for this, for we generally do better by following tradi-
tions than by re-inventing the wheel. However, conventional patterns will
not suit everyone equally well, and those who more easily find happiness
in other ways may attempt life styles that we may at first find threatening.
Why are they threatening? I don’t find that this is an easy question to
answer; but perhaps they are threatening because comparisons with differ-
ence require us to think and reflect upon our own lives and values, which
is often an uncomfortable experience.
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The story so far, then, is this. Central to the liberal social ethos is the
idea that each person has a right to pursue happiness. As a historical
achievement we have found certain ways of living, in general, more con-
ducive to happiness than others. These become conventional life styles, and
the underlying assumption that these ways of living are preferable to others
shapes many of our laws and practices. From time to time certain individ-
uals find certain of these laws and practices overly constraining, and rebel
by attempting to live in a way that allows them to pursue happiness in their
own fashion, but does not coalesce with our existing laws and practices.
This, then, provides a challenge to our social ethos.
Thus challenged, the model proposed suggests that we can respond in
any of at least four ways: with intolerance (refusing to think); with grudg-
ing tolerance (acceptance as a way of avoiding the issues); with accommo-
dating tolerance (coming to understand the value of the alternatives and
making room for them); and with reasoned intolerance (being prepared to
consider accommodation but finding that this is not possible without ‘too
much’ revision). Accordingly, then, once we understand that existing liberal
societies value the pursuit of happiness, we have a necessary core value with
which to run our dynamic model of toleration.
It might be argued that if an ethos is to be adaptable in the way I suggest
then it must have a special underlying value, perhaps ‘live and let live’. If
so, then this opens up two important challenges. First, the contrast between
the dynamic and static disappears, for a society will be tolerant in virtue of
one aspect of its social ethos. Second, the notion of ‘live and let live’ is so
close to the idea of ‘tolerate diversity’ that the analysis becomes circular,
presupposing the idea it is trying to explain.
Now the possible collapse of the distinction between statics and dynam-
ics was always a threat. In brief, any disposition needs a ‘categorical base’
so ultimately the distinction between statics and dynamics is, as I have 
said, one of emphasis. But the problem of circularity is more troubling.
However, my reply is that there is no single, special, value that all tolerant
societies must endorse. A society might be tolerant, for example, purely
because it is based on a strong doctrine of individual rights. Or it might be
committed to the exercise of public reason. Or because its people are just
naturally open-minded. The essence of toleration continues to depend on
the process by which challenges are met, rather than any particular value
or values underlying the process (even though some value or other must be
present).
A different problem in applying the model, it will be said, is that the
values of a liberal society are so thin and inclusive that there is no room
for intolerance unless some sort of clear harm, to individuals or to public
order, is threatened. But even if this is so, it is not an objection. A liberal
society should hope, eventually, to be able to find room for all ways of life
that do not damage third parties. But in addition this objection ignores the
element of time-scale. Change may have to be slow. Thus, there may be rea-
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soned intolerance of particular practices, where the proposed rate of change
is too much, too soon. We cannot expect the overturning of conventional
wisdom to be swift.
Finally, I have claimed that a tolerant society is one that responds to
certain challenges in particular ways; but what should we say about a
society that, as a matter of fact, faces no challenges? Does it not make sense
to ask whether or not such a society could be tolerant, nevertheless?
Here it is tempting to say that we need to consider certain counter-
factuals: how would it respond in the face of challenges? However, the truth
or falsity of such counter-factuals will depend on existing features of the
society; i.e. its statics. In this respect, then, the contrast between the dynamic
view and static view is again one of emphasis rather than deep philosoph-
ical difference. Nevertheless, it does seem, generally, to put the emphasis in
the right place.
Toleration as an individual virtue
The dynamic analysis of toleration as a social virtue was initially motivated
by the thought that toleration as an individual virtue typically requires some
sort of ‘overcoming’. Thus, the question arises of whether we should apply
the dynamic model to individuals as well.
There is reason for disquiet here. The obvious way of developing the view
is that an individual is tolerant only if she has a disposition to react in
certain ways in the face of the experience of new life styles. Here, though,
we meet the objection that someone could have, and espouse, extremely
bigoted views, yet nevertheless has the right dispositions. It is simply that
she has never faced the challenging circumstances, and so her tolerant dis-
positions remain unrealised. But on my analysis this bigoted person would
be classed as tolerant.17
Now, of course, we will not discover that she is tolerant unless she faces
a challenge, so her virtue may lie dormant. But this is not a problem. One
can be musical without ever having played a note, for example, so we are
generally prepared to recognise the existence of yet-unrealised dispositions.
Rather the problem is, so it is claimed, that the bigot is not tolerant at all.
So the analysis fails.
However, I think we need to press this further. Imagine a case of a person
who expresses extremely bigoted views; perhaps virulently anti-gay. But, by
hypothesis, he has never knowingly met a gay person, and so has never had
a chance to put his bigotry into action in any concrete fashion. Now
suppose a gay couple moves in next door. After his initial extreme unease
our subject finds himself going out of his way to make them feel welcome,
and to include the newcomers into the neighbourhood. His behaviour takes
him, and others, by surprise. His bigoted remarks about gays in general
may not have changed, but when it comes to a real challenge he behaves
in a tolerant fashion.
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Now we need to ask, has this person suddenly become tolerant, or was
he tolerant all along, ‘underneath’, without knowing it? Of course we now
have evidence of tolerance, which we did not have before; but that it is not
the question. It seems to me that we should say that he was always a tol-
erant person, but never had a serious chance to show it, or even find out
for himself. So, just as there may be mute Miltons, there may also be bigoted
tolerators.
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France is an indivisible, laïque, democratic and social republic. It ensures equal-
ity of all citizens before the law with no distinction made on the basis of origin,
race or religion. It respects all beliefs.
(Article 2 of 1958 Constitution)
In September 1989, three schoolgirls wearing the traditional Muslim head-
scarf were barred from entering a school near Paris, and later expelled. The
headmaster claimed to be applying a long-established republican rule pro-
hibiting religious symbols in secular state schools. The incident quickly
sparked a hotly contested national debate about the principle of religious
neutrality in republican schools. A decade later, everything, it seems, has
been said about the ‘headscarves affair’, and the way in which, in quite an
exemplary fashion, it crystallised latent national anxieties. These concerned,
notably, the contested status of public education in a fragmented society,
the problematic legitimacy of traditional norms of authority and social 
integration, the protracted liquidation of the colonial heritage, fears about
a ‘conflict of civilisations’ pitting the West against ‘illiberal’ cultures, and a
sense of a diffuse but multifaceted threat to French national identity.
Fewer attempts, however, have been made to take seriously the debate
surrounding the headscarves affair as a form of philosophical engagement
with general principles of toleration, neutrality, and citizenship.1 The head-
scarves debate has generally been perceived as too embedded in a particu-
lar socio-political context – too French, in a way – to be compatible with
any familiar or plausible understanding of justice and citizenship. This rel-
ative neglect of French debates by Anglo-American political theorists
undoubtedly stems both from lack of familiarity with the type of political
argument favoured in France and from genuinely diverging normative com-
mitments. If we are to make sense of a local debate about justice, such as
that surrounding the headscarves affair, we should try to delimit, as far 
as possible, linguistically mediated misunderstandings from substantive 
disagreements.
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I take a tentative step in this direction in this chapter through an eluci-
dation of the meaning of the pivotal concept invoked throughout the head-
scarves debate, laïcité – for which the best (if unsatisfactory) translation
remains ‘secularism’. Although the word itself did not appear until the end
of the nineteenth century, the origins of laïcité are usually traced back to
the French revolution, which brutally accelerated a century-long process of
autonomisation of the civil government from the Catholic Church. After a
century of veiled confrontation and failed compromise between the two
institutions, laïcité became the official doctrine of the Third Republic
(1870–1940), symbolised by such landmarks as the generalisation of secular
state primary education in the 1880s and the disestablishment of the
Catholic Church in 1905.2 However, it would be a mistake to reduce laïcité
to a conception of the proper relationship between state and religion, with
particular attention paid to matters of education. Laïcité is a broader moral
and social philosophy, a complex set of ideals and commitments that 
constitutes the closest equivalent in France – or perhaps direct alternative
– to the liberal philosophy of toleration.
In this chapter I suggest that laïcité is a confusing concept because it is
internally complex, and appeals to values and concerns that tend to be kept
separate in Anglo-American liberal political theory. I identify three main
strands of laïcité: neutrality (laïcité A), autonomy (laïcité B), and commu-
nity (laïcité C). I attempt to situate each of them in the historical context
of its emergence, and to offer an analytical elucidation of its relevance to
the issues raised by the headscarves affair and to wider debates about 
toleration. In the conclusion I suggest that the wearing of headscarves in
schools was problematic in France because it questioned the normative 
relevance of all three interpretations of laïcité at the same time. I also raise
some questions about the coherence of the concept, and point towards an
alternative conceptualisation of laïcité that would do justice to the repub-
lican – rather than liberal – language in which it is embedded.
Laïcité as state neutrality
Laïcité A refers to the institutional separation between church and state.
According to the Law of Separation of 1905, ‘the state neither recognises
nor subsidises any religion’ (Article 2). This establishes a regime of mutual
independence: freedom of religion (in its individual and collective dimen-
sions) is guaranteed in the private sphere, while state policies are pursued
and justified without reference to religious values. Laïcité A is therefore a
form of state neutrality. There are, however, two senses in which a state
policy can be said to be ‘neutral’ towards religion. The first, which roughly
corresponds to the ‘non-establishment’ clause of the First Amendment of
the US Constitution (‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’) forbids all forms
of governmental assistance to any religion. The second, which roughly cor-
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responds to the ‘free exercise’ clause of the First Amendment, may compel
the state to step in to ensure that all groups have effective means to exer-
cise the rights associated with freedom of religion.3
The first interpretation of neutrality captures the dominant spirit of the
1905 Separation Law. State abstention, on the laïcité A interpretation, is
the best way to accommodate the fact of pluralism. By suppressing the privi-
leges enjoyed by the Catholic Church, the Separation Law established the
principle of equal treatment between believers, and between believers and
non-believers. This principle requires that members of religious minorities,
as well as non-religious citizens, not simply be tolerated, but be fully recog-
nised as bearers of the same rights as members of the dominant Church.
These rights are universal rights attached equally to all individuals, rather
than to groups. The process of institutional dissociation between state and
church was thus complemented by the privatisation and individualisation
of religion. Catholics were, in a sense, ‘refused everything as a nation, and
granted everything as individuals’, as Jews had famously been during the
1789 revolution.4 The neutrality of the state, understood as the privatisa-
tion of religious matters, was seen as a guarantee of inclusiveness. All citi-
zens – Catholics and Protestants, Jews and atheists – could identify equally
with a shared, non-discriminatory public space where religious beliefs and
allegiances were ‘bracketed off’. Thus, laïcité has recently been defined as
‘the political philosophy that best entrenches in law the combination of
freedom of conscience and state neutrality’.5 Countries where there is an
official inequality of treatment between established and non-established reli-
gions – such as Britain – or where there is a non-secular public culture –
such as the US – are seen by advocates of laïcité A as falling short of this
ideal of neutrality qua abstention.6
In practice, however, the Catholic Church has not been reduced to the
status of a merely private association in France. The dominant interpreta-
tion of laïcité A as a strict principle of absolute separation between the state
and a wholly ‘privatised’ church must be qualified. After all, Article 2 of
the Separation Law also proclaims that ‘the republic . . . guarantees the
exercise of religious freedom’, and such a guarantee can be understood to
require an ‘active neutrality’.7 In practice, the French state does subsidise
private religious schools, provide financial help towards the maintenance
of religious edifices, respect the internal structure of authority within 
religious associations, and make possible the exercise of religious liberties
in prisons and state boarding schools. ‘Active’ neutrality, in contrast to
‘abstentionist’ neutrality, raises tricky issues concerning equality of treat-
ment between religious groups. There are, for example, significant dispar-
ities in the degree of state support to ‘older’ religions such as Christianity
and religions such as Islam that have been established more recently in
France.8 This is because the public funding of religion has in fact rarely been
articulated as the consequence of a principled commitment to freedom of
religion but was, rather, the outcome of a pragmatic compromise between
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the state and the Catholic Church in 1905.9 Prudence and precedent, rather
than abstract norms of justice, have underpinned the French policy of active
neutrality, which turned out, in practice, to be a policy of active partiality
towards the Catholic Church. No wonder therefore that the dominant 
view of laïcité, that of secular republicans, has been inclined to present the
(relatively modest) instances of state funding of religion as an unfortunate
exception to, not an application of, the principle of laïcité.10 Many
Catholics, by contrast, accepted laïcité only in so far as it was defined as
an active commitment to the actual exercise of freedom of religion. Abstract
liberties, they wryly reminded their opponents on the Left, are not worth
having if they cannot be exercised.11 Nevertheless, the Catholic attempt at
conceptual redefinition failed to displace the dominant philosophical inter-
pretation of laïcité A, that of the separation between the public and the
private sphere, and the strict abstention by the state from interference in
religious matters.
On this view, the boundaries of the public sphere must be strictly policed,
and its secular character preserved, in order for citizens to be able to address
one another as equals. In recent years, this interpretation of neutrality as
abstention, which was originally elaborated in the context of deep-seated
conflicts between state and church, has been extended to the question of
the appropriate response to demands for the public recognition of cultural
diversity. Laïcité A, in a sense, has become a blueprint for the contempo-
rary management of multiculturalism in France. The neutrality of the state
requires that it neither promote nor hamper the expression of religious and
cultural identities. Whereas citizens are free to practise their religion and
culture within civil society, they should disregard their special memberships
in the public sphere. The public sphere, crucially, includes state schools;
pupils and teachers are therefore expected to leave behind their particular
commitments and identities when they pass the gates of the school. Only
then can schools be open to all ‘with no distinction made on the basis 
of opinion or religion’, as proclaimed by the 1884 Education Law, which
established the principle of free, compulsory and secular primary education.
In turn, children are entitled to an education that does not infringe on their
private beliefs. Laïcité A, therefore, promotes an ‘abstentionist’ philosophy
of education. In the words of the inspirer of the 1884 law, Jules Ferry, ‘the
republic stops where conscience begins’: teachers have a duty of religious
and political neutrality. Not only should they refrain from disturbing the
‘sacred conscience’ of children but, in addition, they should be careful not
to impart values and attitudes likely to offend parental beliefs.12 Schools
should eschew morally controversial topics and concentrate on the incul-
cation of so-called ‘elementary’ notions based on morally neutral, scientific
truths. The purpose of public education is to diffuse a corpus of objective
knowledge, while ‘neutralising all partisan opinions’.
Laïcité A, in sum, offers a broadly liberal response to the problem of tol-
eration, based on a ‘wall of separation’ between a neutral political sphere
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and the diverse conceptions of the good held by individuals. However,
laïcité in France is more than an institutional arrangement designed to
accommodate the fact of pluralism. From the start, it was also, perhaps pri-
marily, an attempt to disentangle political institutions from the grip of the
Catholic Church, and to substitute democratic civic loyalty for religious 
and traditional allegiances. In contrast to countries that experienced a slow,
incremental process of secularisation, whereby the state progressively shed
its non-secular attributes and the established Church slowly relinquished 
its political and social power to make way for religious pluralism, France
experienced the brutal – or at any rate confrontational – assertion of an
autonomous civil power struggling to impose a secular, republican order
against the claims of religious supremacy made by the Catholic Church.13
In the light of this historical heritage, it would be ‘reductive’14 to under-
stand laïcité exclusively through the concern for freedom of religion and
state neutrality. From its inception, laïcité was less a consensual compro-
mise than a fighting creed. The separation between public and private
implied a distinct re-evaluation of the public sphere, compounded by the
relegation of religious beliefs to the private sphere.15 Citizens were required,
not only to leave behind, but often to transcend, their particularisms by
endorsing a superior public identity. Laïcité, therefore, often appealed to a
comprehensive liberal ideal of autonomy from religion (laïcité B) or to a
communitarian concern for civic unity (laïcité C).
Laïcité as promotion of individual autonomy
Laïcité B refers to the promotion by the state of the value of secular auton-
omy, not only in public deliberation but also in the conduct of the good
life. It reflects a comprehensive liberal view that the good life consists in
autonomy, as well as a perfectionist belief that the state must encourage 
the pursuit of autonomy-orientated ways of life. Laïcité B differs from
laïcité A in claiming to be ‘a philosophy of human emancipation’, instead
of a philosophy of neutrality,16 and in explicitly attributing to state educa-
tion the function of promoting the skills associated with the exercise of
autonomy.
Historically, laïcité B can be seen as a stage in the forcible liberalisation
of society undertaken by the French state, at a time when republican liber-
alism was a militant fighting creed rather than the consensual ideology it
became during the twentieth century. Liberalising society meant coming into
direct confrontation with a conservative Catholic Church, which deemed
democratic self-determination an aberration, found repugnant the idea that
the identity of the citizen could be separated from that of the believer,
claimed to define moral norms for the whole society, and was reluctant to
give up its social power – notably in the sphere of education.17 It is in a
context of strong opposition to established religious authorities that the
republicans in power sought to disseminate the principles and practices of
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democratic citizenship. As Claude Nicolet has put it, the republican citizen
‘is neither a natural given, nor a product of history. It only exists – in the
full sense – through the conquest and exercise of his [or her] reason.’18
Citizenship consecrated the human capacity for freedom – its ability to
shake off all obstacles to the expression of the autonomous rational will.
Such sources of heteronomy were diverse, ranging from the holding of unre-
flected-upon beliefs to blind obedience to traditional authorities, through
to instinctive loyalty to particularist groups. The attribution of citizenship,
therefore, was conceived as a process of individual emancipation from tra-
ditional, oppressive, and obscurantist institutions. Of these, the Catholic
Church was the most prominent, and republican citizenship was an instru-
ment of emancipation from religious dogmatism. Individuals were to be
encouraged to think of themselves as citizens first, through the inculcation
of what the Protestant educationalist Ferdinand Buisson ambiguously called
a foi laïque (laïque faith).19 Laïcité was like a religion in the etymological
sense: it provided a foundation for individual morality and a sense of col-
lective belonging. But this was a non-transcendental, non-clerical religion,
which appealed to human reason alone, and substituted for the mystical,
conservative and hierarchical ethos of the Church the Enlightenment values
of individualism, egalitarianism and rationalism. On this view, progress was
identified with the progressive emancipation of human reason from its
shackles: ignorance primarily, but also ancestral traditions and unexamined
beliefs. As the republican leader Léon Gambetta put it, ‘we only have one
religion, namely, intellectual culture for all the French’.20 Only autonomous
individuals could be enlightened citizens – hence the crucial autonomy-
promoting function of state education. That autonomy should be promoted
by the state was not seen as a paradox. In the French political tradition,
the state shapes, rather than regulates, liberal society, and modern individ-
ualism is seen as intimately linked to the civilising power of social and polit-
ical institutions.21 The perfectionist strand of laïcité, therefore, fitted neatly
into a tradition less wary of state paternalism than the Anglo-American
tradition.
Laïcité B was therefore originally articulated as the official liberal ideol-
ogy of the French republic. In the early years, however, there was a debate
between what we would now call ‘political’ and ‘comprehensive’ liberals.
The former hoped that laïcité, if construed strictly as a principle of political
morality, could be endorsed even by non-liberals – such as traditional
Catholics. The challenge was then to define a non-religious moral alterna-
tive to religion, which would nonetheless be acceptable to religions. In the
words of the sociologist Emile Durkheim, laïque morality should ‘seek to
capture the truth inherent in every religious or non-religious moral view’22
– for example, a certain conception of the person. To use John Rawls’s 
terms, laïcité should be grounded in an overlapping consensus between
reasonable moral doctrines. As for the latter, more ‘comprehensive’ liberals,
they argued, first, that there was a basic incompatibility between republican
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and Catholic world-views and, second, that the state should not refrain from
promoting specifically liberal conceptions of the good life, even if these
offended non-liberals. In their view, republican laïcité should not be made
compatible with religion simply for the sake of stability. Rather, as the
Kantian philosopher Renouvier put it, laïque morality should explicitly aim
to ‘take minds away from superstitious beliefs, and above all from doctrines
which contradict [the ideal of] justice’.23 Under the double influence of
Enlightenment critical rationalism and nineteenth-century positivism, many
republicans believed that a secular, critically orientated life was more valu-
able than a religious and conformist one. As political anticlericalism merged
with philosophical secularism in the post-Dreyfus years, laïcité became a
fighting creed for the promotion of a distinctive conception of human well-
being. The conservative teachings of the Catholic Church came to be seen
as the main obstacle to social and intellectual progress. Religion, in a word,
embodied heteronomy. Republicans sought to promote what they called
freedom of thought (la liberté de penser) – free rational enquiry and self-
determination – instead of freedom of conscience (la liberté de conscience)
– the freedom to believe whatever one feels inclined to.
In so far as the republicans in power did endorse a more ‘comprehensive’
than ‘political’ understanding of laïque morality, this was translated almost
exclusively – though crucially – into a distinctive philosophy of education.
On the republican view, it is the chief mission of state schools to inculcate
children with the skills essential to the exercise of autonomy. Now, it is true
that in matters of education, the distinction between political and compre-
hensive liberalism is elusive.24 Liberal education promotes individual auton-
omy without necessarily being ipso facto comprehensively liberal – that is,
without controversially promoting a particular conception of the good life.
This is for three main reasons. First, education always involves a degree of
paternalist authority, because it is addressed to individuals who have not
yet formed their conception of the good. Second, education involves incul-
cating general autonomy-related skills such as the capacity to identify causes
and reasons, to exercise critical judgement, to reflect on one’s beliefs, and
the like. Third, although education may teach the value of choice, it does
not have to discriminate between the various ways of life that can be objects
of autonomous choice – even if these amount to ‘voluntary servitude’. Pro-
ponents of laïcité B have often insisted that what matters is not so much
the content of the conception of the good held by individuals as the fact
that it is autonomously chosen. Laïcité is then defined as a ‘culture that
provides the means to orient oneself freely in the question of [the] meaning
[of life]’.25 Laïque education may encourage children to reflect on the reli-
gious beliefs they were brought up with, but does not forbid them from
autonomously endorsing them again at the end of a process of careful crit-
ical attention. As Claude Nicolet puts it, ‘a republican can think what he
wishes, provided he thinks by himself’.26 On this view, laïcité B does not go
beyond providing individuals with the skills associated with the exercise of
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autonomy, that is, it does not stipulate the particular ways in which 
autonomy may be used to the good.
However, it is undeniable that in its exclusive emphasis on the develop-
ment of critical skills and its denial that the function of education can in
any sense be to preserve children’s sense of cultural coherence, laïcité B 
can be said, ultimately, to involve a comprehensive – rather than narrowly
political or instrumental – interpretation of education. Education has more
a transformative (or substantive) than a formative (or instrumental) quality.
Schools are sometimes presented as the only sphere in which – not only
through which – genuine liberty is possible, because they are insulated from
the inegalitarian, oppressive structures of civil society. The clearest exposi-
tion of laïcité as a comprehensive philosophy of emancipation through edu-
cation is by a neo-Kantian educationalist, Catherine Kintzler. Writing in 
the midst of the headscarves affair, she argues that to educate a child is to
encourage her to distance herself from her family or community beliefs and
to reflect critically on them. As Kintzler puts it, children should ‘forget their
community and think of something other than that which they are in order
to think by themselves’. On this view, social structures essentially alienate
individual liberty: only if individuals stand back from received values will
they achieve freedom, conceived as rational self-determination. In a society
characterised by ubiquitous relationships of domination – cultural, religious
and economic – state schools are a privileged locus for the inculcation of
the habit of independence through the exercise of critical judgement.27
Republican education, Kintzler concludes, is quite literally ‘anti-social’: it
substitutes for non-voluntary forms of social membership a rational capac-
ity for individual self-determination.28 On this view, schools should not
‘reproduce’ social diversity: autonomy is gained, not by exposing children
to a range of different ways of life, but by fostering their capacity to abstract
from the bonds of social life itself. The near-absence of exposure to basic
religious knowledge in French state schools certainly betrays a specific view
of the conceptions of the good life that can be the object of legitimate
choice.
One should however take the exact measure of the claims made about
the emancipatory potential of the republican public sphere. Laïcité B is
essentially a philosophy of education: the perfectionist ambitions of the
French state, it should be stressed, hardly extend beyond the school gates
and the protection of under-age children. Significantly, the legal battle
against ‘harmful sects’ (les sectes nocives) in France has focused on the
dangers of the mental manipulation of vulnerable children and adolescents,
rarely of adults. The well-publicised ‘anti-sect’ Vivien Report of 1983, for
example, while underlining the risks of ‘alienation of moral autonomy’
involved in membership of ‘irrational’ movements, reaffirmed France’s
central commitment to freedom of conscience and association, and centred
its proposals on better information and prevention. Typically, it advocated
a reform of laïque education in schools.29 So, while it is legitimate for the
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state to foster the capacity for autonomy – through education – the pro-
motion of its actual exercise by mature adults – through paternalist coer-
cion – is found to be hardly compatible with other republican intuitions.
Significantly too, autonomy-related arguments were sometimes used to
oppose the wearing of headscarves by young Muslim girls, but not by older
students or teachers.30 Laïcité B, in a word, has stopped short of legitimat-
ing an all-out struggle against all forms of heteronomy and domination.
Only socialists, from Jaurès onwards, developed an expansive understand-
ing of laïcité as a comprehensive philosophy of non-domination. Their
laïcité was associated with a progressive, rationalist humanism that 
promoted a conception of social regeneration and comprehensive emanci-
pation from the reactionary structures both of traditional and modern
capitalist society. Laïcité became one integral component of a progressive,
militant creed inspired by visions of a transparent, rationally organised,
domination-free, self-governing egalitarian society. The official doctrine of
laïcité, for its part, rarely questioned structural power relationships in bour-
geois civil society, centrally imbued as it was with the Enlightenment view
that individual flaws such as ignorance, irrationality and unreasonableness
were the only significant obstacles to a ‘free’ society. Yet despite this nar-
rowly individualist, educationalist and intellectualist bias, long stigmatised
by Marxists, there is no denying that laïcité B still offers a distinct alterna-
tive to the Anglo-American liberal philosophy of toleration. In its commit-
ment to the promotion of individual autonomy, it is centrally concerned
with the legitimate limits to toleration, and its advocates often show puz-
zlement at the idea that the toleration of non-liberal practices of domina-
tion can ever be a liberal virtue. Laïcité B, in a word, provides a perfectionist
solution to the paradox of liberal toleration.
More in line perhaps with a less perfectionist, more narrowly ‘political’
liberalism, another justification for autonomy-promoting laïque education
is its contribution to education for democratic citizenship. Here, a certain
level of education is seen as essential to the practice of political delibera-
tion; in Condorcet’s terms, it serves to ‘enlighten men to make them citi-
zens’.31 Historically, this concern for education to citizenship stemmed from
the French experience of democracy as a radical experience of self-
government. Democracy implies the de-legitimisation of all transcendental
or non-rational sources of authority – divine, customary, charismatic – and
the exclusive reliance on the will of the citizenry as the only legitimate foun-
dation of power. The 1789 Revolution is often defined as laïque in this
sense. Interestingly, the etymological origin of laïcité is the Greek laikos, lit-
erally – and as opposed to klerikos – that which characterises the people
as a whole, not only a section of it.32 Democracy means government by
discussion between equal individuals who only recognise the authority of
Reason or, as we would say in post-Kantian, post-metaphysical terms, who
only wish to be convinced by each others’ reasons and to exercise their crit-
ical judgement. Education is crucial in inculcating the skills required to be
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able to question the normativity of existing institutions and norms. As 
Condorcet put it: ‘the goal of instruction is not to make men admire a leg-
islation fully completed, but to render them capable of evaluating and
correcting it’.33 More broadly, laïcité B is often defended as the political
counterpart of the commitment to autonomy; as a practice of free, uncon-
strained democratic deliberation within a ‘pluralist public space’ that wel-
comes ‘uninterrupted questioning’.34 A laïque political space is a space of
radical collective self-determination, a space whose autonomy it is crucial
to protect from the encroachments of non-democratic powers – theocratic,
traditional or technocratic. Laïcité B, therefore, establishes a strong con-
nection between individual autonomy and democratic deliberation; in both
cases, it reflects a concern to preserve and enhance the human capacity for
self-determination – both individual and collective.
Laïcité as civic loyalty
What I propose to call laïcité C is undoubtedly the most difficult to grasp,
because it is least amenable to liberal thought. The intuition behind it is
best captured by the following statement by a contemporary republican
philosopher – that ‘one cannot be laïque in France unless one accepts an
important part of our national-republican heritage’.35 On this view, laïcité
calls not so much for a neutral state respectful of religious difference, 
nor for a perfectionist state committed to the promotion of individual
autonomy, but, rather, for a communitarian state fostering a civic sense of
loyalty to a particular historical community. Historically, laïcité C under-
laid the republican ambition to substitute for traditional Catholic-inspired
sociability a new civic bond, which would unite citizens in common love
of the secular republic. The pro-active policy of laïcisation was therefore
two-pronged: it simultaneously sought to reduce the pervasive and multi-
faceted influence of Catholic norms on French society and to anchor the
liberal, individualistic principles of the revolution in an alternative repub-
lican public culture. The proponents of laïcité C believed that a nation
founded on abstract, disembodied principles of human rights would be
quite unable to replicate the level of affective mobilisation achieved by the
hegemonic Catholic Zeitgeist. On this view, a society whose only public
commitments are to neutrality, individuality or autonomy would be inher-
ently fragile and incapable of sustaining a sense of mutual concern and sol-
idarity between its citizens. In other words, the new laïque civic bond should
not be solely based on liberté and égalité: it would also have to inspire feel-
ings of fraternité. Republican society should foster, not the minimal virtue
of toleration, but the more demanding virtues of mutual empathy and even
altruistic devotion to the community of citizens. Laïcité C supplements the
liberal emphasis with rights and procedures with a concern for the dispo-
sitions and attitudes of citizens and the content of the public culture.
Abstract citizenship must be complemented with allegiance to a republican
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public culture, which provides the motivational anchorage essential to the
legitimacy and stability of a liberal society.
This republican public culture is centred on the cultivation of the tradi-
tions and memories of the national civic community.36 Since the Third
Republic, one explicit purpose of secular, laïque education has been to
promote national unity and social cohesion, and to effect the cultural inte-
gration of the masses. The regime engaged in an ambitious programme of
nation-building that was famously designed to transform ‘peasants into
Frenchmen’ through cultural uniformisation and the diffusion of the values
of egalitarian, democratic, patriotic citizenship.37 Late eighteenth-century
revolutionaries – and a distinguished line of thinkers before and after them,
Rousseau and Tocqueville notably – had wondered whether democracy
required a civil religion as a functional equivalent to Catholicism. In the
course of the nineteenth century, a state-promoted, secularised national
identity came to provide this functional equivalent. The elites of the Third
Republic, influenced partly by the republican civic tradition and by posi-
tivist sociology, sought to establish a new ‘civil religion’ – as laïcité C is
sometimes described to38 – complete with founding myths, revolutionary
rituals and patriotic celebrations, and promoting an ethically-charged
feeling of national belonging and a consensualist conception of democracy.
State schools during the Third Republic were often likened to secular
churches dedicated to the diffusion of the religion of the patrie. The phi-
losophy of education promoted by advocates of laïcité C tended to empha-
sise the centrality of schools in fostering basic moral education, civic loyalty
and social conformity, in contrast to laïcité B’s preferred emphasis on 
the role of education in promoting ‘a-social’ individuality, autonomy and
critical spirit.39
It is, therefore, very fitting that laïcité C should have been dubbed catho-
laïcité by its critics. Republican ideology undoubtedly moulded itself to the
structures of Catholic society and mentality, only to secularise its symbols
and rituals.40 Crucially, it also inherited a powerful state tradition perme-
ated by an overriding concern for national unity, a tradition revived by the
legacy of the revolution of 1789, which had in effect destroyed all inter-
mediary groups between state and individuals. The communitarian inspi-
ration of laïcité C cannot be understood unless one takes the measure of
this long-standing anxiety towards the individualistic fragmentation of
society and the concomitant obsession with social cohesion. Laïcité C must
be interpreted as an explicit attempt to transcend pluralism, mainly through
civic education. In today’s society, where growing cultural and ethical plu-
ralism has become as much a normative value as a sociological fact, a
‘communitarian’ education of that sort is bound to raise questions about
the extent of the republican tolerance of diversity. As Meira Levinson con-
cisely puts it, ‘the French model shifts the brunt of democratic education
from teaching toleration of private others to inculcating mutual respect for
public similars’.41 The question here is whether, by focusing exclusively on
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equal membership in a civic community, laïcité C actually fosters intoler-
ance of private differences. On the one hand, it must be noted that laïcité
C claims to found a liberal community: it, notably, endorses laïcité A’s insis-
tence that equal rights must be protected through a rigid separation between
the public and the private sphere, as well as laïcité B’s emphasis on indi-
viduality and autonomy as the central values of the republican public
culture. On the other hand, it is undeniable that there is a risk that indi-
viduals’ differences are in practice swallowed up rather than protected by
a homogenising national public character’42 and that members of minority
cultures find themselves forced to assimilate into the ways of life of the
majority.
Conceptual coherence in context
At the end of this inquiry we are in a better position to understand why
the wearing of Muslim headscarves in state schools was seen as so prob-
lematic in France. This is because, I would suggest, it questioned the nor-
mative relevance of laïcité in its three dimensions at the same time. In
contrast to other high-profile public debates on laïcité (about the funding
of private schools or the content of school curricula, for example) that
touched only on one aspect of laïcité, the headscarves affair was exemplary
in the complexity of the issues it raised. First, as state schools are seen as
extensions of the public sphere, the ‘ostentatious’ expression of religious
belief that headscarves were deemed to represent was interpreted as an
encroachment on the neutrality of the public sphere and on the separation
between public and private (laïcité A). Second, as veil-wearing is gender-
specific and was seen as imposed on the schoolgirls by their parents, it could
be construed as a symbol both of inequality and of heteronomy, and there-
fore as justifying paternalistic state intervention in the interests of the girls
(laïcité B). Lastly, in a context of mutual hostility between the French state
and sections of the Muslim community (fed by a wave of Algerian funda-
mentalist terrorism and a general sense of social alienation felt by second-
generation immigrants) the intrusion of headscarves in schools was
interpreted as a symbol of the fragmentation and break-up of society under
the centrifugal pressure of multiculturalism (laïcité C). Interestingly, it
should be noted, laïcité was also the central concept invoked by advocates
of the Muslim girls’ position. They too endorsed laïcité A’s concern for
neutrality, but interpreted it primarily in terms of the entrenchment of the
superior principle of freedom of religion. They too invoked the value of
individuality and autonomy central to laïcité B, but contested their oppo-
nents’ definition of what qualifies as an obstacle to autonomy, and pointed
out the value of communal membership to individuality. They shared the
concern for social unity highlighted by laïcité C, but argued that laïcité
should provide a framework for a pluralist social unity, allowing for the
mutual recognition of a diversity of cultural groups. In sum, they defended
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‘open’ laïcité (laïcité ouverte) against the ‘hardline’ laïcité of opponents of
veil-wearing.43
In quite a striking way, therefore, both advocates and opponents of veil-
wearing were involved in a multi-layered debate about what may appear
to be an essentially shaky concept. For the account given here might be
taken to imply that laïcité really refers to three different things (neutrality,
autonomy, community) that are only confused and conflated in French
usage. Yet there is a sense in which my way of recasting the ‘headscarves
affair’ and laïcité in general, while it may satisfy the broad intellectual ref-
erences of Anglo-American liberalism, fails to do justice to the French
debate. For, it might be rightly objected, laïcité works in French public 
discourse precisely as a complex, historically grounded articulation of its
various levels of meaning. While the semantic meaning of laïcité has always
been a matter of intense dispute, the concept is explicitly accepted by all
French participants as a useful, relevant and reasonably coherent concept.
To conclude, let me venture three brief remarks about the complex issue of
conceptual coherence.
First, all political concepts are to some extent contested concepts.44 This
is most obviously true of laïcité, which has always been a practical slogan
rather than an abstract philosophy. Laïcité has never really formed part of
an autonomous juridical, political or philosophical theory, isolated from
concrete historical moments, and has always been intimately linked to the
republican project of the entrenchment of the modern liberal society born
out of the French revolution. The semantic meaning of the concept emerged
out of political processes of ideological contestation, not out of careful
philosophical enterprises of analytical clarification. It is, in fact, a defining
feature of political ideologies – of which French republicanism is one – that
they tend to accommodate a certain level of conceptual indeterminacy.45
Second, the coherence of a concept does to some extent depend on its
capacity to make sense of the ‘reality’ that it claims to describe. The lively
debates about laïcité in France undoubtedly reflect growing uncertainty
about its contemporary meaning and relevance, an uncertainty that is itself
a symptom of the disintegration of the ‘republican synthesis’ forged under
the Third Republic. In the nineteenth century, when nation-building and
liberalisation went hand in hand, little tension was felt between the strug-
gle for private freedoms and equal rights (laïcité A), emancipation from tra-
ditional and religious identities (laïcité B), and the embrace of a new public
identity (laïcité C). It could even be argued that it is precisely the congru-
ence between the three that has defined modern democratic citizenship. In
today’s France, the conditions that made possible what Marcel Gauchet
calls the convergence between ‘the exercise of personal rights and the pro-
duction of collective unity through the state machine’46 have all but disap-
peared. There is now a vast literature on the theme of the ‘crisis of laïcité’.47
This crisis is rooted in a number of complex recent trends: the collapse of
comprehensive ideologies (notably laïcité’s main adversary, Catholicism),
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the displacement of citizenship as individuals’ central identity, the rise of
consumerist individualism, the discredit of shared public moralities, the
broad questioning of Western universalist rationalism, growing pluralism
and demands for the recognition of difference, and the multifaceted crisis
of the nation. It is in this context that the tensions intrinsic to the concept
of laïcité – between state neutrality and state perfectionism on the one hand,
and between individual autonomy and civic loyalty on the other – are most
acutely felt.
Third, the possibility must at least be raised that such conceptual 
tensions are, at least in part, embedded in the analytical language that has
been used to make sense of French laïcité throughout this chapter. I have
explicitly sought to ‘translate’ French debates into the language of Anglo-
American liberal philosophy, using such concepts as state neutrality, polit-
ical and comprehensive liberalism, autonomy-promoting perfectionism,
universalist and communitarian ethics. Such conceptual combinations have
suggested an analytical decomposition of laïcité into three distinct compo-
nents, and allowed a more rigorous understanding of its political implica-
tions. It might be the case, however, that these conceptual combinations
also hide from view other semantic connections, which might be absent
from the ordinary (English) language in which analytical philosophy is
rooted, but central to alternative political philosophies. After all, the domi-
nant language of politics in France is republicanism, not liberalism (even 
if republicanism has historically occupied the ideological space of liberal-
ism). If we recast laïcité in ways that make it consistent with the distinct
understanding of liberty favoured by French (liberal) republicans – liberty
as non-domination – we might be able to soften some of the tensions that
exist between its three analytical components of neutrality, autonomy and
community. The contradiction between laïcité A’s commitment to equal
rights and freedom of religion and laïcité C’s commitment to a state-
promoted public culture, for example, dissolves if it is conceded that liberty
is not a ‘natural’ condition but a fragile social status that must be upheld
by public institutions. Similarly, the tensions between the ideals of com-
prehensive emancipation (laïcité B) and state neutrality (laïcité A) can be
eased somewhat if neutrality (and laïcité) is seen as an ideal of non-
domination rather than an ideal of non-interference. Clearly, more needs to
be done to specify the conceptual ways in which a republican account can
transcend the dichotomies that permeate liberal analytical political philos-
ophy. Such a project is inevitably driven by conflicting objectives. On the
one hand, it must strive to be faithful to existing understandings as they
are embedded in particular discursive traditions (in my case, the tradition
of French republicanism). On the other hand, it must be made commensu-
rable with other languages, notably that of Anglo-American liberalism.
Whether these two concerns – intelligibility and integrity – can be balanced
and reconciled is the central problem of cross-cultural theory.
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Toleration of religious discrimination 
in employment
Stuart White
Introduction: toleration and equal opportunity
Two ideas feature prominently in contemporary accounts of the just society.
One is the idea of toleration and the related idea of religious freedom. A
second is the idea of equal opportunity and, derived from this, the idea 
that the state should protect its members from discrimination in relation to
jobs and other important goods such as education. This chapter explores
an apparent tension between these two commitments. In order to advance
their goals, religious associations sometimes want to discriminate in em-
ployment decisions on grounds that are typically prohibited under anti-
discrimination laws. They may wish to discriminate in favour of those with
their own religious views or those with certain life styles, or on grounds of
gender, sexual orientation, or even race. How should the state respond to
this apparent conflict between religious toleration and equal opportunity?
To what extent should the state permit religious associations to discrimi-
nate in employment? Recent policy developments, such as the British gov-
ernment’s promotion of faith-based schooling and the European Union’s
recent framework directive on equal opportunity in employment, have
increased the urgency of this question.
In this chapter, I explore the question in three stages. Firstly, I outline the
key ‘civil interests’ that I take to be at stake in thinking about the issue 
of employment discrimination. I explain why a concern for these civil
interests might plausibly be thought to support a general prohibition of
religiously-motivated employment discrimination and, at the same time,
some kind of exemption from anti-discrimination law for religious associa-
tions. This sets the scene for the rest of my discussion, in which I explore
whether it is possible to craft an exemption that protects what is likely to
be of most importance to the religious believer but at the same time secures
the other civil interests at stake. I argue that the freedom of religious asso-
ciations to discriminate in employment should be limited by two principles.
The first principle, explored in the second section of the chapter, is that the
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discrimination should be on religion-relevant grounds. On the face of it,
this may seem an innocuous enough. As we shall see, however, there is sub-
stantial controversy as to what kind of religion-relevant grounds the state
should admit as permissible grounds for employment discrimination. The
second principle, explored in the third section, is that discrimination should
apply only to a restricted range of jobs that have, as I put it, a sufficiently
central relationship to the religious activities of the association. I discuss
the tricky question of how this principle might be operationalised, and I
reject the view that the centrality principle is by itself a sufficient limitation
on the freedom of religious associations to discriminate in employment. 
The concluding section of the chapter enters a final caveat to my account
of the permissible grounds of employment discrimination by religious
associations.1
The civil interests at stake
My discussion of the problem proceeds from a certain liberal conception
of political legitimacy. The exercise of state power over individuals is le-
gitimate, I think, when it is exercised in order to ensure the equitable pro-
tection of civil interests. Civil interests (a term I borrow from John Locke’s
Letter Concerning Toleration)2 are interests that are at once basic and
common to all citizens, notwithstanding their different conceptions of the
good life. State power should be exercised for the sake of protecting these
shared basic interests, rather than for the sake of promoting a given
conception of the good life. Turning to the issue of religiously-motivated
employment discrimination that is our specific concern in this chapter, at
least three main interests seem to be at stake.
(1) Opportunity. Citizens have a fundamental civil interest in fair access
to income, wealth, and jobs. In the case of jobs, I shall understand fair
access in meritocratic terms, i.e., as requiring equal consideration for given
employment on the basis of suitable, job-relevant qualifications. If someone
is ranked lower in job selection than another on grounds other than those
to do with genuine occupational qualification, then this civil interest is
violated.
(2) Civic virtue. Citizens share an interest in seeing that other citizens
share the specifically civic virtues necessary for the healthy functioning of
a just society. These virtues centrally include the virtues of toleration of,
and respect for, those of different religious (or irreligious) points of view.
Social institutions and practices that militate against the cultivation of these
virtues jeopardise this civil interest, and are suspect for this reason.
(3) Religious liberty. This encompasses two distinct interests that we will
do well to separate. The first is what we might call the citizen’s expressive
interest. This is her interest in living in authentic accordance with her reli-
gious (or irreligious) beliefs, i.e., in living her life as an expression of the
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said beliefs.3 The second is what we might call the citizen’s deliberative
interest.4 This is her interest in having the opportunity to endorse her reli-
gious beliefs on the basis of informed reflection or deliberation. The correct
answer to the question, ‘What is the good life?’, is hard to see and, since
nobody is obviously an infallible judge of the matter, each individual ought
to be able to make her own informed judgement about where the truth 
of the matter lies. In thinking about religious liberty, then, we need to 
give attention not only to the freedoms that serve expressive interests, but
also to those that serve deliberative interests. Sometimes a concern for A’s
expressive interest may conflict with a concern for B’s deliberative interest,
and I take it that, in such cases, deliberative interests should be given
priority: A should not have the right to substitute her judgement on fun-
damental questions about the value and meaning of life for that of B (even
if A is B’s parent).
The expressive dimension of religious liberty may also conflict, of course,
with other important civil interests. In some cases, our concern for other
civil interests will properly trump the concern for this aspect of religious
liberty. But at the same time I do think that the concern for the free exer-
cise of religion, for the expressive dimension of religious liberty, is (or can
be) a matter of legitimate intrinsic concern, and that we should factor this
concern into our construction of a theory of justice. We should not think
of religious freedom simply as a residual freedom to act as we like for the
sake of religion within the bounds of laws that serve the public interest, but
as something that should enter into our conception of what the public inter-
est truly is.
Now, given a concern for the civil interests just described, it is not hard
to make a good case for a general prohibition on religiously-motivated
employment discrimination. For in a society where such discrimination is
permitted, and widely practised, there would be serious injury to all three
of these key background civil interests. Religiously-motivated employment
discrimination by a prejudiced majority, such as that historically practised
against Roman Catholics in the shipyards of Northern Ireland, might well
violate the opportunity interest of those in religious minorities, by denying
members of such minorities jobs for which they are no less, or even more,
qualified than majority competitors. Secondly, workplaces constitute impor-
tant social spaces in which lessons in tolerance and respect for those of dif-
ferent religions are learned. Permitting religiously-motivated employment
discrimination therefore risks the informal education in civic virtues that
workplaces otherwise provide.5 Thirdly, permitting religiously-motivated
employment discrimination might endanger the interests connected with
religious liberty. Looked at from the perspective of the employer, this may
sound odd: after all, if such discrimination is permitted, the employer is
more free to shape the workplace in accordance with her religion. But 
of course we must consider the interests of the employee, or prospective
employee, as well as the employer. If employment is conditioned on con-
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formity to a given religion, then, depending on the character of the labour
market and the background system of social rights, this threatens to com-
promise the expressive and deliberative interests of the employee. Individ-
uals who desperately need employment might find themselves pressured to
pretend to beliefs they do not have, or to perform actions (for example,
bowing to an icon) that contradict their own beliefs. At the very least, their
free deliberation about religious matters might be distorted as they seek to
adapt their views to those of the employer.
At least some of these considerations motivated the US Congress to
outlaw religiously-motivated employment discrimination as part of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. Title VII of this act prohibits employers from dis-
criminating with respect to hiring, discharging, compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment on account of race, colour, religion,
sex, and national origin. However, for our purposes it also noteworthy that
the Congress incorporated into the law an exemption for religious associ-
ations. In its original form, Section 702 of Title VII stipulated that: ‘This
subchapter [the Title VII prohibition on discrimination in employment
described above] shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association,
educational institution or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation . . . of its religious activities.’6
What might motivate such an exemption? In terms of the framework pre-
sented here, the concern is presumably with the expressive interests of the
religious. The freedom to give expression to one’s religious beliefs in one’s
life typically requires the freedom to associate with like-minded others in
expressive activities, and, in the process of associating, to employ people
with the right qualities to guide and support the expressive activities of the
association. If people lacking the right qualities are somehow imposed on
the association, then its activities will cease to be expressive of its members’
beliefs. As Brian Barry puts it: ‘If you believe that the sacraments have
efficacy only if administered by a man, you can scarcely regard the sex of
the person administering them as irrelevant.’7 For this reason, it might 
be thought that religious associations should be given some power to dis-
criminate in employment in favour of those with what their members regard
as the right qualities; and that, to this end, religious associations should be
given some degree of exemption from general anti-discrimination laws as
these apply to employment. The putative right to discriminate is grounded
in a concern for the expressive dimension of religious liberty.
However, we cannot stop the discussion here. We have already acknowl-
edged how religiously-motivated employment discrimination can jeopardise
important civil interests. This prompts the question I shall address in the
next two sections: Can we frame a right to employment discrimination for
religious associations that (a) secures the core expressive interests of the
believer, but (b) does not seriously threaten other key civil interests/the key
civil interests of other citizens?
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The relevance principle
The simplest way to protect the believer’s expressive interest would be to
give religious associations a blanket exemption from anti-discrimination
laws in employment. Some argued for this in the Congressional debate
surrounding Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.8 But this is surely too
permissive. Under a blanket exemption of the proposed kind, religious
associations would not have to give any reason for a given act or pattern
of discrimination. But if the rationale for giving religious associations a right
to discriminate in employment is that this is necessary to protect the
integrity of their religious activities, then, in principle, they should be free
to discriminate only on grounds that are relevant to this task. In short, they
should be free to discriminate only on what we may term religion-relevant
grounds. We may refer to this simply as the relevance principle.
First and foremost, religion-relevant grounds include religious belief. In
at least one type of case – appointments to the clergy – nobody disputes
the legitimacy of conditioning employment on belief. Nobody seriously
questions the right of, say, the Methodist Church to condition employ-
ment as a minister on being a Methodist. Controversy does begin to arise,
however, once we extend the range of personal characteristics that are 
taken to be religion-relevant grounds for discrimination, and once we move
beyond the clergy to consider other types of employment connected with
religious associations. I will examine the second issue, which concerns the
range of jobs to which the right of discrimination may apply, in the next
section. For the remainder of this section I will focus on the question of
what other personal characteristics, in addition to religious belief, might
reasonably be seen as providing adequate, religion-relevant grounds for dis-
crimination, assuming, for the moment, that we are considering appoint-
ments, like those to the clergy, that are uncontroversially integral to the
religious activities of the association.
It seems fairly uncontroversial to include life style and behaviour amongst
the grounds that can count as religion-relevant reasons for employment dis-
crimination. If one is prospectively employed to propagate a given Church’s
creed, then it seems reasonable that the Church can take into account the
compatibility of one’s life style with this creed in deciding whether to hire
one. Things get a lot more controversial, however, when we move on to
consider whether certain ascriptive characteristics, such as race, gender, 
and sexual orientation, should be regarded as admissible religion-relevant
grounds for employment discrimination. This is where the conflict with
liberal norms becomes evident and the right to discriminate more worry-
ing. The Roman Catholic Church, for example, will currently not consider
a female applicant for the priesthood. Should religious associations have
the freedom to discriminate in employment on the basis of characteristics
such as these if and when their respective religions identify these charac-
teristics as relevant to the performance of certain duties?
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One response to this question holds that the right to discriminate on the
basis of such characteristics is already entailed by the apparently uncon-
troversial right to discriminate (at least in the case of appointments to the
priesthood and the like) in favour of those who hold the association’s
beliefs. If, as in the case of the Roman Catholic Church, it is a part of a
given Church’s established belief system that only men can be priests, then
a woman who demands access to the priesthood apparently reveals herself
to have unorthodox beliefs; and so, the argument runs, her exclusion from
the priesthood is already entailed by the uncontroversial right to restrict the
priesthood to orthodox believers.
However, in many religious communities there is some degree of contes-
tation about belief, and, relatedly, about the relative significance of various
beliefs in qualifying one to remain a member of the community in good
faith. For example, many Roman Catholics, including many who oppose
the ordination of women, do not think that the Church’s view about women
and the priesthood is a matter of fundamental Church doctrine. They thus
have no trouble with the idea that a given person might dissent from the
currently authoritative view on this issue and still quite meaningfully be a
faithful Roman Catholic. In such a case, it is far from obvious that the right
to restrict the priesthood to orthodox believers carries with it, automati-
cally, as a definitional matter, the right to exclude those who dissent from
the currently authoritative view about the ordination of women, including,
of necessity, women who wish to be priests. Pushing this point a little
further, consider how things would stand if a Church, like the Roman
Catholic Church, did try to defend its exclusion of a woman from the priest-
hood in the suggested way. Would the Church also fire or refuse to employ
as priests men who hold the dissenting view? (There are, after all, many
priests in the Roman Catholic Church at present who do hold the dissent-
ing view.)9 If the Church does not refuse men entry to the priesthood on
these grounds, this indicates that, in the case of male applicants to the priest-
hood, the Church does not regard a person’s holding the dissenting view as
sufficient grounds for disqualifying him from the priestly office. So if it then
invokes possession of this view as grounds for disqualification in the case
of women who wish to be priests, the Church is straightforwardly engaged
in gender-based discrimination. It would be holding women, quite arbi-
trarily, to a different standard of belief than men.
It is by no means clear, then, that the right to discriminate in favour of
orthodox believers directly entails the right to discriminate on grounds of
gender, even where the authoritative view within the religious association
in question is that women cannot hold certain positions.
Moreover, even if the right to discriminate on grounds of gender were
directly entailed by the right to discriminate in favour of orthodox believers,
the critic might simply argue that in this case the right to discriminate on the
basis of belief should be compromised in the interests of securing gender
equality. What initially seems an innocuous basis for discrimination is, it
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might be said, quite unacceptable to the extent that, for example, it sanctions
women’s exclusion from the priesthood.
The argument that the state should not permit religious associations to
practice sexual discrimination in employment – even in relation to the clergy
– is made by the legal scholar Jane Rutherford.10 Rutherford points out that
women in conservative religious groups increasingly perceive a terrible
choice between exclusion from the priesthood and the exile involved 
in leaving their original religious community. Moreover, the fear of con-
fronting such a choice might inhibit women believers from exploring their
own beliefs.11 In the terms of the argument here developed, Rutherford
holds that giving religious associations the right to discriminate in employ-
ment on the basis of gender (or race), including the case of appointments
to the clergy, objectionably burdens the expressive and deliberative inter-
ests of those people whose employment options are closed down by the
resulting sexual (or racial) discrimination. Religious associations should not
be free, she thus concludes, to treat gender (or race) as religion-relevant
grounds for employment discrimination.12
On the other hand, according to Martha Nussbaum, ‘it seems illiberal to
hold that practices internal to the conduct of [a] religious body . . . [such
as] the choice of priests’ should be subject to this kind of regulation by the
state.13 Nussbaum does not say a great deal in support of this claim, but I
suspect that she is right to view such regulation as inappropriate. A first
point to make in response to Rutherford’s position is that the demand to
be a priest cannot be divorced from the demand that others acknowledge
one’s admissibility as a priest in the context of their religious community.
However, it does not seem reasonable, as a general matter, to expect others
to acknowledge this. What would Rutherford say, for example, in the case
of a man demanding the right to undertake priestly functions in a ‘Goddess
religion’ that ordinarily restricts these functions to women? Should the state
compel women members of this religious group to admit maverick, but per-
fectly sincere, men as priests? It hardly seems fair to let such men, no matter
how sincere they may be, impose themselves on the religious life of another
group of citizens in this way.
But, it might be said, the women worshippers of the ‘Goddess’ do not
manifest patriarchal prejudice when they demand the right to exclude men
from their priesthood – indeed, they may trying to create a space in which
women can recover from patriarchy – and this is the crucial difference
between them and religious groups that wish to exclude women from the
priesthood. The state should not pander to sexist prejudice, and since
women’s exclusion from the clergy necessarily reflects sexist prejudice, the
state should not indulge religious groups that wish to practise such exclu-
sion. It may, however, permit women-centred religious groups that exclude
men from the priesthood because such groups may serve to help society
recover from its legacy of patriarchy. The problem with this argument,
however, is that it is in fact quite wrong – and quite prejudiced – to assume
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that the desire for an all-male priesthood manifests sexist prejudice. Such a
view rests on a rather uninformed, simplistic appreciation of what may be
going on in citizens’ religious lives.
Consider the case of James, a ‘theologically liberal Odinist’. James
believes that there is a divine force in the universe and that we ought to try
to live in ways that embody the qualities of this force. James believes that
this divine force is represented symbolically in different ways in different
religious traditions. There is, he thinks, no single representation that cap-
tures perfectly the essence of the divine force, but some representations are
better for some people, given their situation and needs. Thus, he can quite
understand why some women (or, indeed, men) find it imperative to imagine
the divine force using feminine imagery, and why, accordingly, they would
wish to restrict priestly functions within their religious groups to women.
From time to time, he finds it helpful to participate in the rituals of 
such groups. But James has recently read Robert Bly’s Iron John, and now
believes that for him, and for some other people, it is better, at least for a
period, to work primarily in a religious tradition that pictures the divine
force largely in male terms. Specifically, he wishes to participate in a neo-
Odinist group that pictures the divine force using figures from Norse
mythology, and in which priestly functions are carried out by men. Perhaps
James suffers from timidity, and he feels that he will overcome this, and so
live a life more worthy of the divine force, by participating in a religious
tradition that gives emphasis to the virtues of ‘manly courage’. Other people
may wish to focus on cultivating other qualities of the divine; or they may
find other representations effective in cultivating the quality he is currently
most interested in; and so, in James’s view, they may find that other reli-
gious groups, with other representations of the divine, are more appropri-
ate to them. But for him, as things stand, and for the time being, this form
of neo-Odinism is, in his view, the appropriate group to join and partici-
pate in.14
Now, so described, James surely cannot be considered a sexist. His desire
to worship in a religious community in which priestly functions are
restricted to men does not reflect a view that women are inferior to, or less
close to God than, men. It reflects a judgement as to what kind of symbolic
framework is likely to be most effective in advancing the ethical project that
he sees as central to his life, and there is nothing intrinsically sexist about
this project in itself.15 Now to say that the state should not permit religious
groups to restrict priestly functions to men is to deny people like James the
freedom to form and join religious groups that they judge most effective 
to advancing wholly non-sexist, and, otherwise, intrinsically decent, even
admirable, personal projects. Perhaps there is some indirect consequence of
allowing such groups that is so bad, in terms of the background civil 
interests, as to justify restricting the apparently unobjectionable freedom of
James to form and join such groups. But what now seems wholly implau-
sible is the claim that the state is justified in denying James this freedom on
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the grounds that all-male priesthoods are intrinsically sexist and (therefore)
objectionable. With cases like that of James in mind, I am inclined to agree
with the basic spirit of what Martha Nussbaum says when she writes that
‘The choices of adult citizens to remain in a religious body that refuses to
hire women as priests should . . . be respected as a part of what we agree
to respect when we acknowledge that our society contains a plurality of
reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good.’16
Nothing I have said is meant to deny the reality of the agonising choices
that many women in traditional religious communities face today as a result
of their exclusion from the priesthood. But I would contend that this ‘fact
of agonising choice’ cannot be a decisive objection to the practice of exclu-
sion, for the simple reason that no coherent regime of religious liberty can
protect people from this kind of choice. The decision to belong to a given
religious community necessarily carries with it an acceptance of some imme-
diate restrictions on the beliefs one has and acts from. If, on continued
reflection, one’s beliefs evolve, one cannot claim the right to remain a full
member of this community, expecting it to accommodate one’s new beliefs
as one would like. Such an idea verges on incoherence: unless all believers
change their beliefs in exactly the same way, at the same time, a right of
the suggested kind could not be generalised to all members of a given reli-
gious community without generating claims for accommodation that con-
tradict each other. The individual’s expressive interest is protected by her
having the freedom to exit from a faith community when her beliefs evolve
away from the mainstream of the community and to join with like-minded
others in new associations; not, as Rutherford implies, in having the
freedom to avoid exiting, and to insist on accommodation when this
happens.
The centrality principle
I tentatively conclude, then, that religious associations should be free to dis-
criminate in employment on religion-relevant grounds, where these grounds
include belief, life style and behaviour, and even ascriptive characteristics
such as gender and race where there is an authoritative view within a given
religious association that such characteristics are in some way relevant to
the performance of certain ecclesiastical duties.17
By itself, however, the relevance principle does not place anything like a
sufficient limit on the freedom of religious associations to discriminate in
employment. To see why it is insufficient, consider another court case from
the US, the notorious case of Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Latter Day Saints v. Amos.18 In the Amos case, a janitor, Arthur
Mayson, who had been employed for sixteen years at a Mormon-run non-
profit gymnasium open to the general public, was fired for not complying
with the eligibility test for attendance at Mormon temples. He sued the
Mormon Church for unfair dismissal, and won the case in the district 
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court, only to have the district court decision overturned by the Supreme
Court.19 Amos is a clear case of discrimination on religion-relevant grounds
as defined above: Mayson was fired because his life style was not com-
patible with Mormon beliefs. And yet it seems important that Mayson was,
after all, a janitor, not a priest or a minister. Moreover, he was a janitor not
in a church, but in a gym; and in a gym that wasn’t even exclusive to
Mormon users. Though an employee of the Mormon Church, the nature
of his employment was clearly very remote from the activities that are
central to the religious life of the Mormon Church, and the employment of
non-believers and the like in positions so distant from these activities hardly
represents a credible threat to the expressive interests of individual
Mormons. No individual Mormon is going to find her ability to live in
authentic accordance with Mormon precepts vitiated because a public gym-
nasium owned by her Church employs a janitor who has, outside working
hours, a somewhat racy life style.
At the same time, granting religious associations a right to employment
discrimination across the full range of jobs they control could well pose a
serious threat to the background civil interests described above: opportu-
nity, civic virtue, and religious liberty (the expressive and deliberative inter-
ests of actual and prospective employees). As Nancy Rosenblum and Brian
Barry both point out, the Supreme Court’s decision in Amos displayed an
extreme preoccupation with possible threats to the liberty of religious asso-
ciations, but no concern at all with the threats to the religious freedom of
individuals like Mason who stand vulnerable in the face of the economic
power of such associations.20 The threat to background civil interests may
not be that great where religious associations control access to a relatively
small proportion of a society’s employment. But the economic power, and
control over employment, wielded by religious associations can actually be
quite considerable. Sticking with the Mormons, for example, Nancy 
Rosenblum points out that: ‘Among its commercial assets, the Mormon
Church owns the top beef ranch in the world, the largest producer of nuts
in America, the country’s fourteenth-largest radio chain, and the Beneficial
Life Insurance Company, with assets of $1.6 billion.’21 Proposals in the USA
and Britain for ‘faith-based’ social policy, using public subsidies to extend
the role of Churches in the provision of social welfare, raise similar anxi-
eties about the potential for religiously-motivated employment discrimina-
tion that violates important civil interests. In view of this threat, it seems
appropriate to limit quite sharply the range of employment within which
religious associations may be permitted to discriminate. The challenge we
then face, of course, is how to define this limit. Focusing on what seems
amiss in the Amos case, we might say that the right to discriminate 
may apply only to jobs that have a sufficiently central relationship to the
religious activities of a religious association. We may refer to this as the
centrality principle.22
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As I have just stated it, however, the centrality principle is too abstract
to be of much use. Clearly, we need to say more about how the state is to
judge whether jobs have ‘a sufficiently central relationship to the religious
activities of a religious association’ and about the sort of things it should
look for in making such a judgement. So far as I can see, there are two
basic approaches we might take here, neither of which is free of difficulty.
A first approach might be described as objectivist, because it involves 
constructing a public definition of what can count as the core, religious
activity of a religious association, and then using this definition as an objec-
tive standard by which to assess any given association’s claims that specific
jobs should be covered by the right to discriminate. The approach might
be developed along the following lines. First, we try to define a category of
activity that is essentially religious: activity the meaning and purpose of
which is necessarily religious, so that to speak of engaging in such activity
outside a context of religious meaning and purpose is nonsensical. Partici-
pation in a ritual of worship, for example, is an activity that is essentially
religious.23 Other practices that arguably fall within the category of the
essentially religious include: evangelism (bearing witness to religious ideas,
spreading the ‘good news’); spiritual guidance (advising fellow believers on
how to live in accordance their religious beliefs); and religious education
(teaching the faith, involving a combination of evangelism and guidance).
These activities are at the core of our understanding of what a religious
association does. Obviously, not all activities are essentially religious. One
might, for example, seek to make a profit for its own sake, not because one
thinks that doing so is the best way to serve the Lord; one might give to a
charity out of brute sympathy for the victims of some disaster or injustice,
not because of any religious belief. However, we can perhaps define a second
category of mission activity. A practice is mission activity, as I here use the
term, if the practice is not essentially religious, but if, for those engaged in
it, it has a primary meaning and purpose that is religious. For example, pro-
viding hot food on a cold winter’s night for the homeless might be a form
of mission activity for members of a given religious group.
We might now say: the right to employment discrimination held by reli-
gious associations ought to extend to jobs that are integral to the essen-
tially religious activity of the association. Appointments to the clergy most
obviously fall into this category. But other kinds of employment, for
example, as a church organist, also plausibly fall into this category. In this
sphere of employment, concern for the expressive interest of the believer
grounds a very strong presumption in favour of permitting employment dis-
crimination. Beyond this publicly-defined sphere of essentially religious
activity, as we move into the realm of what I have termed mission activity,
some freedom to discriminate, on religion-relevant grounds, may be
permissible. But the presumption in favour of this freedom in this area is
weaker, and may well be outweighed by a concern to prevent religious asso-
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ciations exercising too much control over a given type of employment (for
example, in the health-care and education sectors).
The objection to this method of implementing the centrality principle is
that the attempt to construct a public definition of protected, essentially
religious activity will probably conflict with the self-understandings of some
religious groups. A given Church might well regard aspects of its mission
activity, in the sense defined above, as no less an important expression of
its beliefs than activities, such as worship, that the state defines as essen-
tially religious. Indeed, the very distinction between worship and, say, com-
mercial activity, is a distinction that some religious groups will not accept:
on some religious views, making a profit – for the Lord – is itself a form
of worship. So some religious groups stand to be much more heavily
burdened by this approach, by the distinctions it draws, than others.
An alternative approach, which seems to avoid this objection, is subjec-
tivist. In this approach, the kind of work that counts as central to the reli-
gious activity of a given religious association depends simply on what
activities its members view as such. If the right of their Church to discrimi-
nate in relation to a given job is disputed, then the state requires the Church
to show that its members generally regard the activity with which the job
is concerned as central to the Church’s religious activities.24 However, while
this approach would be more neutral in its impact on different religious
groups, it would presumably result in religious associations’ having freedom
to discriminate over a somewhat wider range of jobs. In effect, it would
extend this freedom to include broad swathes of jobs that concern what I
referred to above as mission activity. But as I have just noted, such an exten-
sion carries the risk of greater injury to background civil interests. If we are
to balance these civil interests fairly against the expressive interests of
believers, we may find it necessary to develop some standard, or standards,
against which we can assess the degree of priority we should give to 
believers’ expressive interests. This, however, points us directly back in the
objectivist direction, in which public criteria of centrality are articulated
and then used as an external standard against which to judge specific
groups’ demands for discrimination. I suspect, then, that some non-
neutrality of impact between religious groups is the price we have to pay
to ensure the fairest overall treatment of the various civil interests at stake.
Some commentators, such as Bruce Bagni, argue that all the state need
and should do in this area is condition the right to discriminate on some
version of the centrality principle.25 Bagni believes that we can define a ‘spir-
itual epicentre’ to the activity of religious associations (along objectivist
lines), and that religious associations should then be given complete immu-
nity from anti-discrimination laws as regards employment that has ‘epi-
central attributes’. Outside the epicentre, these laws should apply. This
accords with the position adopted by US courts in disputes concerning
appointments to the clergy. For example, in the case of Simpson v. Wells
Lamont Corporation,26 an individual claimed he had been fired from his
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position as minister in a church in part because of the colour of his wife.
The local court refused to hear his case, arguing that appointments to the
ministry are properly the concern of the relevant church alone: ‘who will
preach from the pulpit, and who will occupy the church parsonage’, the
court claimed, is a concern beyond the proper remit of a civil (as opposed
to an ecclesiastical) court.
Jane Rutherford is critical of this practice, and I think she is right to be
so. Rutherford cites the case of Darreyl M. Young, who, despite ‘glowing
reports’ on her work, was sacked from her job as a minister with the United
Methodist Church. Young claimed she was the victim of sexual and racial
discrimination. As Rutherford puts it: ‘If Young had worked for any other
employer, the government would have assured her an opportunity to present
her case of sex and race discrimination to a federal court. However, the dis-
trict court dismissed the case on the basis of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment before Young even had a chance to present the facts.’27
It is hard to see why employees of religious associations, even those working
in what Bagni would call the ‘spiritual epicentre’ of these associations,
ought to be left so vulnerable to the arbitrary exercise of institutional power.
On the one hand, I do not see how it would significantly burden the expres-
sive interest of association members to insist that their association explain,
in a court of law or relevant employment tribunal, the religious grounds
for a disputed employment decision, even where the decision relates to epi-
central employment.28 On the other hand, the vulnerability that stems from
exposure to unaccountable power could well threaten employees’ expres-
sive (and also, perhaps, deliberative) interests. Even if the employee is never
actually victimised by such power, her freedom is reduced by the position
of dependency and vulnerability this creates.29 Those so dependent might
readily become wrapped up in the game of pandering to those who hold
arbitrary power over them, and this might easily encourage a superficial,
inauthentic engagement with higher matters of the spirit.
Conclusion and caveat
For this reason, at least, I think the centrality principle should be combined
with the relevance principle. Religious associations should be free to dis-
criminate in employment, therefore, only on religion-relevant grounds, and
only for jobs that have a sufficiently central relationship to their religious
activities. I have argued that the relevance principle should be understood
to admit gender and other ascriptive characteristics as permissible grounds
for discrimination. I have sketched two ways in which the centrality prin-
ciple might be operationalised, and I have argued that we probably strike
the best, fairest balance between the various civil interests at stake if the
state judges claims to centrality by reference to a public, external standard
such as, perhaps, a public definition of ‘essentially religious’ employment.
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In closing I would like to enter a final caveat concerning my defence of
the right of religious groups to treat characteristics like gender as religion-
relevant grounds for discrimination in appointments to the priesthood. One
further objection to this practice, not considered above, appeals to the civil
interest in civic virtue. In a just society, a key element of civic virtue is the
disposition to respect other citizens, qua citizens, as equals: the disposition
to wish to see them enjoy equal civil and political rights and economic
opportunity. And it might be objected that exclusion from the priesthood
sends a powerful symbolic message of women’s supposed inferiority that
undermines equal respect for women in the wider political community.30
Now, were this the case, and were it also the case that there is no other
effective way of undoing the harm in question, then I accept that the
freedom of religious groups to exclude women from the priesthood would
need to be reconsidered. Nevertheless, I think we should treat this sort of
argument with great caution. It is all too easy to speculate that a given prac-
tice has undesirable wider effects on our public culture. Before we proceed
to take away the freedom of citizens to engage in any such practice,
however, we should have sound evidence that the alleged effects are genuine.
Moreover, we have seen above that there is nothing intrinsically sexist about
a desire to form and/or join a religious group with a clergy exclusive to one
gender. In some cases, this desire may be tied to perfectly decent, even
admirable, personal projects. Consequently, even if we did have sound
evidence that exclusion of women from the clergy of religious groups is
harming women’s standing in the wider political community, we would need
to balance this harm against the harm we would do, in prohibiting such
groups, to non-sexist men (and perhaps women) innocently seeking to form
and join groups of this kind. As in other cases of disputed toleration, where
similar harms are alleged, such as the dispute over pornography, a concern
to protect intrinsically legitimate and valuable personal freedoms should
incline us to look first to alternative remedies for the alleged harms, before
we legislate to remove the freedoms.31
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churches of God’ (cited in Rosenblum, ‘Amos’, p. 170).
9 See, for example, the ‘Radical Catholic’ website at:
www.bway.net/~halsall/radcath.html
10 See J. Rutherford, ‘Equality as the primary constitutional value: the case for
applying employment discrimination laws to religion’, Cornell Law Review, 81
(1996) 1049–128.
11 Rutherford, ibid., p. 1085.
12 Rutherford would allow Churches to pay damages to women who are excluded
from the priesthood instead of admitting women to the priesthood. But the
financial implications of this could obviously have the same effect as a direct
insistence to admit women.
13 M. Nussbaum, ‘A plea for difficulty’, in S. M. Okin et al., Is Multiculturalism
Bad for Women? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 105–14,
at p. 114.
14 I confess that this example is based somewhat on my own speculative imagin-
ings as to what contemporary Odinists believe and do. Nothing of substance in
my argument actually hangs on James’s desired religious group being specifically
‘Odinist’, and I apologise to any contemporary Odinists who feel this example
misrepresents their religion. I am confident, however, that this hypothetical
example is perfectly realistic in its essentials.
15 The project is to live in accordance with the qualities of the divine force, and
James does not think this force is ultimately male or female, or that the total-
ity of its qualities are in some sense more male than female.
16 Nussbaum, ‘Plea for difficulty’, p. 114. This conclusion also seems consistent
with what John Rawls says about the relationship between ‘principles of politi-
cal justice’ and associational life: ‘. . . liberal principles of political justice do not
require ecclesiastical governance to be democratic . . . nor need the benefits
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attached to a church’s hierarchy of offices satisfy a specified distributive prin-
ciple . . . the principles of political justice do not apply to the internal life of the
church, nor is it desirable, or consistent with liberty of conscience of freedom
of association, that they should’ (italics added). See J. Rawls, ‘The idea of public
reason revisited’, in J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1999), pp. 129–80, at p. 158.
17 I have explicitly considered only the case of sexual discrimination for the priest-
hood, but I believe similar considerations to those advanced above would also
allow for racial discrimination where this has a basis in the religious associa-
tion’s belief system.
18 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter Day Saints v. Amos
(483 U.S. 327 [1987]).
19 The Supreme Court did not determine that religious associations have a right
to discriminate of this kind guaranteed by the US constitution (as part of 
the right of ‘free exercise’ of religion guaranteed under the First Amendment).
The right to discriminate is based on the exemption to anti-discrimination laws
that Congress granted (specifically, the Section 702 exemption to Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended by Congress in 1972), and the 
Supreme Court held that this Congressionally crafted exemption was not 
unconstitutional.
20 See Rosenblum, ‘Amos’, pp. 183–7, and Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 167.
21 See Rosenblum, ‘Amos’, p. 186.
22 The European Union’s recent anti-discrimination framework directive seems to
be groping at such a principle when it says that discrimination on grounds 
of religion by religious associations is admitted specifically ‘for the particular
occupational activities within those organizations which are directly and 
essentially related to religion or belief’, and where ‘the nature of these acti-
vities or the context in which they are carried out’ are such that ‘a person’s reli-
gion or belief constitute a genuine occupational requirement.’ See Article 4,
Council Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in em-
ployment and occupation (presented by the Commission pursuant to Article 
250 (2) of the EC-Treaty), available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/dat/2000/en_500PC0652.html.
23 Perhaps, it would be more exact to say that an essentially religious activity 
is one the context of which necessarily includes the religious. For a given
worshipper, the activity of worship could have other meanings and purposes, to
do for example with friendship and social life. But if someone attends rituals 
of worship only for these non-religious reasons, I would question whether 
what they are doing is in fact worship.
24 This version of the centrality principle is suggested by Nancy Rosenblum in her
discussion of the Supreme Court’s arguments in Amos. See ‘Amos’, pp. 174–6.
25 See B. Bagni, ‘Discrimination in the name of the Lord: a critical evaluation of
discrimination by religious organizations’, Columbia Law Review, 79 (1979)
1514–49.
26 Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corporation (494 F2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974)). See Bagni,
‘Discrimination’, p. 1535; Rosenblum, ‘Amos’, p. 169.
27 Rutherford, ‘Equality’, pp. 1056–7.
28 Or to explain legitimate, non-religious grounds for a decision, for instance
neglect of duties. It might be said that we should not insist on bringing Church
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employees into state tribunals if we are satisfied that the Church itself has 
sufficiently fair internal appeals processes. But could we be sure these processes
would be sufficiently fair and impartial? Note that even if a state tribunal finds
against a Church in such a case, this need not entail Church members being
lumbered with a cleric they do not want. The Church can be required to pay
compensation instead.
29 See P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997); and Q. Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
30 This point also features in Rutherford’s argument against permitting sexual
discrimination in employment, including appointments to the priesthood. See
Rutherford, ‘Equality’, pp. 1087–9.
31 See Cohen, ‘Freedom of expression’, especially pp. 198–9.
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Education to toleration: 
some philosophical obstacles 
and their resolution
David Heyd
Toleration as a perceptual shift of perspectives
Moral education has played a central role in all major ethical systems of
thought from Aristotle to Kant, from the Torah to socialist ideology. Pro-
viding the young with moral education is particularly tricky, since moral
judgement, and even more so moral behaviour, does not come naturally to
human beings. The incorporation of moral values and norms requires a 
distinctive effort and often calls for overcoming natural inclinations and
inborn tendencies. The main business of moral education in its traditional
form has been the transmission of a set of principles of conduct, forms of
judgement, beliefs and sensibilities deemed by the older generation appro-
priate, even necessary, for its successors. However, with the rise of liberal
culture, moral education has become suspect, and its main tenets are often
seen now as incompatible with the overall normative scepticism character-
istic of this culture. The very right to educate, particularly in the realm of
values, has become the object of critical examination. What qualifies
parents or the state to decide the values and moral preferences of children
and youth? Once moral objectivism or absolutism is abandoned, the
grounds for the paternalistic inculcation of moral principles become shaky.
It is therefore typical of contemporary liberal attitude, both on the family
level and that of schooling, to reject the traditional, ‘rich’ pattern of moral
education. First-order virtues, principles, character traits and values are
only cautiously suggested to the child or adolescent, usually as options in
a wide repertoire of partly competing values and principles. The traditional
commitment to such first-order moral values is characteristically replaced
by the dominant effort to promote second-order values, most conspicuously
autonomy, critical thinking, respect and tolerance. Moral training is accord-
ingly seen primarily in terms of the capacity to make meaningful choices 
in one’s life (self-critical exercise of autonomy), on the one hand, and the
ability to live side by side with people who have different, often incompat-
ible, values and life styles from our own (respect and tolerance), on the
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other. Beyond the implementation of the fundamental norms of social
behaviour, the principal goal of moral education in liberal society is thus
the creation of conditions for dealing with the absence of common 
standards and a shared commitment to the good in society.
To our liberal sensibility implanting the value of autonomy and tolerance
seems to be a more minimal and hence an easier task than creating an all-
round moral personality. However, there are particular difficulties, both
conceptual and practical, in liberal education, and there is a strong analogy
between the difficulties involved in teaching people to be autonomous and
bringing them up on the idea of tolerance. The present chapter will focus
on the problems of education to toleration. Its aim is primarily philosophi-
cal, that is, to expose the elusive nature of the very idea of toleration and
its implications in education and to discuss some psychological and practi-
cal obstacles in educating the young to adopt a tolerant attitude to others.
The fundamental theoretical difficulty I am thinking of is associated with
the well-known ‘paradox of toleration’. Strictly speaking, tolerance is the
attitude of restraint in responding to morally wrong beliefs and practices.
Furthermore, as some philosophers insist, the ‘nuclear’ concept of tolerance
is applicable only in situations in which the beliefs and practices are held
as really, that is objectively, wrong, not only subjectively resisted or detested
by the tolerant subject.1 Put bluntly, the principle of tolerance calls upon
us to tolerate the intolerable. Tolerant forbearance from a negative response
stands in direct conflict with the judgement that the tolerated belief or prac-
tice is morally repugnant, obnoxious or wrong. How can we justify the
abstention from acting against moral wrongs? And when we come to the
sphere of education, how can we hope to raise a child to become a person
committed to moral values, yet at the same time willing to tolerate their
infringement?
One way to avoid the paradox of toleration is to relax the stringent con-
ditions in the definition of the concept itself. Thus, toleration would char-
acterise restraint in our response to beliefs and practices that we hold to be
legitimate even though contrary to our own views. Such a concept of tol-
erance is typical of value pluralism: we refrain from persecuting other reli-
gions, from hindering the life plans that look to us wasteful and silly, or
from trying to convince people that their aesthetic tastes are cheap, since
we recognise them as legitimate even if wrong in our eyes or lacking in
value. Pluralism has many versions: there is moral pluralism of the kind
Isaiah Berlin (probably on the basis of J. S. Mill’s view) has eloquently advo-
cated; there is religious pluralism of the type developed in Locke’s famous
Letters on Toleration, according to which even if there is religious truth it
cannot be established with certainty, let alone enforced on those who do
not accept it; there is the pluralism of tastes and preferences that belongs
to the aesthetic and personal realm to which our moral values are conflated.
But what is common to all these versions is that the toleration they call for
is always justified by some form of denial or weakening of the objective
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moral wrongness of the tolerated belief or conduct. Educating people to
realise the plurality of values and preferences and teaching them to respond
in a gentle manner to differences is certainly of much value; but it does not
directly address the core of the paradox of toleration.2 The difficult cases
of toleration relate to beliefs and values that we know to be morally and
objectively false or even dangerous. The inculcation of a pluralist view calls
for the development of equanimity or even indifference in our response to
other views and life styles, or at least of a detached curiosity. Toleration,
on the other hand, is necessarily concerned with suffering; it has a price;
toleration can never arise out of apathy.
Another way to relax the conditions of toleration is by focusing on 
its pragmatic nature. Tolerance, according to this approach, is primarily a
political virtue. It brings peace and secures social co-existence in a society
that is split in its moral and religious conceptions. Much of the early history
of toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries appealed to this
concept of toleration as compromise. We are willing to put aside our com-
mitment to our moral beliefs, not because we think there are other legiti-
mate options, but because we know there is no other way to maintain social
stability. The call for mutual toleration between orthodox and secular Jews
in Israel is typically guided by this idea of mutual concession rather than
by that of mutual recognition.3 And again, there is nothing wrong in such
a political principle of pragmatic reconciliation. However, it again does not
capture the core idea of toleration. Furthermore, as an educational ideal,
compromise misses an important dimension in our relation to those who
are seriously different from us, since by its nature it is guided by ad hoc
considerations of relative power and by circumstantial social goals that
justify the concessions involved in every compromise. The principle of tol-
eration we are trying to articulate is a typically principled attitude, a virtue
that is not based on epistemological or pragmatic considerations that are
by definition contingent.4
I therefore suggest focusing on toleration as a principled forbearance
from a negative interference in beliefs and actions that are thought of as
(objectively) morally objectionable. Tolerated phenomena lie between that
which should never be tolerated (violence or cruelty) and that which should
not be objected to in the first place (racial differences or sexual inclina-
tions). My own suggestion as to how to conceptualise and justify tolera-
tion might be called perceptual.5 According to this view, toleration involves
a perceptual shift in the way we look at a situation. Roughly speaking, we
can either turn our attention to the belief or act in question and judge them
on their merit, that is impersonally; or, alternatively, we can focus on the
subject of the belief or the agent of the action and judge them as holding
the belief or acting on their values, that is to say personally. I would like
to claim that the two perspectives of judgement are separate, irreducible
and often mutually exclusive. The perceptual shift from one perspective to
the other may be compared to the Gestalt switch of the rabbit–duck type.
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One can choose to see either a rabbit or a duck, but never both at once.
One is usually inclined to see the one, but can train oneself or make an
effort to see the other. Neither image is more valid or true than the other.
Furthermore, as in a Gestalt shift, there is no direct balancing of reasons
of the two kinds that makes one perspective superior to the other – only a
general, second-order reason to switch from one point of view to the other.
Now, toleration means the shift from the impersonal perspective to the
personal. Rather than judging the beliefs or actions in themselves, the tol-
erant party is considering the subject or agent behind them, the way the
beliefs were formed, the manner in which they cohere together in a system
of beliefs or constitute a life plan of an individual. According to this per-
sonal analysis, both the subject and the object of toleration must be human
beings. Consequently, the state (at least in the modern, impersonal con-
ception) cannot be said (strictly speaking) to be tolerant. It can be just and
neutral, but it does not suffer or restrain itself from acting on what it deems
right and just. Similarly, we tolerate people but not actions and opinions
(despite ordinary parlance).
It is thus natural that most (though by no means all) accounts of tolera-
tion as a principled attitude refer to autonomy and respect as the ultimate
grounds for tolerant restraint:6 these are in the terms I am suggesting the
justification for the intentional abandonment of the judgemental perspec-
tive of beliefs and actions as such. Unlike the rabbit–duck case, the two
competing perspectives are not symmetrical. At least in some circumstances,
there are good moral reasons for adopting the personal view. Many philoso-
phers appeal to personal autonomy as the ultimate basis for the superior-
ity of the personal to the impersonal perspective. Another view, which has
received only little attention in the literature on toleration, is viewing it as
supererogatory.7 But in any case, the common underlying reason for switch-
ing to the personal point of view is that beyond our interest in truth and
goodness in the abstract, we are often more interested in the way these are
achieved and sustained by actual human beings. The validity of beliefs and
values may be judged independently of their subjects, but their value for us
is dependent on the way they cohere in a particular system of beliefs, the
process by which they were acquired, the degree to which their subjects are
committed to them. These are issues, to which much of the literature on
toleration is devoted, but which lie beyond the scope of the present chapter.
Our concern here is educational.
By separating two incompatible perspectives, the perceptual model 
suggested here may solve the conceptual paradox of toleration. There is no
contradiction between judging an action as wrong and yet appreciating or
respecting its agent (and of course no contradiction between loathing a
person and yet at the same time judging one of his actions as right and just).
But this does not diminish the difficulties in training people to acquire the
ability to make the right shift in the right circumstances. For instance, we
know that, in the realm of science, the impersonal perspective is the correct
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one, and that judging scientific statements about the world in terms of the
history of their formation in the subject holding them or in terms of the
way they fit with other beliefs of that subject is a fallacy (as, for instance,
in the case of ad hominem arguments). Similarly, court judges are usually
called to judge the case brought before them on its merits, that is, in imper-
sonal terms; their job is exactly to decide whether an action was right 
or wrong, legal or illegal. However, psychologists are usually expected to
adopt the personal point of view, to turn their attention away (even when
it takes a special effort) from the inclination to judge the substantive worth
of a person’s behaviour. Similarly, in the moral sphere, forgiveness is a
typical example in which we turn a blind eye to the insulting or offensive
act itself and focus on the character of the agent, the previous friendly rela-
tions with her and her repentance for the wrong act.8 Toleration belongs to
this category of actions, in which the personal autonomy and the respect
for the individual forming a meaningful life for herself are the grounds for
the shift of attention from the judgemental, impersonal perspective to the
personal.
It should, however, be noted that the ability to keep agent separate from
deeds may come under particular strain when a good deal of the agent’s
actions are wrong or some of her actions are extremely repugnant. For the
identity of agents is to a large extent dependent on their actions. Thus, we
may forgive or tolerate a friend’s misbehaviour as long as there remains
enough in her character and record to justify the friendship. But once the
behaviour reflects a major change in personality (for example, the person
becoming a racist, a child abuser, etc.), it is no more the ‘same’ person with
whom we had a relationship of friendship. This is exactly where the sepa-
rability of agent from action becomes impossible and we refer to the wrong
action as ‘unforgivable’ or ‘intolerable’.
The difficulties in inculcating toleration in children
Children find such a separation of the personal from the impersonal diffi-
cult. On the one hand, they tend to view individual persons as constituted
by their particular actions and beliefs; on the other hand, they judge the
validity of beliefs and actions in terms of their attitude towards the indi-
vidual holding them. Thus, children are even more prone than adults to ad
hominem arguments or to arguments from authority. Accordingly, they are
less capable both of impersonal objective judgement and of forgiveness and
tolerance. This double deficiency defines the challenge of moral education
in general and education to toleration in particular. Moral education aims
to instil three capacities: first, the capacity to make normative judgements
about beliefs and practices in abstracto; secondly, the capacity to relate 
to moral agents independently of their particular views or conduct; and
thirdly, the capacity to distinguish between the contexts in which each of
these perspectives should be adopted. Much of the literature on moral edu-
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cation deals with the development of the moral judgement of the child –
that is to say, with the first perspective. Children gradually learn to detach
the evaluation of states of affairs (typically, distributions) from the natural
first-person bias. By that they internalise the idea of justice and fairness (in
a way that is analogous, as Piaget has taught us, to the acquisition of sym-
metrical thinking in scientific matters, which is equally ‘impersonal’). The
inculcation of the second, ‘personal’ perspective is discussed much less.
How do we educate people to become forgiving, respectful and tolerant?
While the self-regarding second-order value of autonomy is easy for the
child to adopt owing to its egocentric nature, the ability to see the other as
the subject of such autonomy takes more cognitive and emotional effort. 
It calls for an attitude that is potentially incompatible both with the child’s
first-order beliefs of what is right and wrong and with her self-centred 
interests.
The widespread strategy of turning the offended child’s attention to the
intention or the motive of the offender is a step in the direction of the sep-
aration of person from action. ‘He did not mean what he said’, or ‘he only
wanted to help you’ are surely effective means of training the child to see
beyond the wrongness of the action itself. However, this is still not implant-
ing the virtue of toleration. For these are cases that are conceptually more
similar to understanding, excusing, and condoning. These are attitudes that
call for a change in one’s judgement of the action itself in the light of a
broader view of its circumstances (most ethical theories consider the inten-
tion or motive of the action as at least partly relevant to its moral status).
Tolerance, in the nuclear sense I am trying to examine here, implies a more
radical separation. It requires the complete abandonment of the judgemen-
tal perspective, turning a blind eye to a wrong that cannot be mitigated,
condoned or excused, but must simply be put aside in favour of an assess-
ment of the individual who happens sincerely to believe otherwise. Toler-
ance is usually costly: as its etymology intimates, it involves ‘suffering’.9
How does this analysis of the education to toleration work on the politi-
cal plane, that which transcends responses on the individual level? Struc-
turally, political toleration is associated with the same tension between the
commitment of people to their own cultural heritage and identity and their
recognition of the legitimacy, even the inherent value, of other cultures.
Susan Mendus, following Bernard Williams, argues that toleration in a
multicultural society is based neither on the idea of the autonomy of other
groups to form their own culture (since the value of autonomy is itself con-
troversial), nor on some notion of cultural relativism. The very comparison
between our culture and that of others is not the issue. At most the under-
standing and ‘recognition’ of other cultures may serve as a source for under-
standing the limits of justification of our own culture.10 I wish to argue that
the tension between loyalty to cultural identity and commitment to demo-
cratic citizenship, highlighted by Mendus, is analogous to that between my
own concept of truth and value and my respect for other people. Political
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toleration thus requires of the child the same feat of abstraction or separa-
tion of two incomparable points of view, that is to say, the adoption of a
second-order reason for switching from the substantive identification with
my group’s values to the political recognition of the idea of equal citizen-
ship, group autonomy, or irreducible plurality of ways of life that can never
claim to have ultimate justification as the best or the superior.
A serious problem in the education to tolerance is that the educational
relationship itself is often intolerant in its very nature. Even in liberal edu-
cation based on the ideal of respect for the child, the educator’s role is not
a model of toleration. This model has to be imported from other contexts
to which the child is exposed. We tolerate other people whose views and
practices we find objectionable because we respect their autonomy – that
is their capacity and right to make choices and live by them. However, with
our children, or pupils, our principal aim is to create this capacity, to form
an autonomous personality, and this involves the exercise of paternalistic
authority. Exactly because we care so much and feel responsible for their
future we do not tolerate the wrong beliefs and conduct of our children or
students. An extreme, limiting case, which explains why tolerance is not the
attitude we show to the people particularly close to us, is our attitude to
ourselves: the reason we cannot be said to tolerate ourselves, is that the sep-
aration of action from agent, belief from subject, cannot be reflexively
applied. We simply cannot view ourselves as distinct from what we do. The
intimate proximity of personhood to its particular manifestation in action
and belief is most conspicuous in first-person contexts. But it is also typical
of the way young children view others. However, though the idea of for-
giving or tolerating oneself is at most metaphorical, forgiving and tolerat-
ing others is a great virtue on which we try to bring up the young.
So even if the conceptual analysis of toleration I am suggesting here
resolves the paradox of toleration, the psychological obstacles to creating
a tolerant inclination in both children and adults are serious. In the same
way as the personal and impersonal perspectives are mutually exclusive, so
are the judgemental and the tolerant frames of mind or propensities. Even
though moral pluralism or scepticism is not equivalent to toleration, as we
have argued, they psychologically fit a tolerant attitude, or at least are of
no hindrance to such an attitude. But there is a way in which even liberal
education aims at the creation of individuals who are strongly committed
to some of their beliefs and norms, who are convinced of the superiority of
those values that constitute their fundamental life projects. As modern lib-
erals like Joseph Raz have shown, the exercise of autonomy presupposes
that the options for choice are genuinely valuable or good.11 In other words,
the goal of moral education consists primarily of the creation of a distinct
moral profile. But the deeper the commitment of a person to a set of norms,
the more dogmatic she will tend to become and the less tolerant to com-
peting points of view. There is a point in both the accusations of liberals
and those of religious fundamentalists: the one group is psychologically
202 Education to toleration: some philosophical obstacles resolved
MCK11  1/10/2003  10:35 AM  Page 202
inclined to dogmatic and intolerant attitudes; the other to scepticism, plu-
ralism, and indifference. But of course there is no symmetry between the
two: non-liberal systems of values can do without the principle of tolera-
tion; they advocate the principle of compromise in its stead, and they do
so without compromising in a deep sense their commitment to their nor-
mative principles. Yet liberals must incorporate a principled, second-order
virtue of toleration, which is a more difficult task, since it conflicts with
their first-order moral convictions.
Toleration versus other second-order responses
Education to toleration is just one part in the general teaching of second-
order moral principles, such as punishment, forgiveness, and compromise,
that is to say the correct response to the violation of first-order principles
or norms. However, just punishment is itself part of the system of justice
and hence can be taught fairly easily (although there is always the need to
overcome the natural tendency to vindictive over-punishment, as Locke has
taught us). Compromise is incompatible with a commitment to the right
solution, but every child naturally adopts it, because reality forces upon
everybody the realisation of the limits of one’s power as well as the risk of
ongoing rivalry and conflict. Furthermore, sheer fatigue from conflict and
war may lead to that change of attitude that is associated with compromise
in the first stage and toleration in the second. This was the historical case
in the aftermath of the bloodshed of the wars of religion in the early modern
period,12 but can also explain the development of the capacity to tolerate
in children.
Toleration is, however, trickier than compromise, since it requires the
development of a sense of an independent value – that of respect for others.
Education to toleration consists in the formation of a capacity to see beliefs
and actions not in the light of some impersonally validating criteria but as
parts in a coherent whole, constituting a moral personality or character and
being the consequence of a sincere attempt to achieve meaning and truth.
It takes moral imagination, the ability to see the other from her point of
view. And unlike the development of the sense of justice, or the realisation
of the inevitability of compromise, which are universal and independent 
of any specific moral view, toleration is a ‘local’, culture-dependent value,
which can be given meaning only within a liberal morality. There is nothing
in the nature of society or human nature as such which makes toleration
necessary.
It should be noted that less restrictive analyses of toleration, such as Peter
Gardner’s, view it as an attitude that does not necessarily involve dislike or
disapproval by the tolerator. Toleration, according to these accounts, means
more openness, less certainty about one’s beliefs, the willingness to delib-
erate and change one’s opinions. People can be tolerant towards practices
and beliefs that they themselves neither disapprove of nor dislike, but that
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others would be likely to disapprove of or dislike.13 Consequently, educa-
tion to toleration requires the development of open-mindedness, critical
scepticism, the power of deliberation, and the willingness to change one’s
attitude. This concept of toleration eschews the difficulty of the more
restrictive concept, according to which toleration means the commitment
to a particular opinion that excludes the tolerated one. Education to 
toleration, in this case, does not imply supporting children’s biases and 
prejudices.14
Gardner’s conception of toleration definitely accords with everyday usage
of the term. However, it does not capture the most difficult and demand-
ing contexts in which toleration is called for (and considered as intrinsically
valuable). It tends to blur the boundaries between tolerance, on the one
hand, and open-mindedness, critical scepticism and moderate judgement,
on the other. It does not do justice to the suffering of the tolerator, the price
of restraint and the effort involved in it. And although it considers toler-
ance and respect as compatible, it does not distinguish between the toler-
ance and respect shown to the person and the disapproval and lack of
respect for the belief or practice as such.
In 1998, the Israeli Ministry of Education officially declared the school
year as that of ‘the right to self-respect and the duty to respect’. The aim
was surely political, and the basic idea was to ease the social and ideolog-
ical tensions following the trauma of Rabin’s assassination. But I believe
that there was something philosophically correct in the juxtaposition of the
right to self-respect (or to be respected) and the duty to respect others. Ulti-
mately, the source of our awareness of the intrinsic value of other people’s
lives and personalities grows out of our sense of the infinite (immeasurable)
value of our life to ourselves! This is not only in line with the Kantian her-
itage in ethical theory but also the basic clue as to the educational means
for promoting a tolerant perception of moral differences. Even if I am con-
vinced that you are morally wrong in the way you are leading your life, I
can perceive the independent value of your personality analogically to the
intrinsic value that I ascribe to my own life. For I basically value my own
life and autonomy irrespective of the particular views I hold or even the
actions that I take.
A similar projection of self-centred values to the way we view others
occurs in the education to autonomous choice. The separation of the per-
sonal from the impersonal is manifest in teaching the young that the way
in which beliefs and values are adopted is of no less importance than their
truth or validity. The educator’s intellectual effort in the inculcation of criti-
cal thinking and autonomous choice often constitutes a conscious temper-
ing of the pursuit of truth as such. Children and adults are called to
experiment with ideas even at the risk of error, since the experiment itself
is regarded as having an intrinsic value. Now, it is relatively easy for the
subject herself to recognise the value of such authenticity, free choice, or
critical reflection. But symmetrical thinking leads to the ascription of the
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same value to others. This is one of the main routes to toleration: patience
with other people’s mistakes, the moderation of the judgemental attitude,
or the capacity ‘to deliberate with equanimity’.15
And yet the transition from the duty to respect others to the ideal of
toleration is neither necessary nor morally neutral. Non-liberals can con-
sistently adopt the norm of respect and at the same time interpret it as fully
consistent with or even requiring of an intolerant interference in the lives
of those who happen to be wrong in their beliefs and values. Sincere pater-
nalistic concern for the welfare of heretics motivates many forms of reli-
gious intolerance. Only in the liberal understanding of respect does a
principled restraint, toleration, follow from the principle of respect. This is
a notion of respect that is constituted by the ultimate value of the subject’s
free choice and the relevance of the manner in which the beliefs are formed
in the subject. Therefore, education to toleration is possible, but only within
a general liberal framework. And even within that framework it is far from
easy, since it involves a schizophrenic, two-level view of the nature of moral
judgement, and the versatile capacity to switch from the one to the other
and to do so in the right circumstances.
Our philosophical analysis of the concept of toleration has demonstrated
that the concept is elusive. The pure concept turns out to have little con-
crete application, since the space between what should not be opposed to
begin with and what should not be tolerated is very narrow. Thus, we learn
that in most uses of the concept of tolerance what we really mean is either
compromise, or recognition of plurality, or even indifference. The notion
of tolerance is not only conceptually evasive; it is historically and psycho-
logically intermediary in nature, merely a stage between intolerant opposi-
tion and positive recognition. This conclusion is of a significant educational
import, since as a matter of fact we are justified in hoping that by the pro-
motion of the capacity to compromise, which we showed to be an easier
task, we gradually learn to tolerate others; and that by acquiring a toler-
ant disposition, we progressively move towards full recognition of at least
some of the opinions and practices of other people. Thus, through the
general capacity to separate subjects from their actions, human beings can
learn first to compromise, then to tolerate, and finally to fully respect and
accept other individuals.16
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